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Thesis Abstract 
The Feasibility of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) in Pakistan 
 
Due to increasing demographic pressures and the mismanagement of natural resources, 
Pakistan is experiencing a severe water crisis. The mismanagement of Pakistan’s water 
resources is linked to its legacy of colonialism. Failures to reign in the stranglehold of the 
rural elite or invest in transformative policies is leading to a downward spiral of poverty 
linked to environmental degradation (European Commission 2007). Despite having one of 
the lowest levels of water productivity in the world, Pakistan is rarely included in studies of 
IWRM. The frequent omission of Pakistan from case studies on water resources management 
has contributed to knowledge gaps on the potential for a more tailored forms of IWRM in 
countries containing semi-feudal setups and colonial based systems of water management. 
The research question for this thesis focuses on aspects of IWRM that can be tailored to 
Pakistan’s country context using the agricultural provinces of Punjab and Sindh as case 
studies.  
 
Due to the emphasis in this thesis on shifting away from universal approaches, a significant 
portion of the study analyses the type and causes of water problems and existing legislation 
for water resources management in Pakistan. Extensive field research is utilised to partially 
overcome identified gaps in IWRM literature. This field research is in the form of key 
informant interviews with government officials, an institutional assessment of Farmers 
Organisations and Water User Associations, and focus group discussions with farming 
communities.  
 
The study finds major flaws in Pakistan’s water agreements, funding systems, and 
institutional framework leading to operational problems. It finds that institutions created 
under participatory irrigation policies have made political alliances in order to function 
exacerbating biases in water allocations.  The study concludes that for IWRM to be effective, 
it must be accompanied by land redistribution to weaken the political power of landlords, 
legislative changes to improve the transparency of voting, improved regulations, strengthened 
enforcement, and greater clarity in water agreements.  Donor expectations on the role of 
women in irrigation management must also be more realistic if they are to be represented. 
The study finds that given the severity of current problems, if changes are not implemented, 
Pakistan will confront increasing political instability in the coming years. 
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Explanations 
Abiana/ hakaba Charges levied for surface irrigation water  
Alluvial plain Predominantly flat landform created by the sediment deposits 
from rivers over a long-time period 
Aquifer Underground water store/source within permeable rock or 
earth that sits beneath the water table, water can be extracted 
from aquifers using wells etc. 
Barani Rain-fed agricultural areas 
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and nutrients 
Potability Water fit for drinking, (drinking water may be referred to as 
potable water) 
Patwari Government accountant at the village level who maintains 
records and collects land taxes in rural areas 
Rabi crops Crops sown and harvested in the winter and spring season 
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River basin Land surface drained by rivers and its tributaries in the form 
of streams and creeks etc. 
Riparian Interface or banks between land and a river or stream 
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table/groundwater level is too high hindering agricultural 
activities 
Warabundi Systems of water allocation in Pakistan based on timeshare 
Water table Level underground water where soil is permanently saturated, 
the water table can rise and fall depending on rates of 
extraction and recharge from aquifers 
Upconing When overexploitation of the freshwater aquifer occurs in 
areas where there is underlain saltwater, the saltwater flows 
upwards contaminating freshwater wells 
	
 	
i. Introduction	
Since the 1970s, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has been promoted by 
international policymakers as a central means to address some of the most pressing questions 
we confront in water management in the 21st century. Having won global consensus, IWRM 
has the potential to produce marked change in the management of water resources globally. 
The potential impacts of such globally driven policies have been shown in the work produced 
under the Millennium Development Goals, Sustainable Development Goals, and the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. These global policies have shown that 
international consensus drives resource mobilisation and research as issues are pushed to the 
top of the global agenda. However, the negotiation and attainment of global consensus also 
comes at a cost in terms of generalisation and compromise. In the case of IWRM, significant 
criticism has been drawn from the loss of contextual solutions to geographies of water 
scarcity and the failure to account for social, political and economic conditions in its 
application.  
 
Much of the literature on IWRM is focused on theory and it is frequently acknowledged that 
few practical evaluations on its implementation completed to date (A. K. Biswas 2008). This 
thesis has been undertaken to help address this major gap in current literature on IWRM. This 
will specifically take the form of a country level case study from South Asia, a region 
confronting major problems in water management due to its rapidly rising population and 
massive agricultural sector. Pakistan has been selected for the country level case study due to 
its rapid rate of population growth contributing to severe constraints on its water resources 
and the paucity of research conducted on IWRM implementation in the country. Pakistan also 
has the lowest levels of water productivity in the world and parts of the country remain in the 
grip of its rural elite preventing social and economic development. 
 
This case study focuses on the evaluation of IWRM implementation in Pakistan. The 
overarching research question centres on which elements of the IWRM framework are 
appropriate for, and can be feasibly implemented in the Pakistan context, and how the 
framework can be adapted to facilitate its acceptance among both government and 
communities. The analysis of change processes rather than policy outcomes alone forms a 
critical section of this study. The analysis of key aspects of the change process are guided by 
5 questions, these are: 
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• What aspects of the IWRM framework are the most controversial to implement in 
countries containing semi-feudal relations? This question is related to power and 
institutional resistance. 
• What is the feasibility of setting up operational IWRM water management institutions 
in countries with traditionally dominant Irrigation Departments such as in Pakistan?  
• What is the realistic role of women in water management in male dominated 
societies?  
• Is IWRM financially feasible for heavily indebted countries and to what extent is 
political will lent to externally conceived and funded policies? 
• Are there conditions underwhich, the process of implementing IWRM have any 
negative consequences? 
 
Despite criticisms of IWRM being too abstract and a one-size-fits-all framework, it has been 
selected as the focus of this work due to its prominence in international platforms and 
funding it has been accorded. Due to the difficulties of implementing any type of policy 
change where power structures are potentially disrupted, IWRM is taken as an ideal that 
countries should move towards rather than an immediate goal. For this reason, more bottom-
up frameworks such as Wade’s Village Republics where resources are management entirely 
by resource users are not included in analysis (Wade 2008). This was also due to the holistic 
approach taken by this study and the fact that it is recognised that water management takes 
place at all administrative levels. For example, if a federal or provincial level administration 
decides to redirect water at the expense of entire villages or even districts, there is little 
effective action that can be taken by water users operating in highly centralised resource 
management setups. A strong advantage of looking at IWRM is that all administrative levels 
and the vertical and horizontal relationships between institutions are taken into account. 
 
 The mismanagement of Pakistan’s natural resources is linked to its legacy of colonialism 
that continues to hinder progress in the redistribution of resources, stronger regulations, and 
effective enforcement. Failures to reign in the stranglehold of the rural elite on water and land 
resources or to invest in implementing transformative policies is leading to a ‘downward 
spiral of poverty’ linked to environmental degradation (European Commission 2007). The 
impacts of resource mismanagement are exacerbated by the cumulative effects of climate 
change with the country experiencing longer periods of drought and higher volumes of 
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monsoon rains. These multiple and ingrained influences indicate that the management of 
Pakistan’s water resources needed urgent review. 
 
Until the late 1970s, policies on water management in Pakistan comprised models based on 
engineering approaches limiting the scope of research studies. This approach is epitomised in 
World Bank studies on the original and Revised Indus Basin Model conducted from 1976 and 
the linked Water Sector Investment Planning Study (World Bank 1990, World Bank 1984). 
More recent studies such as by Yu, et al. (2013) and Briscoe and Qamar (2006), conducted by 
the World Bank, also fail to link problems to ongoing political instability and the culture of 
resource monopolisation in the country. The 2005 Country Policy Strategy Paper by the 
European Commission to encourage the development of water resources in Pakistan’s 
province of Balochistan, further takes a technical approach to the analysis of water resources. 
The failure to include political institutions in the writing of this paper led to few 
recommendations being implemented (CPSP 2005). It is only in recent years, as the negative 
effects of investing in large scale immoveable infrastructure for water management have 
come under increasing criticism, that interest has grown in examining more innovative 
policies for the participatory management of water resources in Pakistan.  
 
In an endeavour to break from previous technocratic analyses, more independent studies 
conducted by Mustafa and Wrathall (2011), Qureshi and Hirashima (2007), Ballabh (2008), 
Bisht (2013), Cheema, Khan and Malik (2007), IWMI (2014), and a series of studies in 
Water International collated by Ringler and Anwar (2016) have began to combine elements 
of the political, technical, and socioeconomic analysis in their assessment of water resources 
management. More in-depth studies have also been conducted at the provincial level in the 
work of Haines (2013) looking into the evolution of water resources management in Punjab 
and by Perera (2003) and Palijo (2003) that focus on Sindh. However, there is still a gap only 
explored to some extent in the account of Palijo (2003), for analysis that links political 
motivations behind policy decisions with outcomes.  
 
The nature of problems confronted meant this review needed to cover a situation analysis of 
current water resources in Pakistan, water management policies and legislation implemented 
to date, water management institutions, and the measures that have been taken to address 
Pakistan’s water crisis. Reviewed legislation includes the 1960 Indus Water Agreement and 
1991 Water Apportionment Accord in terms of potential biases in these agreements and how 
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these affect cooperation. Given the strength of landlord power in Pakistan, a political 
economy analysis has been included linking the control of water resources to structures of 
power since independence. A further key related aspect investigated is whether the 
environmental ‘tipping point’ has been reached. This is in terms of whether space has been 
created for open debate on curtailing the power of vested interests in resource allocations. 
The political economy dimension is primarily utilised to show that approaches based solely 
on demand and supply are unrealistic within the context of a predatory state bureaucracy and 
hydraulic societies where water is a highly political tool.  
 
The two agricultural provinces of Punjab and Sindh are zoomed in on to collect detailed field 
research conducted over 2015. This research is predominantly utilised to evaluate the impact 
of investments in IWRM in Pakistan on institutional politics at the provincial and district 
levels and how this has affected agricultural communities. Further evaluated areas is the 
sustainability of participatory water management institutions. Information is collated from a 
series of key informant interviews with government officials working in the irrigation and 
agricultural sectors, focus group discussion with farming communities, and an institutional 
assessment of selected Farmers’ Organisations and Water User Associations (Khaal 
Panchayats) in Punjab. This field research contributes to information on the impacts of 
IWRM investments on government and community level institutions and on the lives of 
surrounding communities. 
1.1.1 Theoretical	framework	for	analysis	
Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework is frequently drawn upon as a theory to analyse 
policy change in many parts of this thesis. The Advocacy Coalition Framework is 
acknowledged to be one of the most influential approaches to the analysis of public policy 
emerging in the 1990s (Cairney 2014). This has been selected as a theoretical framework for 
the analysis of IWRM implementation and the environment for policy change in Pakistan due 
to its analysis of complex relationships. It is also useful for analysing the process of policy 
change in political environments such as Pakistan where a small number of power coalitions 
operate to control institutional decisions and policy outcomes. As Cairney (2014) highlights 
the framework also enables the analysis of how multiple actors operate around shared 
interests at different levels of government.  
The key aspects of the Advocacy Coalition Framework utilised are closely linked to several 
of the outlined research questions posed on IWRM in Pakistan. These specifically relate to: 
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the role of landlord-politician coalitions in creating institutional resistance to change, the role 
of new coalitions between landlords and government in the new institutional setup, and in 
addition to this, whether the tipping point has been reached for policy change to be accepted. 
This latter question explores the question of resistance further in terms of whether it has 
strengthened or been weakened by Pakistan’s growing water crisis. This is an aspect also 
discussed by Shah et al (2006) that supports the hypothesis that barriers to policy change will 
recede as the water crisis intensifies and the opportunity costs of not adapting mount. 	
 Methodology and Sources 
International studies undertaken by Rockström (2009) and revisited by Mekonnen and 
Hoesktra 2016, are initially drawn upon to set Pakistan’s resource problems within the wider 
context of the global water crisis. The global analysis of water scarcity demonstrates that the 
problem of water mismanagement is not isolated to Pakistan and that its redressal is part of a 
wider shift in mindsets and policies globally. This is emphasised by advocates of the IWRM 
approach such as Ray (2010), Merry (2008), Jeffrey and Geary (2006), and the GWP (2000) 
with papers taken from journals including Water International, Water Alternatives, IWRM, 
and Agriculture and Development. The host of international studies looking into the impacts 
of water mismanagement show this to be a long-standing problem both in the west and in 
former colonial countries guided into the same short-term thinking. These studies further 
show that former approaches to water management were primarily driven by a belief in 
man’s ability to control nature with little thought to long-term environmental consequences. 
 
For the analysis of water management in South Asia and more specifically Pakistan, studies 
are drawn upon that look into British involvement in the establishment of structures of water 
management before analysing policies adopted for water management post-independence. 
From the colonial period, sources include the Gazeteer for Sindh and Punjab which includes 
an analysis of provincial level profiling, legislative documents, and the account of Malcolm 
Darling and his observations on the impacts of British irrigation policy. Further information 
is taken from secondary sources including the work of Ray (2010) for the more regional 
analysis of water management, alongside studies by Huda (2005), Mohile (2005), and 
Sharma (2008) to draw comparisons with India and Bangladesh. Both countries are found to 
confront similar crisis situations in the face of demographic pressures and poor resource 
management. The works of Perera (2003), Ali (1988), and Palijo (2003) are utilised for 
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analysis that focuses more on Pakistan’s experience of water management pre-and post-
independence.  
 
Post-1947, primary sources are predominantly drawn from the Government of Pakistan, the 
Agriculture Department, and the World Bank. The work of Shah (2008) is predominantly 
used to look more into the potential for policies on sharing groundwater resources. The 
World Bank has published several research papers and books on the management of water 
resources in Pakistan since independence, more recently under Ahmed, Brooke and Kutcher 
(1990), Briscoe and Qamar (2006), and Yu et al (2013). Many sources published by the 
World Bank were obtained from its office in Islamabad and the Irrigation Department in 
Lahore.  
 
Further key studies are utilised to assess the political environments under which 
policymaking and water agreements took place. The literature utilised for this section is 
drawn from studies within journals on water governance, political analysis and commentary 
in newspapers, legislation on water management, government action plans, and UN reports. 
Prominent among these, are the works of Lieven (2012) focusing on the influence of political 
parties and landlords in Pakistan in which a number of interviews are conducted with key 
party officials, Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf (2010) and S. A. Khan (2015) that analyse policy 
motivations under the Musharraf military regime, contemporary newspapers such as Dawn, 
and again the work of Ali (1988), Haines (2013) and Palijo (2003) for more in-depth 
provincial analysis. These combined accounts enable a more complete multi-disciplinary 
analysis of the motivations, rationale, and environmental and socioeconomic consequences of 
Pakistan’s approach to water management.  
 
The integration of water and environmental management initiatives is in the early stages of 
development in Pakistan. The work of IWMI (2014), Ringler and Anwar (2016), and Kamal, 
Amir, and Mohtadullah (2012) are provisionally utilised to look into the potential for IWRM 
in Pakistan. These studies analyse, Pakistan’s previous and more recent experience of 
trialling aspects of IWRM in Punjab focusing on the impact of changes to the institutional 
setup and the creation of Farmer Organisations (FOs). However, these studies only briefly 
look into the changing role of the Irrigation Department and its response to investments in 
more grassroots institutions, a gap that is acknowledged. All studies further stress the need 
for further fieldwork analysing the impacts of the parallel structure of Provincial Irrigation 
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Authorities set up by the World Bank and the potential for the role of women in irrigation 
management. These areas are both explored in the field research section of this study. It is 
hoped that this thesis will form a critical contribution to the work conducted on the impacts 
IWRM in South Asian countries to date and the feasibility of further implementing this 
policy in the region. 
 
Section Outline 
Section 1: The first chapter provides an overview of the need to improve water management 
at all levels. The analysis first looks at drivers behind global patterns of water scarcity before 
moving onto explore challenges associated with water management in South Asia. A more 
detailed analysis of water scarcity, water management, and the impacts of climate change on 
water resources is then conducted for Pakistan. Water scarcity is explored in the context of 
the decreasing availability of freshwater against increased demand and long term biases in its 
distribution. Distributional biases are examined in relation to the link between resource 
management, power, and levels of socioeconomic development. In the final section of this 
chapter, the provinces of Sindh and Punjab are analysed as provincial level case studies.  
 
Section 2 aims to identify common challenges that prevent the better governance of 
transboundary surface and groundwater. This second chapter focuses on the legal and 
institutional frameworks and policies that broadly govern how water resources are managed. 
The analysis starts by exploring existing challenges in water legislation and frameworks 
focusing on the development of IWRM as an international water policy. The chapter then 
explores legislation for water resources management in South Asia looking in more detail at 
agreements between India and Pakistan. Emphasis is placed on finding means to strengthen 
regional cooperation given the shared river systems in South Asia. The analysis then focuses 
on Pakistan, its provincial level water agreements focusing on Sindh and Punjab, and the 
institutions that manage its water resources. The work undertaken in this chapter explores 
relevant theoretical frameworks for analysing progress in IWRM drawing on the advocacy 
coalition framework and institutional theory. The chapter is also utilised to identify gaps in 
the evaluation of IWRM at the country level.  
 
Section 3: The third chapter outlines the methodology for field research conducted in the 
provinces of Sindh and Punjab. It then moves into an analysis of coding from the key 
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informant interviews with government officials mapping out what are perceived to be key 
issues in the management of water resources. An institutional assessment is further carried 
out of local water institutions created under IWRM policy in central Punjab. This assessment 
is utilised to decipher the sustainability of institutions working under the policy of 
participatory irrigation management and their relationship with local government. The 
chapter closes with an analysis of focus group discussons conducted with agricultural 
communities in Sindh and Punjab analysing the impacts of changes in government policy and 
cuts to funding on farmers.  Analysis from focus groups is further utilised to explore the 
potential for cooperation between service users and government. The data is used to explore 
perceptions of the current system of water management and how it can be improved. Field 
based studies on the effects of poor water management on yield are rare in Pakistan (Abid, 
Schilling, et al. 2016), as such this section is expected to make an important contribution to 
research and in the design of evidence-based policy. 
 
Section 4: The fourth section comprises the conclusion which critically analyses whether and 
how the IWRM framework can be adapted for the Pakistan context. This section also outlines 
how the thesis contributes to closing the critical gaps in the literature on IWRM identified in 
section 3. The fourth section closes by forwarding recommendations on which IWRM 
principles may be feasible for application in Pakistan. These recommendations are broadly 
adapted from the existing IWRM framework. However, they re-shaped to take into account 
the political, cultural, and economic context of country conditions. These conditions include 
the realistic scope for participation in irrigation management for politically weak farmers, the 
accepted role of women in society, the continued dominance of landlords over the state 
bureaucracy, and the extent of water scarcity in the country. 
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Section	one:	Situation	analysis:	Water	scarcity,	its	causes,	and	consequences	
Chapter	1:	Analysing	the	global	water	crisis	
1.2 Global	Water	Resources	and	the	Growing	Crisis	in	Water	Scarcity	
Secure water supply forms the basis of central planning, food security, public health, energy, 
and industry. Due to its core role in economic development, the development and 
management of water resources is ‘chronologically locked’ with the development of the 
‘modern nation-state’ (Jeffrey and Gearey 2006). However, this critical resource is under 
threat from long overlooked problems associated with its management, increased demand, 
and climate change, the impacts of which are only just beginning to be understood. Problems 
with access to water, once viewed as a ‘third world’ problem, now affect parts of the 
Australia, and Europe, Iran, and the US. Regional tensions around shared basins are 
evidenced in the sharp rise in water-related conflicts since the 1990s (Ray 2010).  
 
The overconsumption of freshwater is depleting water resources faster than they can be 
replenished drying up aquifers, lowering river flow, and reducing lake volumes. Prominent 
examples of rivers that no longer reach the end of their courses, include the Yellow River in 
Northern China and the Colorado River in the Western US (Ray 2010, Postel 2000 cited in 
Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016). The Karakum canal project in the USSR that resulted in the 
desiccation of the Aral Sea is a further more direct example of the impacts of human agency 
on the depletion of water resources (Ray 2010). Between 1970 and 2000, the per capita 
availability of freshwater reduced by 40% globally (Ray 2010). The situation is at its worst in 
Africa, Asia, and South America, by 2000 respectively having 25.5%, 34.4%, and 27% of the 
freshwater resources they had in 1950 (Ray 2010).  
 
The steady increase in global water consumption from the second half of the twentieth 
century was in part driven by rapid population growth, now standing at 7.3 billion, (UNFPA 
2016, Ray 2010). Population is widely accepted as the strongest ‘driver of change in water 
availability’ with water consumption being approximately 1,300m3 per person (Rockström, et 
al. 2009, Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016). The correlation between population and water 
scarcity, among other variables, is shown by the fact that nearly half the global population 
affected by water scarcity live in India and China (Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016).  
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As demand for food has increased, land under irrigation has expanded. Irrigated agriculture is 
responsible for more than 70% of water withdrawals worldwide between 1970 and 2000 with 
land under irrigation increasing in the past 100 years from 50 million hectares (MH) to 250 
MH globally (Ray 2010 3) (Shiklomanov 1990 cited in Ray 2010 11-12). Freshwater use in 
agriculture also increased by 175% from 1970 to 2000 against showing sharp rises in water 
use in the latter half of the twentieth century (Shiklomanov 1990 cited in Ray 2010 11-12). 
The UN projects a further 50% to 100% increase in the use of irrigation water by 2025 
(World Meteorological Organisation 1997 cited in Ray 2010 80). Each percentage increase 
forces water to be re-directed from other ecosystems and uses having follow-on impacts on 
the environment, water storage capacity, and human welfare (Rockström, et al. 2009).  
 
Economic development is a second major driver of water scarcity with annual per capita 
water withdrawals three times greater in higher income countries at 1,167 CM compared to 
386 CM in developing countries (Ray 2010 63). Taken in conjunction with climate change, 
the variables of population, irrigated agriculture, and economic development combined with 
the mismanagement of water, are creating the largest threat to sustainable development and 
human life in this century (World Economic Forum 2015). In its 2015 annual risk report, the 
World Economic Forum cites water scarcity as the largest risk globally in terms of potential 
scale of impact. The growing scale of water shortages are further cited by the US Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence in 2012, to be a potential cause of state failure 
(Falkenmark 1998, Vorosmarty et al 2000, cited in Ray 2010 30).  
 
Mekonnen and Hoesktra (2016) define water scarce areas as locations where water use 
exceeds 100% of freshwater availability. This is calculated on the basis of 1,300m3 of water 
per capita per year for a standard diet of 3,000 kcals per capita per day (consisting of 20% 
animal protein and 80% plant based foods) (Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016). Taken on an 
annual basis, Mekonnen and Koesktra (2016) forward that there is enough freshwater at the 
global level to meet current demand. However, spatial and temporal variations in water 
availability and demand cause periodic water scarcity in specific parts of the world. This is in 
part due to the failure to store water efficiently. Accounting for seasonal fluctuations, 
Mekonnen and Koesktra (2016) estimate that two-thirds of the world’s population (4.0 billion 
people) experienced severe water scarcity for at least 1 month of every year from 1996 to 
2005 (Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016). This revision from previous estimates of 1.7 to 3.1 
billion people is based on the work of Rockström, et al. (2009). Researchers further 
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previously failed to account for ecosystem flow requirements and the impact of upstream 
activities on downstream basin areas (Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016).  
 
Mekonnen and Hoesktra (2016) further find that 1.8 to 2.9 billion people are affected by 
severe water scarcity for at least 4 to 6 months whilst 0.5 billion people are affected by water 
scarity for almost the entire year. From this latter figure, 180 million people live in India, 73 
million in Pakistan, 27 million in Egypt, 20 million in Mexico, 20 million in Saudi Arabia, 
and 18 million in Yemen (Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016). Mekonnen and Hoesktra (2016) 
find that the worst months for water scarcity are experienced in Africa, Mexico, parts of 
Central America, and in India from February to April/ May each year. At higher latitudes in 
the Western US, Southern Europe, and Northern China, they find water scarcity is 
experienced from March to June/July.  
 
See figure 1 for a depiction of annual average monthly freshwater scarcity for the period 
1996 to 2005. The map shows that countries within Africa, Latin America, South America, 
parts of Australia, and South Asia experience water scarcity for 12 months every year. 
 
Figure 1 Temporal and spatial map of global water stress (source: Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016) 
 
 
Table 1 Temporal analysis of water scarcity (source: Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016) 
Billions of people affected 
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No. 
mths 
per yr 
(n) 
Low 
water 
scarcity 
Moderate 
water 
scarcity 
Significant 
water 
scarcity 
Severe 
Water 
Scarcity 
Billions facing 
moderate or 
worse scarcity 
during n mths 
per yr  
Billions facing 
severe scarcity 
during at least n 
mths per yr 
0 0.54 4.98 5.22 2.07 6.04 6.04 
1 0.12 0.81 0.66 0.31 4.26 3.97 
2 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.37 3.95 3.66 
3 0.35 0.05 0.03 0.37 3.55 3.28 
4 0.33 0.01 0.001 0.59 3.15 2.91 
5 0.30 0 0 0.55 2.56 2.32 
6 0.33 0 0 0.27 2.09 1.78 
7 0.47 0 0 0.21 1.76 1.50 
8 0.59 0 0 0.29 1.46 1.30 
9 0.40 0 0 0.30 1.13 1.01 
10 0.40 0 0 0.12 0.78 0.71 
11 0.30 0 0 0.09 0.66 0.59 
12 1.78 0 0 0.50 0.54 0.50 
Total 6.04 6.04 6.04 6.04   
 
Table 2 further shows a projection of blue-green water shortages by region by 2050. The 
value taken by Rockström et al (2009) here is for chronic blue water shortages calculated as 
1,000m3 per capita per year making these figures more conservative than those of Mekonnen 
and Koesktra (2016). These figures do not take into account seasonal fluctuations and are 
used to show the relative depletion of blue-green water resources (surface to rainwater). 
Taking total water resources into account, even these conservative projections show an 
increase in the total number of people affected by water scarcity from 0.26 billion people in 
2000 to 3.35 billion people by 2050.  
 
Table 2 Regional populations facing water shortages between 2000 and projected for 2050 
(source: Rockström et al. 2009) 
Region 
Blue water 
shortage 2000 
Green-Blue 
shortage 2000 
Blue Shortage 
2050 
Green-Blue 
shortage 2050 
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(billion 
persons) 
(billion 
persons) 
(billion 
persons) 
(billion 
persons) 
Asia 2.76 0.26 5.46 3.35 
Europe 0.16 0 0.16 0.00081 
Africa 0.25 0.02 0.83 0.57 
North America 0 0 0.05 0.0052 
South America 0 0 0 0 
Oceania 0 0 0 0 
World Water 
Shortage 
3.17 0.27 6.50 3.93 
World 5.98 5.98 10.95 10.95 
 
1.3 The	unsustainable	management	of	water	resources	globally	
The mismanagement of water is epitomised by river basins such as the Ganges in India and 
Limpopo in South Africa where water consumption and its availability are ‘countercyclical’. 
In these areas, water consumption is highest during the periods when the availability of 
freshwater is lowest (Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016). The world’s most water scarce regions 
are those affected by the highest levels of variability in rainfall distribution; these areas tend 
to be those most affected by climate change (Rockström, et al. 2009, Mekonnen and Hoesktra 
2016). The mismanagement of water resources is increasing incidences of drought, the 
salinization of groundwater and soil, and land subsidence, resulting in smaller harvests, 
reduced incomes, and the loss of biodiversity (Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016).  
 
Molle (2006) dates modern ideas of river basin management to the belief in man’s ability to 
conquer nature, a concept widely propagated in the early nineteenth century (cited in Merrey 
2008). In the short term, this belief led to the emergence of farms in the desert, the 
transformation of colonies into major exporters of produce, and a reduction in flooding and 
famine (Molle 2006 cited in Merrey 2008, Mustafa and Wrathall 2011). Quick successes, 
alongside the development of hydroelectric power and groundwater extraction in the 1930s, 
pushed investment in the construction of multi-purpose dams (White 1998, Merrey 2008). 
Such projects, as carried out in the Ganges Basin, the Tennessee Basin, and the Loire Basin 
(Jacobs and Wescoat 1994 cited in Mustafa and Wrathall 2011) were modelled on the US 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The scale of these projects is demonstrated in the 
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findings of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration showing that the 
redistribution of water via dam construction has shifted the angle of the Earth’s axis by 
approximately 60cms since 1950. This factor has in turn altered ‘river morphology’, 
Chapman (1992) states that the Koshi river, that descends from the Himalayas into Bihar in 
India, has moved approximately 130kms west in the last 2000 years (cited in Ray 2010 29). 
 
Since the 1970s, there has been a backlash against the environmental impacts of programmes 
based on purely technical solutions to the management of water resources. Single sector 
water development or un-integrated water resources management is recognised today to have 
caused ‘irreversible’ environmental damages (Merrey 2008). A prominent example of the 
impacts of the TVA approach is seen in the example of the Colorado River with the Ogallala 
aquifer now threatened by contamination and overuse (Gleick 2004 cited in Ray 2010). The 
US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has found that one in every three lakes in the 
US, and nearly a quarter of the nation’s rivers, contain unsafe levels of pollution (cited in Ray 
2010). Lower water levels and slower flow caused by dams, has further led to the spread of 
gastrointestinal, skin, and parasitic diseases (Platt 2006) such as bilharzia, cholera, dengue, 
malaria, yellow fever, lymphatic filariasis, Japanese encephalitis, and the zika virus (Ray 
2010). The use of large scale water infrastructure has exacerbated the impacts of water 
variability. Using case studies from the US, Platt (2006) shows how interventions to control 
water in the form of levees, dams, and seawalls cumulatively increase annual flood losses 
with deforestation, coastal erosion, and soil erosion increasing sediment build up. In India, an 
estimated 50% of land was affected by soil degradation by the 1990s, and in Pakistan, this 
was reported to be 17% (Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific 1992 cited in 
Ray 2010 83).  
 
The cost-benefit analysis of the TVA has further been exposed as having been manipulated to 
justify its construction via the use of limited and vague criteria (Chander 1985 cited in Ray 
2010). White (1998) and Ray (2010), accuse evaluators of being purposefully misleading 
being critical of reports that focus on direct expenditures, land area, and revenue, rather than 
on impacts on environmental systems and poverty alleviation. Moreira and Poole (1993) 
further accuse planners of failing to adjust criteria to country-specific needs (cited in Ray 
2010). A prominent example is the failure of planners to take into account the duration of the 
dry season as experienced in India significantly affecting its hydro-capacity (Ray 2010). 
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Dharmadhikary (1995) states that such projects may become net consumers of energy rather 
than producers (cited in Ray 2010).  
 
Ray (2010) highlights a Nordic study which points to evidence of collusion with the 
formation of relationships among donors, consultants, and the dam construction industry. In 
turn, the weak decision-making powers of developing countries on how donor funding is 
spent is evidenced by the high proportion of tied loans and grants (Randel and German 1994 
cited in Ray 2010 112). Despite the shift in the 1960s to more sustainable approaches to 
water management in the west, donor countries and international financial institutions 
continued to promote mega-projects. Many industrialised countries and UN agencies 
supported the TVA approach to freshwater management until the 1980s (Ray 2010). This 
mentality is shown in the funding for the 1960 Indus Basin Development Project (IBDP) in 
Pakistan and the Helmand-Arghandab Valley Project in Afghanistan (Mustafa and Wrathall 
2011). In contrast, in the West, there has been a movement towards river restoration with the 
decommissioning of 500 dams in the US by 2002 and a freeze on dam construction in 
Scandinavia (Gleick 2000 cited in Ray 2010, 93). The eventual shift in donor mindsets is to 
some extent evidenced in the World Bank’s withdrawal from India’s Sardar Sarovar Dam 
Project (Doolette and Magrath 1990, cited in Ray 2010). 
 
Global inefficiencies in the management of water resources further relate to the failure to co-
manage the use of blue and green water leading to chronic shortages (less than 1,000m3 of 
water per capita per year), despite the fact that overall supply may be adequate at more than 
1,300m3 per capita per year (as calculated by Rockström et al. 2009). Rockström et al (2009) 
estimate that average savings of 60% could be made for projected additional water 
requirements for 2050 if a combined blue-green water approach was taken. However, 
policymakers have been slow to catch up with research resulting in unrealistic assumptions of 
water availability and demand.  
 
Despite mounting tensions around water scarcity, attention largely remains focused on supply 
rather than demand-side management. Variances in availability continue to be largely ignored 
in annual planning, and management is more influenced by politics than need. Researchers 
are questioning when the ‘tipping point’ will be reached and the long term consequences of 
ecological damages (Ray 2010). Mekonnen and Hoesktra (2016) state the bid to achieve 
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sustainable water management is ‘one of the most difficult and important challenges of this 
century’.   
1.4 The	Impact	of	Climate	Change	on	Water	Resources	Globally	
Over the last 100 years, global mean surface temperature has increased by 0.6o±0.2oC and is 
expected to rise to 5.8oC by 2100 leading to increased climate variability (IPCC 2001, cited 
in Mirza and Ahmad 2005). Sadoff and Muller (2009) calculate hydrological extremes to 
now constitute 90% of natural hazards globally (cited in Keskitalo 2013). Such extreme 
weather events have led to greater variations in supply levels resulting in more frequent 
periods of prolonged flooding and drought (Jeffrey and Gearey 2006, Third IPCC Report). In 
2010 alone, there were 295 hydrological related disasters that took approximately 170,000 
lives and caused billions in damages, the UN estimates that 90% of those affected were in 
developing countries(OFDA/CRED 2017, UNISDR 2016). Often dependent upon ‘high-risk, 
low return livelihood systems such as rain-fed agriculture’, socially, economically, and 
spatially marginalised populations are the most vulnerable to climate related shocks 
(Sivakumar n.d.).  
 
Globally, snowfields are no longer gathering the same volumes of mush snow (Ray 2010), an 
important source of irrigation in the Himalayas. Vapour concentration, expected to increase 
in South Asia by 5% to 20%, will further increase global temperatures (IPCC 2001, cited in 
Mirza and Ahmad 2005). Higher rates of evapotranspiration are already leading to increased 
moisture loss from soil extending periods of drought and increasing rates of 
evapotranspiration (Schindler 2003 cited in Ray 2010). Higher water temperatures will lower 
oxygen concentrations, increase the spread of algae blooms and waterborne parasites, and 
affect the reaction of chemical pollutants (IPCC 2001, cited in Mirza and Ahmad 2005). 
 
Due to the thermal expansion of seawater and the loss of sea ice, global mean sea level is 
projected to rise 9cm to 88cm by 2100 (IPCC 2001, cited in Mirza and Ahmad 2005, 8). With 
the melting of Greenland’s 3km thick ice sheets, sea level rise is now expected to swamp 
low-lying areas across the globe (Mirza and Ahmad 2005). This is leading to saline intrusion 
onto agricultural land destroying large portions of cropland globally. Such impacts are 
affecting vulnerable populations globally leading to a scarcity in drinking water, crop 
failures, associated malnutrition, and increased cases of waterborne diseases. 
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2 Chapter	two:	Water	resources	in	South	Asia	and	the	reasons	for	their	
depletion	
2.1 An	analysis	of	water	scarcity	in	South	Asia	
Holding approximately 1.8 billion people (World Bank 2017), South Asia is the most densely 
populated region in the world placing enormous pressure on its natural resources. India holds 
16% of the global population with access to only 4% of freshwater resources (Ray 2010, xx, 
16). Countries holding rapidly growing populations such as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan 
all confront problems of managing finite resources with increased water use (Ray 2010). The 
use of freshwater in Asia has more than doubled in the last 30 years (Ray 2010 65)2, see table 
4.  
Table 3 Actual and Projected Population in the Mainland Sub-Continental Countries 1980-2015 
(source World Bank 2000, cited in Ray 2010 17, Yu, et al. 2013) 
Country/ 
Region 
Population in Millions 
% growth 
in 
population 
1980-2015 
Average Annual 
Growth rate 
1980 2000 2015 1980-2000 2000-2015 
Pakistan 82.7 138.1 192.8 133.1 2.6 1.8 
India 689.3 1,015.9 1,227.9 78.7 2.0 1.3 
Bangladesh 85.4 131.1 167.7 96.4 2.1 1.6 
Nepal 14.6 23.0 31.1 113.0 2.3 2.0 
Total 870.0 1,308.1 1,619.5 86.1 - - 
World 4,429.3 6,057.3 7,101.2 60.3 1.6 1.1 
 
The FAO estimates that 1,570 CM is demanded per capita for a mixed animal and plant based 
diet of 2,700 calories per day (cited in Ray 2010 64). However, healthy diets are no longer 
supported by water resources with the per capita availability of freshwater in India declining 
from 5,177 cubic meters in 1951 to 1,820 by 2001 (Ray 2010 179). In part due to global 
warming, this figure is expected to drop to around 760 CM by 2050 (World Resources 1998 
cited in Ray 2010 66). In the World Water Development Report on the availability of 
freshwater, India ranked 133 out of 180 countries, Pakistan 80, and Nepal 78 (Ray 2010).  
 
                                                             
2 Although high, this is generally in line with other continents 
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Despite population size affecting water consumption, larger populations do not always 
directly translate into higher water consumption. The per capita consumption of water is 
dependent on multiple variables including: the urban to rural ratio with water use being 
higher in urban areas, levels of economic prosperity prompting changes in diet, 
environmental factors, water infrastructure, the use of water saving technologies, the use 
HYV crops, and levels of demand management. The per capita availability of freshwater 
water versus consumption is outlined in table 4. This shows Pakistan, followed by India, to 
have the lowest level of water productivity in South Asia. 
 
Table 4 Per capita availability of freshwater versus consumption in selected South Asian countries 
(source: Subba 2001, FAO 2002, cited in Mirza and Ahmed 2005 5, Gleick 2000, cited in Ray 2010 
65) 
Country Availability of 
water  
(per capita) 
Consumption 
(per capita) 
Agriculture 
% 
Industry 
% 
Domestic 
% 
Pakistan 3,250 1,269 97 1.5 1.5 
India 2,158 612 92 3 5 
Bangladesh 19,210 217 86 2 12 
Bhutan 120,405 13 54 10 36 
Nepal 7,623 154 99 0 1 
 
Agriculture remains a significant source of employment and the largest contributor to GDP in 
South Asia with 65% to 90% of people dependent on agriculture related livelihoods (Ray 
2010, 4). The availability of water resources significantly influences livelihood opportunities 
with the monsoon rains being of critical importance. However, with rainfall limited to 3-4 
months a year, blue water requirements are high in the irrigation sector (Mirza and Ahmad 
2005). The total arable land area in Pakistan is 22 MHA of which 74% is irrigated, in India 
arable land accounts for 188 MHA of which 38% is irrigated, and Bangladesh holds 7.4 
MHA of arable land of which 30% is irrigated (Biswas et al 2005). The scale of the 
agricultural sector in South Asia means that the irrigation infrastructure absorbs over 90% of 
South Asia’s water use.  
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From 1961-1997, land under irrigation increased by 93% globally compared to 108% in Asia 
(World Bank 2002 cited in Ray 2010 81). Asia is ahead of all other continents in its rate of 
water withdrawals being 61% in 2000 (Ray 2010). Ray (2010) states that the deepening water 
crisis in the region is the result of treating water as an ‘externality’. He further cites the Green 
Revolution as a prominent example that led to a tenfold increase in water use to produce the 
same quantity of crops. Rockström et al (2009) find that major improvements are required in 
irrigation efficiency to sustain a significant portion of livelihood activities.  
 
Due to the depletion of surface water, groundwater is growing in importance in South Asia 
being pumped out at a rate 70% faster than in the 1990s (Goldenberg 2014); this amounts to a 
loss of 54km3 of groundwater each year (Goldenberg 2014). This has occurred despite the 
UN pushing for the more sustainable use of groundwater since 1963 (UN 1989 cited in Ray 
2010). Industrial growth has contributed to this situation with high water use in industries 
such as mining, steel, fertilizers, petro-chemicals, paper, textiles, and cement, spreading 
across the region (Mirza and Ahmad 2005). Difficult trade-offs are required between water 
use for irrigation, industry, and domestic requirements to reach sustainable levels of water 
use (GWP 2000).  
 
Economic growth and the increased challenges confronted by farmers have increased rates of 
migration pushing the expansion of urban areas and peri-urban peripheral zones (Narain et al. 
2013, cited in Merrey et al 2016). Rapid rates of urbanisation in formally agricultural areas 
are expected to increase water and food scarcity (Rockström, et al. 2009). Due to the scale of 
water scarcity in South Asia, the onus has shifted to limiting expected impacts rather than on 
prevention. Zedillo (2007) states that it is imperative for policymakers to address issues 
related to water sharing at the regional level, the ‘failure to do so will be economically and 
environmentally disastrous for the - region’ (146, cited in Ray 2010).  
2.2 An	analysis	of	water	quality	in	South	Asia	
Water quality is declining in South Asian countries exacerbating to water scarcity. The 
decline in water quality has been caused by the poor disposal of industrial wastewater, the 
runoff of chemical fertilizers or nutrients encouraging algae growth, organic materials 
causing oxygen deficiency in water bodies, sewerage, aquifer mining, and saltwater intrusion 
(Mirza and Ahmad 2005). Pollution is made worse by low water flow reducing the dilution of 
chemicals. Bangladesh’s groundwater is further contaminated by arsenic, a problem that has 
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led to arsenicosis in an estimated 40,000 Bangladeshis (Shah and Lele 2011). Intense 
exposure can lead to skin, lung, kidney, and bladder cancer. Water-related diseases lead to 
the deaths of an estimated 14,000 to 30,000 people in developing countries daily (Ray 2010 
63).  
 
The over-exploitation of groundwater has led to secondary salinization via lower water 
levels, a factor that destroys fertile lands over time. The quantity of dissolved salts has in 
many places surpassed the ‘acceptable limits’ for potability (Jairath and Ballabh 2008, 3). 
Pakistan is one of the worst cases with around one fifth of irrigated land in the country saline 
(Rabbi and Ahmed 1997 cited in Biswas et al 2005). Seawater has further encroached into 
underground aquifers in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Western India due to lower water tables 
(Mirza and Ahmad 2005). The contamination and mismanagement of groundwater in South 
Asia is explored in detail by Shah (2007). 
2.3 The	persistence	of	early	post-war	approaches	to	water	management	in	
South	Asia	
Droughts and flooding have occurred for thousands of years in South Asia. The earliest 
available reports document the failure of rains in Madras in 1781-82 and 1806-7, Bombay in 
1801-3, Hyderabad in 1801-2, parts of northern India in 1803-4, 1812-14, Central India in 
1817-19, and Delhi in 1825-5 (Sharma 2008). Pre-colonial technology for the management of 
water resources included temporary earth dams, stone built underground reservoirs, step-
wells, and inundation canals. The British viewed indigenous practices as backward focusing 
early efforts on the construction of the first major canal in India, the 900-mile Ganga Canal, 
in 1854-55 (Sharma 2008). The administration continued to make enormous investments in 
irrigation infrastructure in the presidencies of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and later Sindh. By 
the mid-1890s, the net revenue from irrigation works in the region had increased by 62% 
(Perera 2003).  
 
By the mid-nineteenth century, efforts shifted to repair works and the renovation of non-
functioning canals with major works being reclassified as ‘productive’ or ‘protective’ from 
1882-83 (Sharma 2008, Perera 2003). Water management in the form of works based on 
engineered structures became the jurisdiction of the Military Board. Investment in major 
projects continued into the twentieth century with Punjab receiving nearly a third of capital 
expenditure (Sharma 2008).  
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The British approach to land and water management served to entrench inequalities as the 
loyalty of the local elite was bought via the recognition of the feudal land rights of zamindars 
(Stone cited in Sharma 2009). The fact that planning for water infrastructure at times ignored 
local needs is illustrated by significant local opposition to the construction of the Sharda 
Canal in Utter Pradesh in India (Sharma 2008). Incidents of drought and famine persisted 
with the Indian Famine Commission set up in 1898 and 1901. The emphasis of colonialism 
on the export economy is shown in the growth of cash crops such as wheat, sugarcane, and 
indigo over staple foods, worsening the impacts of drought on the rural poor. This was later 
encouraged by the development of high yielding varieties (HYVs) of crops for wheat and 
sugarcane requiring at least twice the amount of water of conventional crops (Sharma 2008). 
Food insecurity was to some extent alleviated by the development of railways and markets 
facilitating labour mobility and weakening the connection between drought and the famine 
(McAlpin 1983 cited in Sharma 2008).  
 
The introduction of use of tubewells further pushed the exploitation of water resources. 
Hydroelectricity was encouraged heightening competition for water resources in the dry 
season (Sharma 2008). The consistent focus on short-term gains and the monopolistic control 
of resources meant that economic development was achieved at the cost of environmental, 
social and political stability (Mustafa and Wrathall 2011). In the final years of colonial rule, 
the limitations of large-scale irrigation infrastructure were realised. Permanent and 
‘immovable structures’ such as barrages and weirs were in conflict with changing: cropping 
patterns, demand for irrigation water, patterns of population growth, and the physical 
geography of the region (Sharma 2008). This was compounded in the findings of the 1945 
Famine Commission recommending the development of more varied methods of irrigation 
comprising multi-purpose reservoirs, open wells, river pumping, tanks, private irrigation 
works, and rainwater harvesting (Famine Enquiry Commission, Final Report 1945, cited in 
Sharma 2008).   
 
By the end of British colonial rule, state monopoly over water resources had been established 
(Sharma 2008) leaving no room for local participation in water resources management. Under 
the influence of neo-colonial education and feudalism (Sengupta 1985 cited in Ray 2010), 
there has been little change in water policies post-independence. This is shown in India’s 
construction of 3,300 large dams since independence (Roy 1999 cited in Ray 2010 37). 
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Approaches to water resources management in South Asia remain focused on supply-side 
management (Ray 2010) with a complete separation of infrastructural design from social, 
political, and ecological context (Jairath and Ballabh 2008 5).   
 
Ray (2010) states that the continued use of dams to prevent flooding is unfeasible given the 
higher variability in climatic conditions in countries such as India where 80% of rainfall is 
received between June and September. Dams are frequently unable to withstand the pressure 
of the monsoon rains with increased incidences of flooding from 1960 to 1980 following the 
construction of the Hirakud Dam (Ray 2010). Prolonged dry seasons in South Asian 
countries make the use of dams and canals for hydro-electricity largely unprofitable (Ray 
2010 124). Dams further consume a considerable amount of land with the Bargi dam in India 
submerging approximately 81,000 hectares of agricultural and forest land to irrigate an area 
of 440,000 hectares, of which 3% is receiving irrigation water (Raman 1993, cited in Ray 
2010). Ray (2010) highlights that forced displacement due to dam construction has 
heightened political unrest and militancy in rural India, this has also occurred in the Punjab, 
Sindh, and Balochistan in Pakistan. 
 
Problems associated with canal infrastructure leading to the build-up of silt, drainage 
problems, waterlogging, and land degradation have limited the productivity of irrigated land 
since the 1980s (Ray 2010). The inability of countries such as Pakistan and India to construct 
adequate drainage has brought toxic alkali salts to the surface leading to widespread saline 
efflorescence (Sharma 2009). Even at the time of canal construction by the British there were 
warnings that the construction of large scale water infrastructure could turn thousands of 
hectares of cropland into a ‘salt covered desert’ (Whitcombe 1972 cited in Ray 2010 83). 
Chambers (1988) further highlights the poor yields in many canal-irrigated areas and the 
impacts of water taxes levied on farmers (cited in Ray 2010). Canal irrigation also swallows 
up land with between 5% to 13% of irrigated land in India diverted for reservoirs, canals and 
drainage infrastructure (McCully 1996 cited in Ray 2010 83). On average, 60-75% of water 
is lost due to evaporation, seepage, and runoff during its transportation in Indian canals (Ray 
2010 84). Due to these impacts and the more controlled use of water, Ray (2010) finds 
productivity in well-irrigated areas to be on average almost twice that of canal irrigated areas.  
 
Despite mounting environmental problems, South Asian countries remain loyal to colonial 
approaches to water resources management with an emphasis on increasing productivity at all 
 38 
costs (Mustafa and Wrathall 2011). There has been little in the way of strategic planning for 
the more integrated management of water resources (Wescoat, Halvorson and Mustafa 2000). 
Instead, it has been ‘business as usual’ with the addition of compensatory donor and 
government investments comprising capacity building in community based disaster risk 
management and skills training for alternative or supplementary livelihood activities. A 
radical re-thinking in approaches to water resources management is required if the scale of 
the water crisis is to be manageable. 
2.4 The	politics	of	resource	management	and	distribution	in	South	Asia	
There is a growing body of research that criticises approaches that calculate water scarcity 
based on the total quantum of water against population, formally spearheaded by the 
hydrologist Malin Falkenmark. These criticisms are centred on the ‘artificial averages’ 
created by such calculations that fail to account for variations in water scarcity experienced 
within the same geographical areas (Mirza and Ahmad 2005, Jairath and Ballabh 2008). This 
is discussed in the more mainstream work of Mekonnen and Hoesktra (2016) and Mirza and 
Ahmad (2005), particularly in relation to tail-end areas. However, mainstream research still 
fails to acknowledge the extent of ‘water-scarcity driven poverty’ caused by artificial water 
scarcity and discriminatory access to resources (Jairath and Ballabh 2008, Ballabh 2008).  
 
Since colonial times, natural resources have been used as a tool for political leverage in South 
Asia preventing their efficient management. The distribution of water resources has been 
historically unequal between and within countries (Jairath and Ballabh 2008). Understanding 
the role that water plays in politics and power relations, can guide in setting realistic 
reallocations and in the formulation of longer-term policy. It can also build the case for the 
decentralised management of resources towards local priorities (Jairath and Ballabh 2008).   
 
Research taking more of a political economy approach to the analysis of water resources, 
such as conducted by Jairath and Ballabh (2008) is reminiscent of the work of dependency 
theorists such as Gunder Frank (1966) and the Marxist geographer David Harvey (2009). 
These theorists highlight the major role played by discriminatory structures in creating and 
exacerbating resource scarcity, and hence ‘underdevelopment’. Such monopolies over key 
resources are evidenced by cases of drought occurring in water plenty conditions and floods 
being exacerbated by water being directed away from influential areas. Prominent examples 
of these cases are brought out in De Silva’s 2008 analysis of drought in Sri Lanka, Mainuddin 
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and Alam’s exploration of drought in Bangladesh, and the dual conditions of flooding and 
drought described in Sarwar’s research on Pakistan (De Silva 2008, Mainuddin and Alam 
2008, Sarwar 2008). These researchers state that prolonged problems of water scarcity are 
due to insufficient investment and an ‘inaccurate assessment of the problem’ resulting in 
ineffective solutions that exacerbate water scarcity (Jairath and Ballabh 2008, 32).  
 
Technical solutions in the form of civil engineering structures to augment supply are seen as 
ineffective in that they are ‘divorced from the social, political, and ecological contexts’ of 
their application and impacts (Jairath and Ballabh 2008, 5). These solutions fail to account 
for the problems that ‘asymmetric access’ to water resources generates (Jairath and Ballabh 
2008, i). Further misguided or politically motivated solutions are: price support for water-
intensive agriculture, the competitive displacement of dug wells with subsidised tubewells, 
subsidised machinery for larger farms, subsidised inputs for larger farms, subsidised 
electricity for water mining, and subsidised water for urban consumers.  
 
Jairath and Ballabh (2008) state that the continued focus on supply-side solutions to water 
scarcity is a consciously framed discourse on the part of elite /commercial farmers with 
investments driven ‘by political calculus’ rather than the need for livelihood security (24). 
Such supply-side solutions leave the existing political economy of distribution intact (Jairath 
and Ballabh 2008), with politically weak areas continuing to experience the denial of their 
water rights. This denial of water rights to surface water is epitomised in tail-end canal areas, 
further excluded from groundwater resources by those with the machinery to dig deeper 
(Jairath and Ballabh 2008). The strength of alliances between landlords and politicians means 
there are effectively no support systems for the politically weak (Jairath and Ballabh 2008, 
18). The exclusion of the poor by power coalitions of landlords-politicians, who also have the 
power to facilitate or block policy implementation, is a key aspect brought out in the analysis 
of IWRM implementation in Pakistan also. This approach to policy analysis draws heavily on 
the Advocacy Coalition framework. 
 
Jairath and Ballabh (2008) stress that ‘unequal power relations’ affecting access to resources 
are reproduced at each administrative level in a system that reinforces the exclusion of the 
majority to ensure power and water security for the few (Jairath and Ballabh 2008, 23). Such 
findings reinforce the 1966 work of Gunder Frank on The Development of 
Underdevelopment which outlines how the control of resources was transferred from colonial 
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powers to local elites in a system supported by politically influential individuals. The 
resistance of this system to change, made worse by increased competition over resources, 
needs to be factored into strategies for the effective management of water resources (Jairath 
and Ballabh 2008). Jairath and Ballabh (2008) further state that increased demand for water 
has been accompanied by a weakening of the institutions that oversee their protection. They 
call for a review of the politics around water resources, water policies, and technological and 
institutional investment decisions. These findings strongly support the research question 
posed in this study and highlight the need to review the impacts of donor driven policies that 
fail to take political context and power relations into account in policy implementation.  
2.5 The	impacts	of	climate	change	on	water	resources	in	South	Asia	
The major rivers in South 
Asia are the Ganges, 
Brahmaputra, and the 
Indus. These are 
Himalayan rivers formed 
by melting snow and 
glaciers and have a 
continuous flow 
throughout the year. 
During the dry season, up 
to 80% of water supply 
from these rivers comes 
from Himalayan glaciers 
with the Indus River being 
the most reliant on this water source (Subba 2001, cited in Mirza and Ahmed 2005). The 
Himalayan Rivers occupy 2.32 million km2 or 55% of basin areas; the remaining 1.90 million 
km2 or 45% of basin areas comprise rain-fed and non-perennial rivers (Mirza and Ahmad 
2005, 1).  
 
Figure 2 Map of Water Resources in Southeast Asia (source melt 
down in Tibet n.d.) 
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Table 5 Major rivers and their sources in South Asia (source: Central Water Commission 1987, 
cited in Mirza and Ahmad 2005)3 
River Origin 
Length 
(km) 
Riparian 
Countries 
Water 
Source  
Basin Area  
(106 km2) 
Indus 
Manasorovar, 
Tibet 
2,880 
Pakistan, 
India 
Snow + 
Rainfall 
0.47 
Brahmaputra 
Kailash Range, 
Tibet 
2,900 
India, 
Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, 
(China) 
Snow + 
Rainfall 
0.58 
Ganges Uttarkhashi, India 2,525 
India, 
Nepal, 
Bangladesh 
Snow + 
Rainfall 
1.086 
Maghna 
Manipur Hills, 
India 
900 India Rainfall 0.078 
Sabarmati 
Aravalli Hills, 
India 
371 India Rainfall 0.021 
Mahi Dhar, India 583 India Rainfall 0.034 
Narmada Amarkantak, India 1,312 India Rainfall 0.098 
Tapi Batul, India 724 India Rainfall 0.065 
Mahanadi Nazri Town, India 851 India Rainfall 0.14 
Godavari Nasik, India 1,465 India Rainfall 0.31 
Krishna 
Mahabaleshwar, 
India 
1,401 India Rainfall 0.29 
Pennar Kolar, India 597 India Rainfall 0.055 
Cauvery Coorg, India 800 India Rainfall 0.81 
 
Over the last 40 years, glaciers in western China’s Qinghai-Tibet Plateau have been shrinking 
by 7% annually, retreating rapidly from the 1990s onwards (Ray 2010 16, Kotlyakov 1999, 
cited in Mirza and Ahmad 2005). The snowline is also rising as temperatures increase. These 
factors will result in higher volumes of water in glacial dependent rivers in the short-term and 
                                                             
3 Adapted to include riparian countries 
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increased water shortages in the longer term (Gore 2006 cited in Ray 2010, Mirza and 
Ahmad 2005)4. Pakistan, Nepal, India, and Bangladesh have already experienced increased 
levels of annual flooding. 70% of Pakistan was inundated by flooding in 2010 and 70% of 
Bangladesh was submerged in 1987, 1988, and 1998. The 1998 flood in Bangladesh 
destroyed 3.5 million tons of crops and the three events taken together resulted in 1 billion to 
4 billion USD in damages (Mirza 2002, cited in Mirza and Ahmad 2005 16).  
 
The southwest summer monsoon accounts for 70-90% of annual rainfall over most of the 
region (Mirza and Ahmad 2005, 1). Most monsoon waters are received within a relatively 
short period from June to September and flow unused into the sea. This factor can make 
measurements for annual water availability versus demand misleading (Mirza and Ahmad 
2005). The ratio for dry season to monsoon season flows are 1:6 for the Ganges, 1:4 for the 
Brahmaputra, and 1:10 for the Godavari (Mirza and Ahmad 2005, 2). The north part of South 
Asia relies on precipitation from Western disturbances whilst the south of the region is 
dependent on weather patterns driven by the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (Mirza and 
Ahmad 2005). The seasonal nature of these water sources, particularly in the arid and semi-
arid areas of Pakistan and India, makes the region vulnerable to hydrological shocks 
(Panchauri 2005). This was evidenced during the prolonged drought experienced in both 
countries in 2000, considered to be one of the worst in the last century.  
 
The continued dependence on the agricultural sector has made South Asia vulnerable to 
climate change. Yields from rice crops, that along with cereal dominate the agricultural 
sector, decline by 15% for every 1oC increase in daily mean temperature (Ray 2010, 4). This 
makes the management of water resources more complex in countries already affected by 
acute drought such as Southern Pakistan and Western India (Mirza and Ahmad 2005). Even 
during the monsoon season, a large part of India and Bangladesh are affected by water 
scarcity. Experts believe that 60 million people will be displaced in Kolkata and Bangladesh 
if global warming continues at its current rate (Ray 2010). The poor efficiency of irrigation 
systems in these countries has exacerbated water scarcity with South Asian researchers 
leading calls for structural reforms to remove perverse incentives in water management 
                                                             
4 I completed a separate article in 2018 looking into the increasing strategic influence of China over water 
resources in South Asian countries entitled ‘The Race to the Bottom: Hydro-politics in South Asia’ 
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(Mirza and Ahmad 2005, Ray 2010). This again links into the importance of this research in 
identifying policy incentives that work in the South Asian and post-colonial power context. 
 
The Himalayan Mountain range is relatively new with high rates of erosion. Movement in the 
tectonic plates are pushing the Deccan plate towards the Himalayas. Topsoil is being washed 
away by landslides and torrential rains, reducing the productivity of land (Ray 2010 150). 
These factors exacerbate sediment build-up in irrigation infrastructure reducing the capacity 
and life of dams and reservoirs. The effects of soil erosion can be seen with the lower part of 
the Indus Valley carrying up to four times more silt than the Nile (Doolette and Magrath 
1990 cited in Ray 2010 74). Reservoirs in India are on average losing storage capacity at a 
rate of 1.49 acre-feet/mile2/year (Mirza and Ahmad 2005, 17). Such scenarios under climate 
change must prompt a review of the motivations for building further water infrastructure 
(Ray 2010, Mirza and Ahmad 2005). Mirza and Ahmad (2005) state that means of improving 
regional cooperation and levels of adaptation must be integrated into national development 
plans. This is a core reason that an analysis of the South Asian context has been included in 
this study. 
3 Chapter	three:	Pakistan	and	the	depletion	of	its	Water	Resources		
3.1 Water	scarcity	in	Pakistan		
In 1951, Pakistan was a water excess country with 5,650 CM of water available per capita per 
year (Yu, et al. 2013, 38). However, by 1997, Pakistan was classed as a water stressed 
country by the 
Stockholm 
Environmental Institute 
(Biswas, et al. 2005). 
Water levels continue to 
fall and by 2010, 
Pakistan had a 
freshwater supply of 
1,000 CM per capita per 
year, see figure 3 (Yu, et 
al. 2013). Supply is 
Figure 3 Population Growth and Water Availability per Capita in 
Pakistan (source Qureshi 2005) 
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expected to pass the ‘water barrier’ by 2025 when it reaches 800 CM per capita per year5 
(Falkenmark 1989 cited in Rockström, et al. 2009). This is the value at which water 
availability becomes ‘a primary constraint to life’ (Engelman and Leroy 1993, cited in 
Qureshi 2005 207). Pakistan has the highest levels of water scarcity in South Asia affecting 
50%-55% of the country’s population for the entire year (Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016). The 
impacts of water scarcity are felt in both rural and urban areas with Pakistan’s major cities of 
Islamabad-Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi confronting problems (Wescoat, Halvorson and 
Mustafa 2000). 
 
Despite this situation, the country remains reliant on a single system of water management, 
the IBIS, that contributes USD 18 billion or 21% of GDP from the agriculture and livestock 
sectors (Franken 2012 cited in Ringler and Anwar 2016). The costs of failing to invest in 
alternative economic strategies are mounting with reports that the level of sediment load from 
the Himalayan Rivers has decreased the water storage capacity of the Mangla and Tarbela 
dams by more than 30% (CPSP 2005). The continued nonchalant attitude of officials towards 
the major volumes of unaccounted water losses means Pakistan may experience significant 
instability before difficult investment decisions are made. Reasons for the resistance of 
officials to change is a core area analysed in the fieldwork section of this study and links in 
closely with the overarching research question looking into how IWRM can be adapted. 
 
Water resources significantly vary over space and time with areas of the country affected to 
varying degrees. The availability of water is higher in the northern areas and lowest in the 
southern provinces of Sindh, southern Punjab, and Balochistan. Levels of solar radiation are 
highest in the south with annual rates of evapotranspiration varying from 1,300MM in 
northern Punjab to 2,800MM in southern Sindh (UN 1995 cited in Ray 2010, 5, Sarwar 2008, 
209). Mean annual precipitation ranges from 750mm in the more humid Upper Indus Plain to 
100mm in the arid Lower Plain (Bhatti and Akhtar 2002, cited in Qureshi 2005).  
 
                                                             
5 Countries are classed as water scarce when supply is below 1,000 CM per capita per year 
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However, the level of surface water is declining with the Indus barely reaching the Arabian 
Sea. Even small deviations in rainfall in the southern provinces can lead to drought (Sarwar 
2008), see figure 4. Between 1965 and 2000, there were 26 droughts recorded in northern and 
central Punjab, 63 in Sindh, 
and 75 in Balochistan. The 
worst drought occurred from 
1997 to 2001 during which 
50% of normal levels of 
rainfall were received 
reducing canal water supply 
by 26% (Sarwar 2008, 209). 
During this drought, diets 
changed to cheaper, less 
nutritious foods with a 60-
80% decline in rain-fed crop 
production in affected areas 
(Sarwar 2008, 200).  
 
Approximately 40% of water demand in Pakistan is met by the Indus Basin Irrigation System 
(IBIS) (Ringler and Anwar 2016 17). The water supply gap is made worse by the country’s 
population growth rate standing at 1.8% (Yu, et al. 2013, Nazar 2016) Pakistan’s population 
is an estimated 140 million people and projected to reach 250 million by 2025 (Pakistan 
Bureau of Statistics 2015, Qureshi 2005). Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the 
world (Yu, et al. 2013). 
 
Per capita food production varies by province with food insecurity affecting 29% of people in 
Punjab, 65% in Sindh and 85% in Balochistan (Yu, et al. 2013, 23). Further population 
growth and increases in life expectancy are expected to push food and water shortfalls to an 
unmanageable level. Qureshi (2005) calculates that by 2025, shortfalls will amount to 18.5 
million tons in food grains, 1.8 million tons in oilseed, 5.3 million tons in vegetables, and 7.1 
million tons in fruit (209). Rockström, et al. (2009) conclude that countries with such acute 
levels of water scarcity will have to rely on food imports (referred to as the virtual water 
trade) in order to meet requirements by 2050.  
 
Figure 4 Drought map of Pakistan 2016 (Pakistan Metrological 
Department 2016) 
 46 
The agricultural sector accounts for 60% of export earnings (Qureshi 2005, FAOSTAT 
2012), and supports the livelihoods of 68% of people in rural areas (Sarwar 2008, 2010). The 
sector’s share of total water withdrawals is between 90% to 97% (Varis 2005, Ray 2010 16). 
90% of grains and 100% of cash crops are produced via irrigated agriculture (Ringler and 
Anwar 2016, Hayat 2007 cited in Bisht 2013). The remaining land is irrigated by rainfall 
(Bisht 2013). At present, domestic and industrial water demand remains relatively small 
compared to the irrigation sector with both sectors constituting an estimated 10 MAF of 
demand by 2025 (Ahmad 2008 cited in Ringler and Anwar 2016 17). Despite its high share 
of water use, the IBIS was not designed to carry such high volumes of water, designed as a 
gravity flow river system to support subsistence agriculture at a cropping intensity of 50-75% 
(Nadeem 2007, 107).  
The introduction of high yielding varieties of crops in the 1970s strengthened the relationship 
between farming and irrigation with the Green Revolution reducing the use of traditional crop 
mixes such as millet, cereals and pulses that are more robust against drought (Sharma 2008, 
Ahmad 2007). Canal water levels are connected to river flow and cannot meet demand for 
current cropping intensity at 130% 
(Nadeem 2007, 107). In terms of 
economic value, the most 
important produce is milk, 
followed by wheat, cotton, rice, 
meat, and sugarcane (FAOSTAT 
2012). Problems of growing water 
intensive crops such as sugarcane 
within an environment of water 
scarcity has contributed to poor 
yields (see figure 5 for water 
consumption by crop type). From 1991 to 2008, there was poor growth recorded for yields 
for all major crops except maize (Briscoe and Qamar 2006).  
 
This Indus Basin River System is underlain by an aquifer system covering an area of 
approximately 16 MHA and extending to a depth of around 300m (Haider et al 1999 cited in 
Qureshi 2005 201). Groundwater is the only source of potable water in parts of Pakistan and 
has been a driver of increases in agricultural productivity. More than 50% of cultivated land 
Figure 5 CM of water required to produce a ton of produce 
(Hoefstra 2003, cited in Briscoe and Qamar 2008) 
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relies on groundwater extraction with an average of 13.83 MHM of groundwater mined 
annually (Mustafa and Wrathall 2011). Groundwater and rainwater are utilised to fill 
approximately 40% of the shortfall in surface-water supplies (Ullah et al 2001 cited in Akram 
2016). Reductions in the availability of surface water mean that groundwater abstraction are 
increasing (IWMI 2014). The extent of groundwater pumping is drying up the Indus Delta 
with net recharge in fresh groundwater areas ‘negative in all provinces’. This is affecting the 
availability of potable water in urban areas.  
 
In Balochistan groundwater levels are at a crisis point decreasing by 3.5m annually. At the 
current rate of pumping, researchers predict groundwater resources to run out in 10-15 years 
(Yu, et al. 2013, 13, Qureshi 2005 
216, Kamal 2009 cited in Bisht 
2013). Groundwater 
mining has spread to barani rain-
fed areas reducing drought 
resilience (Briscoe and Qamar 
2006, 42). Safe groundwater supply 
is estimated at 68 BCM and 
extraction has reached 59 BCM 
(PWP 2001 cited in Qureshi 2005 
201). Without adequate recharge, 
water tables are receding lowering 
from 3.6m in 1988 to more than 7m 
in 1996 (A. S. Qureshi 2005), see 
figure 6.  
 
Lower water levels have led to the drying up of dug-wells, 70% of karezes (used for 
water harvesting), and accelerated internal migration from water scarce areas (Ray 2010 184, 
Sarwar 2008). Groundwater use is expected to further increase with urbanisation (Briscoe and 
Qamar 2006, 55). If rates of water consumption and population increases continue, 
researchers predict that 1 in every 3 people in Pakistan will confront critical water shortages 
‘threatening their survival’ (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 216). It is critical that regular situation 
analysis is undertaken as means of documenting the extent of the crisis and supporting policy 
change. 
Figure 6 Groundwater depth by province (Van Steenbergen 
and Gohar 2005, cited in Yu 2013) 
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3.2 An	Analysis	of	Water	Quality	in	Pakistan	
The majority of Pakistan’s population do not have access to potable water (A. S. Qureshi 
2005). The water of the Indus River and its tributaries is considered to be of a high quality. 
However, the disposal of saline drainage effluents has increased quantities of total dissolved 
fluids (TDS). Approximately 2,122 million gallons of sewerage per day is dumped untreated 
into water bodies, alongside water from leakages from sewerage systems and septic tanks (A. 
S. Qureshi 2005, 201). Saleemi (1993) estimates that 9,000 million gallon of untreated 
waters, in the form of sewerage, pesticides, fertilisers, industrial wastes, heavy metals and 
other chemicals, are discharged into natural water sources and drains on a daily basis (cited in 
Ahmad 2007). Just 8% of urban wastewater is treated and in mostly substandard plants, see 
table 6 (Briscoe and Qamar 2006).  
 
Table 6 Sewerage Treatment Plants by City (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 55) 
City, Province Population (millions) Status and condition of facility 
Islamabad, ICT 0.5 2 plants overloaded 
Karachi, Sindh 10 3 non-functional plants  
Hyderabad, Sindh 1 2 non-functional plants 
Lahore, Punjab 5 No treatment plant 
Faisalabad, Punjab 2 1 treatment plant, substandard 
Rawalpindi, 
Punjab 
1 No treatment plant 
Multan, Punjab 1.2 No treatment plant 
Sargodha, Punjab 0.5 No treatment plant 
Gujranwala, 
Punjab 
1 No treatment plant 
Quetta, 
Balochistan 
0.5 No treatment plant 
Peshawar, KPK 1 1 plant non-functional, plants being 
constructed in Charsadda and Warask 
 
The agricultural sector, and the growing number of sugar mills, is another major source of 
pollution. 5.6 million tonnes of fertilizer and 70,000 tons of pesticide are consumed per 
annum (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 57). These pesticides leach into the soil and contaminate 
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groundwater aquifers. 25% of samples taken from across Pakistan were found to contain 
dangerous levels of boron, cyanide, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, nickel, selenium, 
and zinc (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). Polluted groundwater is a major health hazard. Poorer 
people living on the urban periphery also often irrigate crops with sewerage water causing 
further health problems (Briscoe and Qamar 2006).  
 
The effects of pollution have led to variations in water quality in the upper and lower reaches 
of the Indus. Quantities of TDS range from 100-200ppm in the upper reaches of the Indus to 
350ppm in the lower reaches. The biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) for Jhelum, Chenab, 
Sutlej, and Indus range from 2mg/l-5mg/l indicating moderate levels of pollution in the form 
of nitrates and phosphates which cause algae, (pristine rivers have a BOD of less than 
1mg/litre6) (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 201). This situation has led to a decline in marine life in 
Pakistan’s rivers (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). 
 
The worsening quality of 
groundwater has caused 
progressive salinity as water 
levels fall, see figure 7. Salinity 
is becoming a major water 
resource issue with salt 
accumulation ‘positive in all 
provinces’ (Yu, et al. 2013, 13). 
Levels of salinity range from 
less than 625ppm in areas close 
to major rivers to highly saline 
in areas further away where water contains more than 1,800ppm (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 202). 
Once tubewells tap into brackish water, secondary salinization takes place reducing crop 
yield. Lower water tables enable saline contamination from deep aquifers via upconing. This 
process has led to the abandonment of 250 irrigation tubewells. 30-50% of land in canal areas 
is estimated to be affected by salinity (Kamal 2009 cited in Bisht 2013). 70% of tubewells are 
also pumping sodic water onto land (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 211). This contains high 
                                                             
6 Moderately polluted rivers have a BOD value in the range of 2 to 8mg/L 
Figure 7 Levels of groundwater salinity by province (Bhutta 
and Smedema 2005 cited in Briscoe and Qamar 2006) 
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concentrations of carbonate and bicarbonate resulting in changes to soil structure restricting 
crop growth.  
 
Relatively new research conducted by the National Water Quality Monitoring Programme 
shows that parts of the country are affected by natural arsenic contamination, a potential 
cause of morbidity (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). Although limited to a few locations, high 
fluoride contents, a potential cause of bone deformation, have been found in the groundwater 
(Briscoe and Qamar 2006). Despite the increasing incidence of water related diseases, there 
continues to be limited investment water-related environmental schemes or in the protection 
of groundwater. Due to lowering water levels and resultant contamination, the water in many 
deep-water wells is ‘unfit for human consumption’ (Sarwar 2008, 215). A 2002 FAO/WFP 
study in Pakistan, recorded cases of diarrhoea, vomiting, fevers, and other enteric problems in 
30% of children (Sarwar 2008, 215). The spread of waterborne diseases and water scarcity 
has contributed to widespread malnutrition and increased mortality rates among new-borns 
(FAO/WFP 2002, cited in Sarwar 2008). There is mounting evidence that water management 
regulations and practices in the country require review. These findings also place into 
question the impact of IWRM policies to date. 
3.3 Water	Management	in	Pakistan	
The majority of the Indus Basin is situated in Pakistan covering 65% of the country and 
stretching 520,000km2 over the provinces of Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and 
eastern Balochistan (Franken 2012 cited in Ringler and Anwar 2016 16). The Indus waters 
pass through multiple regulatory structures before entering onto plains (Riebsame et al 1995 
cited in Akram 2016, 88). The scale of the IBIS makes the efficient management of water 
resources a key issue for Pakistan’s provincial economies.  
 
Little has changed in Pakistan’s approach to water management since the colonial period with 
the country continuing to rely on a single system of water management, the IBIS. Internally, 
there was no critical analysis of irrigation policies pursued post-independence with the 
continuance of the former doctrine of the Tennessee Valley Authority approach (Sharma 
2008). This is shown by the significant number of large-scale dams constructed post-
independence. The extent of Pakistan’s reliance on the IBIS has led to the build-up of 
problems relating to:  
 51 
• limited water storage capacity being 30 days, a high priority when 84% of the Indus 
waters are received during the kharif (summer months) (Kahlown and Majeed 2002 
cited in Ringler and Anwar 2016 17), this is compared to best practice on the Murray-
Darling River basins which each have approximately 900 days of storage (Akram 
2016) 
• low water productivity with the IBIS having a productivity of 40% (Ringler and 
Anwar 2016 17) 
• infrastructural and resource degradation affecting the quality and quantity of water,  
• the financial sustainability of the IBIS  
• weak political will to manage demand for water with investment and planning 
focused on augmenting 
supply from a static 
resource.  
 
Containing 3 storage reservoirs, 19 
barrages, 43,561 canals stretching 
for 60,000kms, more than 120,000 
watercourses spanning another 1.8 
million kms, and 107,000 outlets, 
the IBIS constitutes the largest 
contiguous irrigation system in the 
world (Yu, et al. 2013, 1, Latif 2007 
and National Water Policy 2004, 
cited in Akram 2016 88). The IBIS 
is fed by the Indus River and its 
major tributaries, the Kabul, 
Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej 
(Qureshi 2005, see figure 6). The 
management of the IBIS is 
challenging due to its hydrological 
and physical limitations (Ringler 
and Anwar 2016). The total inflow of water from the Indus River System at the rim station 
Figure 8 Indus Basin Irrigation System (adapted from 
Yu et al 2013) 
Head canal works: 19  
Link canals: 12 
Major canal commands: 45 
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has averaged 132 MAF during recent decades (Sarwar 2008, 209) with 106 MAF of water 
diverted to canals annually (COMSATS 2003 cited in Yu, et al. 2013)..  
 
Established by the British Administration in the nineteenth and twentieth century, the IBIS 
underpins the rural economy (Mustafa and Wrathall 2011). The use of fixed water 
infrastructure was designed to have low management and operational requirements. Water 
allocations are based on a system of individual timeshare water rights (warabandi) to canals/ 
watercourses. This system, which dates back to 1867, is based on calculations of the water 
distribution needs of each 
command area and the number of 
acres that can be irrigated per 
cubic foot of water per second 
(cusec) from a canal (Perera 
2003). Water outlets (moghas) 
built into distributary and minor 
channels have fixed diameters and 
are opened during allocated time 
slots, see figure 9. The number of 
cultivable acres that can be 
irrigated with a cusec of water is 
then used to calculate irrigation 
duty (abiana), the cost of sending 
water to each landholding, and 
permitted weekly water volume 
(Perera 2003), as set out under the 
1873 Canal Act. These 
‘engineering and economic 
principles for irrigation management’ have persisted for more than 150 years (Perera 2003, 
56).  
 
With an estimated replacement cost of USD 60 billion and much of the infrastructure past its 
design life, maintaining the IBIS is challenging (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 60). Expenditure 
on maintaining its associated irrigation bureaucracy leaves few funds for system maintenance 
and results in inefficiencies and delays (Hunting and MacDonald 1965 cited n Perera 2003). 
Figure 9 System of water distribution on the IBIS 
(Blackmore and Hansan 2005, cited in Yu, et al. 2013) 
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This is shown by the fact that 76% of the budget for water management in Punjab is spent on 
HR (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 61). There is no asset management plan and the budget for the 
replacement of infrastructural stock is limited (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 61). Abiana (water 
duty) is also significantly lower than maintenance costs per hectare. Briscoe and Qamar 
(2006) estimate replacement and maintenance costs at 3% of the capital stock of 
infrastructure to be USD 0.6 billion per year for Punjab alone (61). However, Punjab’s 
budget for maintenance is approximately 6.5% of this figure at PKR 1.2 billion (Briscoe and 
Qamar 2006, 61). The remissive attitude towards the maintenance of the IBIS has led to 
cumulative losses.  
 
Zamindars are legally responsible for the maintenance of watercourses but frequently leave 
them in a state of disrepair (Perera 2003). Minimal investment has been made in clearing 
canals with 20-30% of water in the Indus Basin consumed by weeds (Briscoe and Qamar 
2006, 33). Further wastage is in the form of seepages with 50-60% of water lost during 
transportation from canal head to crop root zone, see table 7 (Tara 1995 cited in Qureshi 
2005).  
Table 7 Seepage losses in the IBIS (GPCC 2005, cited in Yu, et al. 2013) 
Location Delivery at head 
(MAF) 
Percentage Losses Losses in MAF 
Main and branch 
canals 
106 15 16 
Distributaries and 
minors 
90 8 7 
Watercourses 83 30 25 
Fields 58 30 17 
Crop use 41 n.a. n.a. 
Total  61 65 
 
The canal system and underlying aquifer are an ‘integrated system’, any ‘manipulation’ of 
the system affects groundwater recharge (Perera 2003, 108). The construction of the IBIS 
without adequate drainage altered the ‘hydrological balance’ of the Indus Basin (Perera 2003, 
108). The government’s recognition of the scale of problems was shown in the 1993-98 Five 
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Year Plan that allocated 71% of the water sector’s budget to drainage (Perera 2003, 115). 
Drainage problems are made worse by persistent seepage from unlined earthen canals.  
 
Groundwater levels have risen in areas close to where seepages take place (see figure 10), at 
the time of construction water table levels ranged from 20-30m below the soil surface (A. S. 
Qureshi 2005, 209), prior to the monsoon season, 13% of irrigated land has groundwater 
levels within 1.5m of the surface being classed as severely waterlogged (Tara 1995 cited in 
Qureshi 2005). Post-monsoon season in September, this increases to 30% of irrigated land 
(Tara 1995 cited in Qureshi 2005). Due to the extent of seepages and mismanagement, an 
IWMI study identified areas in Sindh and Punjab where drought had a positive impact on 
crop productivity (Briscoe and Qamar 2006).  
 
15,000 public tubewells were installed under the Salinity Control and Reclamation Project 
(SCARP) in 1960 to limit the circulation of freshwater into saline areas. Under SCARP, 
around 12 BCM of groundwater was pumped out per year with freshwater recycled into 
canals whilst saline water was pumped into saline areas (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 209). Cultivated 
area doubled under SCARP and the Green Revolution until the deterioration of its tubewells 
from the 1980s onwards. SCARP prompted a growth in private tubewells increasing from 
approximately 10,000 in 1960 to over half a million in 2002. Groundwater pumping accounts 
for 75% of the increase in water supplies in the last 25 years (Steenbergen and Gohar 2005, 
cited in Briscoe and Qamar 2008). There are no regulations for groundwater extraction and 
Figure 10 Historic changes in groundwater levels measured in meters above sea level (A. S. 
Qureshi 2005) 
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tariffs for agricultural tubewells are 35% below rates for domestic and industrial use (Briscoe 
and Qamar 2006, 45).  
 
Approximately 35-40% of irrigated land is affected by salinity of which 50% is in irrigated 
areas (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 211). 16 million tonnes or 1 tonne of salt per hectare per year of 
irrigated land are stored in the Indus basin (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 210). 2.2 million tonnes are 
stored in evaporation ponds with the remaining salts accumulating in the root zone (Briscoe 
and Qamar 2006, 47). Approximately 40,000 HA of land are abandoned annually due to 
secondary salinization in the Indus (A. S. Qureshi 2005).  
 
The separate management of the irrigation and agricultural sectors has worsened the 
management of irrigation water (Nadeem 2007). Minimal investment has been placed in 
measures to improve water conservation with Pakistan utilising just 30% of green water 
productively (Rockström et al 2009). Poor planning during periods of low rainfall in arid 
zones has worsened the severity of droughts helping to transform the 2000 drought into a 
prolonged famine (Sarwar 2008). Given the scale of problems confronted, Yu, et al. (2013) 
state that a new phase of visionary planning is required focusing on the ‘conjunctive 
management of surface and groundwater resources’ (13). This suggests that IWRM is well 
suited as a policy solution in Pakistan. However, the same constraints that have prevented 
progress to date, are also likely to affect IWRM implementation. 
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3.4 The	impacts	of	climate	change	on	water	resources	in	Pakistan	
Pakistan sits in the inter-tropical 
convergence zone, predicted to 
experience the highest uncertainties 
in climate change projections (IPCC 
2001, cited in Varis 2005). Further 
uncertainty comes from Pakistan’s 
highly varied climate with its 
southern areas being some of the 
hottest on earth whilst the north sits 
in the Himalayan mountain range. 
By 2020, temperatures are expected 
to increase by 2oC in northern 
Pakistan, 1.5oC in the central region, 
and 1oC in the coastal areas (Yu, et 
al. 2013, 86). The frequency of 
droughts has increased in recent decades occurring in 4 in every 10 years (Sarwar 2008). 
Localised approaches need to be applied to the analysis and mitigation of climate change 
impacts requiring reliable data at the sub-national level. Due to the paucity of data on glacial 
melting and climate change impacts, it is unclear how Pakistan will be affected over the 
longer term.  
 
Supplying 50-80% of Pakistan’s water resources, glaciers ‘act as a reservoir capturing snow 
and rain’ (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 26). The glacial area in the Upper Indus is approximately 
20,700km2 of which 7,000-8,000km2 is below the summer freezing zone level, and 
constitutes the source of annual glacial melt flow (Yu, et al. 2013). Yu, et al. (2013) estimate 
glacier runoff to contribute approximately 18% of annual flow in the Indus, 82% is 
contributed by snowpack (Yu, et al. 2013, 57). The effects of higher temperatures on glacial 
and snowmelt, are likely to have an irreversible impact on the variability and timing of water 
supply (Yu, et al. 2013, 2). Despite the critical importance of mountain water flow, Pakistan 
has few hydrometric monitoring stations to record changes in glacial area (Yu, et al. 2013).  
 
Figure 11 The river system in Pakistan (source: 
Ancient World Studies 2014) 
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A 25% (63mm) increase over the past century in levels of winter precipitation in the form of 
summer snowmelt is affecting water resources in the Upper Indus Punjab and Balochistan 
(Yu, et al. 2013, 80). Earlier snowmelt in June is affecting the timing of annual flows and 
planting. The volume of water in the Chenab, fed entirely by glacial melt, is increasing 
towards the Rabi season from October to March, whilst flows in the Jhelum and the Indus are 
decreasing during Kharif from April to September (Yu, et al. 2013, 84). These shifts need to 
be accounted for in water management planning (Yu, et al. 2013, 42). However, the 
immovable infrastructure and inflexible system of the IBIS is poorly equipped to operate 
‘under conditions of changing hydroclimatic variability’ (Briscoe and Qamar 2006).  
 
The scale of monsoon flooding is predicted to increase by 17% by 2050 (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 
218). Under climate change, the monsoon rains have been transformed from a source of 
support to a threat to the livelihoods they sustain (Mohile 2005). Hill torrents in KPK, 
Balochistan, and Punjab sustain approximately 1 million hectares of agricultural land but are 
a source of flash flooding (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). Major monsoon floods were 
experienced in Pakistan in 2003, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014. Flooding has been 
made worse due to illegal logging in KPK and mangrove forest areas, a first line of defence 
against hydrological events. Mangrove forest area has decreased from 400,000 ha in 1945 to 
70,000 ha in 2016 (Nazar 2016). Such activities are associated with the mafia and amount to 
billions of rupees annually, often with the consent of politicians (Shamsie 2010 cited in Bisht 
2013).  
 
Flooding causes massive damages to summer crops and interferes with the sowing of winter 
seeds. Yields are reduced due to the loss of topsoil with 76% of land in Pakistan affected by 
wind and water erosion (CPSP 2005 13). The annual scale of soil loss in KPK alone is 
estimated at 2.5 tons per hectare in areas unprotected by flood bunds (CPSP 2005 13). The 
2010 floods caused US$10 billion in damages, 50% of which were sustained by the 
agriculture sector (Yu, et al. 2013). Sea level rises in Pakistan are further predicted to 
produce an estimated 35-40 million climate refugees (Nazar 2016). 
 
A large part of Pakistan is arid and deficient in rainfall varying between 1,200mm and less 
than 100mm (Ray 2010 184), 68mh of land receives less than 300mm of rainfall annually 
classed as drought prone (A. S. Qureshi 2005). The IPCC predicts a reduction in the number 
of rainy days against an increase in the number of extreme hydrological events. This will 
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require investment in managing the increased area affected by water scarcity (Briscoe and 
Qamar 2006). The combined impacts of repeated flooding and drought have been in part 
blamed for the drop in the contribution of agriculture to GPD falling from 53% in 1949 to 
1950 to 21.4% today (Nazar 2016).  
 
Patterns of rainfall have changed, Balochistan is the worst affected with the monsoon rains 
recently only falling in the east of the province (A. S. Qureshi 2005). Changes in rainfall 
contributed to the worst drought in Pakistan’s history in 2000 costing the economy PKR 25 
billion (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 216). In 2009, weak monsoon rains also caused drought 
conditions and food insecurity exacerbated by rising world food prices (Yu, et al. 2013). Due 
to its low storage capacity, Pakistan’s provinces are highly vulnerable to even small changes 
in water supply (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 205).  
 
Pakistan has committed to the Paris Agreement 2015 and Sendai Framework on climate 
change mitigation and is obligated to report progress. At present, Pakistan has allocated PKR 
58.8 million to climate change mitigation and adaptation, an amount that may be increased 
via financial aid related to the Paris Climate Summit (Nazar 2016). However, more needs to 
be done to build the capacity of its Department for Climate Change and to obtain a 
comprehensive sub-national data on resource vulnerabilities. Although the IWRM framework 
addresses water scarcity, the multiple level impacts of climate change need more explicitly 
for countries confronting large scale of impacts such as Pakistan.  
3.5 The	politics	of	water	distribution	in	Pakistan	
Pakistan’s feudal structure has been endemic in its society for centuries with control over 
land and water resources historically tied to political power. The British channelled the feudal 
power of the zamindars to control Pakistan’s rural populations and this system of feudal 
intermediaries has been utilised by successive governments. The weak extent of land reforms 
that took place post-independence have enabled 80 families to continue their control over 
approximately one tenth of cultivated land in 3 of the wealthiest provinces (Ray 2010 186).  
A substantial portion of Pakistan’s population covering the rural landless, the urban poor, and 
the tribal areas, have failed to benefit from massive investments made in the agricultural 
sector. The political fractures caused by the unequal distribution of resources is typical of 
post-colonial societies with the inability to access to riparian water sources a major factor 
behind rising ethnic tensions and separatist movements (Duchacek 1986 cited in Ray 2010).  
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Using the advocacy coalition framework as a tool for analysis, the coalitions and associated 
politics that drives decisions on water management in Pakistan is illustrated at every level of 
government. With the exception of Jamaat Islami and Muttahida Qaumi Mahaz (MQM), 
predominantly supported by migrants, parties in Pakistan are not based on ideology or mass 
organisation but family allegiance (Lieven 2012). The subdivision of land by inheritance 
makes it even more necessary to manage land as a family collective (Lieven 2012). The most 
strongest coalition of interests is therefore the family and one that lasts from generation to 
generation.  
 
Leaders such as the Bhuttos and Zardari under the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the 
Sharifs under the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML(N)), often inherit or marry into 
political dynasties (Lieven 2012). In a 2012 interview, Syed Mustafa Kamal, the mayor of 
Karachi stated that for ‘the past 60 years, 40 families have ruled Pakistan’ being ‘re-elected 7 
times’. (Lieven 2012 319). The PPP, the most overtly feudal in its composition, draws its 
power from groups of landlords in Sindh and southern Punjab. Due to the need for coalitions 
with landlords for their support base, Lievan (2012) states, it is ‘out of the question’ for the 
PPP, and unlikely for any party, to follow ‘economically or socially progressive agendas’ 
(236). Alliances with feudal lords are a necessity, if support is to be gained in rural areas. 
Land and its associated resources, remain the ‘essential link to the people and voters’ (Abida 
Hussain quoted in Lieven 2012).  
 
Due to the role of water in securing landlord support, one of the most politically important 
positions in government is that of Minister for Water and Power (Lieven 2012). Landlords 
wield enormous power in the provincial assemblies and over rural vote banks making their 
allegiance in political coalitions is vital. The election of politicians depends on winning the 
backing of competing landowning families requiring large buy-offs (Lieven 2012). The rural 
base of political power and funding, can be seen in the rapid growth of sugar mills, high 
profits mean that these are often provided as a reward for political services (Briscoe and 
Qamar 2006). Despite sugarcane requiring 8 times the water than wheat, it is the largest 
produced crop by tonnage. The number of sugar mills has increased from 1 in 1947, to more 
than 80 today (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). The link between the sugar industry and politics is 
evidenced in the actions of the Nawaz Sherif government in pushing financial institutions to 
extend loans to sugar mills to which Sharif’s Ittefaq Foundries was the capital goods supplier 
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(Briscoe and Qamar 2006). The industry is subsidised by consumers with domestic prices 
higher than international ones. This shows the strength of ties between political power and 
the agricultural sector and the perverse incentives this creates.  
 
A second coalition exists between the the government and the military. The military has 
strong interests in land and the control of associated resources with 3 coups taking place since 
1947. This is in part a legacy of colonial rule with officers recruited from the feudal families 
allying the old aristocracy with the British Government (T. Ali 2009). The link between the 
army and water resources was cemented with the British Administration and later 
governments awarding large tracks of irrigated land to army officials in reward for service. 
This was undertaken with the expansion of the canal system in Sindh and Punjab with 2.3 
million acres of land allocated to the military since 1947, (Gazdar 2009). In this context, the 
military was dubbed the new generation of absentee landlords (Arif 2004). The military later 
became a strong stakeholder in local politics as power was devolved to the provinces during 
the Musharraf regime from 2000 (Bisht 2013).  
 
Prior to 1958, landlords controlled 28 of the 80 seats in the National Assembly and held key 
positions in the provincial administration (Goodnow 1964, cited in Tai 1974). The power 
brought by political coalitions enables landlords to act with impunity. This was shown in 
areas of western Sindh during the 2010 floods when landlord-politicians broke barrages to 
divert floodwaters from their lands, in some cases, resulting in the destruction of entire 
villages (Lieven 2012). Conversely, politicians endeavour to have their own districts declared 
as drought affected in order to receive relief, a form of aid often prioritised for areas 
belonging to a public official in the ruling party (Sarwar 2008). Even in normal conditions, 
the influence of patronage on water allocation can lead to permanent artificial drought in 
areas lacking in political influence (Jairath and Ballabh 2008). This shows how the control of 
water distribution can be responsible for building or destroying local economies.  
 
The warabandi system was designed to provide outlet users with an entitlement to water in 
accordance with land size and, in principle, limit administrative discretion (Briscoe and 
Qamar 2006, Perera 2003). However, the system favours larger farmers with private 
arrangements effectively permitted between farmers and officials for water shares, that may 
be influenced by interpersonal relationships (Perera 2003). The implementation of a 
telemetric system to address this issue via the automatic measurement of flows into barrages 
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and control structures has been delayed (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). Reporting on outflows 
has not been made publicly available, no independent audit of water outflows has taken place 
(Briscoe and Qamar 2006).  
 
Due to the outlined factors, 
water distribution typically 
favours larger farmers 
situated in head reach canal 
areas with farmers in middle 
canal areas receiving around 
20% less water (Briscoe and 
Qamar 2006, 31). In turn, 
users at the tail-end receive 
approximately 20% less 
water than those in the middle (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 31), see figure 12. The fundamental 
lack of transparency and means of verification in respect to water distribution facilitates 
corrupt activities and has led to a widespread mistrust among farmers and officials from the 
Irrigation Department. Water stealing is in the form of alterations to outlet sizes and the 
addition of direct outlets and pipes from main canals. These are illegal under the 1873 
Irrigation Act but often overlooked by officials in exchange for bribes. Their presence means 
that little water often reaches the tail-end of canals (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). 
 
Enforcement is limited with powerful landlords maintaining armed guards against officials or 
farmers who try to report them. Murtaza Jatoi (1990), son of the caretaker of the Minister of 
Sindh, states that once in power, a party has the ability to remove water, apply taxation as 
desired, divert subsidies, and recall state loans from rival areas (quoted in Lieven 2012). The 
control of government by landlords and businessmen is part of the reason behind the low rate 
of applied taxation and loan collection in Pakistan, with India collecting 50% more revenue 
(Finance Minister Mahbub-ul-Haq 1988 quoted in Lieven 2012). The current funding gap 
leaves scant funds for infrastructural repairs, improving storage, or for competitive salaries, 
and law enforcement.  
 
Although the bulk of rural populations continue to rely on rain-fed agriculture (Perera 2003), 
poorer sections of society are often provided with some form of minimal support. Votes in 
Figure 12 Crop yields for head and tail canal areas (Bhatia 2005, 
cited in Yu, et al. 2013) 
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entire villages may be bought by landlord influence. This may be in the form of food 
distribution, the provision of electricity, transport infrastructure, favourable water 
distribution, the provision of connections to officials, or using armed supporters (Lieven 
2012). It is via this hope of a ‘distant connection’ for even the poorest farmer, that corruption 
is accepted, discouraging concerted action and the sharing of information on pricing, 
subsidies, and taxation (Lieven 2012). The culture of mistrust within communities is 
supported by the fact that access to water depends on relations with local officials and law 
enforcement. Widespread illiteracy means there are limited avenues for the interests of the 
rural poor to be articulated at the policy level. The extent of tenants or labourers continued 
dependence on landlords has made elections in many areas a formality (Maniruzzaman 1966, 
85).   
 
Despite the continued power of landlords, there is evidence of rural monopolies evolving 
with loyalty requiring ever more gifts and personal visits to villages. This has occurred with 
the rise of businessmen placing people in a more competitive market to sell their political 
support (Lieven 2012). However, a larger break in monopolies is required to loosen the grip 
of Sindhi and Southern Punjab landlords over water resources. This would be similar to that 
seen in northern Europe with the affects of the Black Death contributing to the overthrow of 
the landlord class (as set out in Epstein). Although by no means desirable, such large scale 
events may be caused by future conflicts over water. It is clear that the root causes of water 
shortages in Pakistan are in line with the arguments of Gunder Frank (1970) and the 
monopolisation of resources. This monopolisation of resources by vested interests is enabled 
by Pakistan’s predatory state system and officials’ continued reliance on water as a form of 
patronage. The threat posed to political stability by the long-term degradation of water 
resources has been underestimated by successive governments and remains a problem only 
recognised in rural areas (Lieven 2012). 
 
The analysis and resolution of problems associated with Pakistan’s water resources 
management requires a recognition that those who benefit from how the system operates will 
‘not easily acquiesce to change’ (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 40). However, tensions over 
water within and between provinces may eventually be stronger than the power of elites to 
contain them making effective government ‘unworkable’ (Lieven 2012, 264). Long term 
change in the form of new policies and more participatory institutions will require some level 
of compromise on the part of the elite class with technology likely to play a role. One of the 
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central problems with the current implementation of IWRM policy in Pakistan is that the 
importance and influence of landlord-politician coalitions was not taken into account. If 
IWRM institutions are to be made operational, negotiations will be required account for the 
threat that changes in water management direct at the balance of power. Lieven (2012) states 
this to be an aspect no party in power has questioned to date (Lieven 2012).  
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4 Chapter	four:	Provincial	case	studies:	Punjab	and	Sindh	
The provinces of Punjab and Sindh are focused on as case studies for the causes, institutional 
responses, and impacts of the water crisis in Pakistan. The decision was made to focus in on 
two provinces two provinces due to the size of Pakistan in terms of land area and population. 
The selection of two provinces also allows for a more in-depth historical and contextual 
analysis of problems confronted. Punjab and Sindh have been selected because they are they 
are main agricultural areas of Pakistan. These two provinces are also where government 
responses to the water crisis have been focused in terms of setting up its new institutional 
framework discussed in section 2. 
4.1 Water	Resources	and	their	depletion	in	the	Punjab	Province	
Panch aab means the land of the five rivers, constituting the Indus and its five tributaries. 
The utilisation of these waters was maximised by the British with the construction of its 
massive irrigation system at the expense of lower riparian areas. These canals fed by the 
River Jhelum, the Chenab, Sutlej, and the Ravi prevent Punjab’s major agricultural districts 
from being almost 150 miles of desert land and prompted rapid population growth in these 
areas (Darling 1928). Despite this extensive water infrastructure, Punjab, a predominantly 
semi-arid lowlands region, 
continues to experience periods 
of water scarcity with 26 
droughts recorded in central 
and northern Punjab between 
1965 and 2000 (A. S. Qureshi 
2005). In the worst recorded 
drought from 1997 to 2000, 
approximately 43% of 
livestock was lost (A. S. 
Qureshi 2005, 216). 
 
Holding 56.5% of Pakistan’s population and 25.8% of its land area, Punjab is Pakistan’s most 
populous province and second largest in terms of geographical area (Briscoe and Qamar 
2006). However, as population size and urbanisation increases, there has been increasing 
pressure on land and water resources. 59% of Punjab’s land is under cultivation, 90% of 
Figure 13 Map of the Pakistan Punjab (Source: Abid, 
Ngarulya, et al. 2017) 
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which comes from irrigated agriculture (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, Abid, Schilling, et al. 
2016). The extent of reliance on irrigation infrastructure in Punjab means that pockets of 
wealthy areas co-exist with drought prone districts such as Cholistan in South Punjab. 
Cholistan is known as a permanently water scarce district with brackish groundwater and 
little access to surface water. Other districts lacking in water are Potohar and DI Khan. 
 
Groundwater accounts for more than 60% of water use via approximately 1 million tubewells 
(Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 16, Ringler and Anwar 2016 18). This accounts for two thirds of 
the tubewells in Pakistan with the majority situated in central Punjab (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 
Perera 2003, 112). Other areas dependent on groundwater to supplement rainwater include 
the Potwar Plateau and Salt Range. The areas along the Suleiman Range in western Punjab, 
and the Cholistan Desert in the southeast depend on groundwater and river flow (Qureshi and 
Hirashima 2007).  
Aquifer recharge comes from rainfall and indirectly from surface water (Briscoe and Qamar 
2006, 16). Punjab has the 
largest negative values for 
groundwater net recharge 
averaging -9.6 MAF (Yu, 
et al. 2013, 138). The 
water table is declining by 
1-6ft per year (Qureshi 
2005 201). Due to 
excessive pumping putting 
wells out of production, 
5% of groundwater area is 
out of reach of poorer farmers with expensive machinery required for pumping (Qureshi and 
Majeeb 2003, cited in Qureshi 2005). Water scarcity in the Potwar region in the northwest is 
leading to land sales. This is due to the Potwar region being excluded from the canal colonies 
and increasing water stress due to demand for water from the cities of Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi. In Punjab’s largest city of Lahore also, more than 300 tubewells pump over 300 
MAD of water annually (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 56, 43). Despite the image of Punjab as an 
economically developed well managed province in Pakistan, the management of its water 
resources clearly needs review if a deeper crisis is to be averted. 
Figure 14 Declining groundwater table in the Chaj Doab in Punjab 
(source: Biscoe and Qamar 2006) 
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4.2 Water	Quality	in	the	Punjab	
The falling groundwater table in parts of Punjab has made areas vulnerable to the intrusion of 
saline groundwater. In central Punjab, saline water is concentrated in the centre of each if its 
6 doabs (areas between 2 rivers) with water levels only replenished in areas situated closer to 
rivers (Qureshi and Hirashima 2007). Added to this, 3.63 BCM of saline effluent needs to be 
drained each year from river flows (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 217).  
Wastewater is contaminating groundwater supplies in parts of Lahore with the existing 
sewerage system in a state of disrepair. In Lahore only 3 out of 100 industries using 
hazardous chemicals treat their wastewater, BOD and COD levels in urban streams are higher 
than the national standards (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 56). The majority of wastewater, along 
with effluents from industry containing long-life synthetic organic chemicals and heavy 
metals, flow directly into open drains (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). These organisms 
concentrate and remain in aquifers for decades.  
In parts of Punjab there are reports of groundwater containing high fluoride content (7mg/l-
12mg/l) and high 
concentrations of arsenic 
(50µg/l), found in locations including Lahore, Bahawalpur, Multan, and Sheikhupura, see 
figure 15 (Qureshi 2005, 202, Briscoe and Qamar 2006 45). A recent study by the 
Environmental Protection 
Department in Punjab found 
the concentration of heavy 
toxic metals (cyanide, 
chromium, cadmium, mercury, 
lead, boron, nickel, selenium, 
and zinc) to be in excess of 
WHO standards for up to 25% 
of 280 samples taken from 
across the province (Briscoe 
and Qamar 2006, 57).  
Punjab confronts major problems stemming from industrial pollutants. Dissolved oxygen 
contents in all rivers from the lower reaches are above the acceptable levels of 4mg/l 
(Halcrow 2001 cited in Qureshi 2005). Pollution is highest in the River Ravi which receives 
Figure 15 Arsenic levels in groundwater in the Punjab (Source: 
Steenbergen and Gohar 2005 cited in Briscoe and Qamar 2006) 
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47% of discharged municipal and industrial wastewater (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 201). The BOD 
value for the River Ravi is estimated at 77mg/l, calculated against mean annual flow (treated 
municipal sewerage would have a BOD value of around 20 mg/l). The declining water table 
in many parts of the Punjab and failure to enforce industry regulations for pollution is 
contributing to water shortages. This aspect links in well with the IWRM framework which 
stresses the need to protect freshwater resources. However, to date little appears to have been 
done, an aspect that will be looked into in greater detail during the fieldwork analysis of 
IWRM implementation. 
4.3 Water	Management	in	the	Punjab	
The extensive irrigation infrastructure laid down by the British from the time of Punjab’s 
annexation in 1849, and the transformation it has had on its formerly sparsely inhabited 
barren lands is outlined in the work of Malcomb Darling (1923). The canal network 
transformed Punjab from a desert wasteland to ‘one of the major centres of commerce 
agriculture in South Asia’ (I. Ali 1988, 3). The Upper Bari Doab Canal was the first canal 
constructed in 1860-61 taking waters from the River Ravi more than 100 miles from the foot 
of hills to densely populated Lahore. In 1886-88, the first canal colony was formed with the 
River Sutlej used to irrigate 178,000 acres of wasteland in district Multan and colonised with 
migrants predominantly from agricultural tribes in Central Punjab (Darling 1928, 112). This 
scheme was upscaled with the construction of the Lower Chenab Canal in 1887-92 irrigating 
and colonising over a million acres of land (Darling 1928, 112). This massive investment in 
irrigation infrastructure signalled the ‘turning point in the economic history of the Punjab’ 
(Darling 1928, 112)  
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These schemes were followed by the Lower Jhelum Canal Colony on the former wasteland of 
Shahpur in 1897 and the ambitious Triple Project in 1905-17. The Triple Project involving 3 
canals was constructed to reach the desert land of southwest Punjab. The Upper Jhelum Canal 
took ‘spare water’ from the 
River Jhelum and 
redirected it into the 
Chenab irrigating 350,000 
acres of land, the Chenab 
and Ravi were then linked 
via the construction of the 
Upper Chenab Canal 
irrigating 650,000 acres of 
land in Gujranwala and 
Sheikupura (Darling 1928, 
112). Remaining water 
was carried across the 
River Ravi into the third canal, the Lower Bari Boab traveling 134 miles into Multan forming 
the Lower Bari Doab Canal Colony. The final colony was formed from lower reaches of the 
River Sutlej in the former wasteland along the southern boundary of Multan. These 4 
colonies covered 5 MA with an additional 6 smaller colonies covering another 0.5 MA and a 
canal system of 20,000 miles (Darling 1928). Today Punjab holds 23 of Pakistan’s 44 canal 
commands with 90% of irrigation water provided by surface water (Briscoe and Qamar 2006, 
16).  
 
Due to poor maintenance, seepage from the irrigation system is estimated at 38% with 
approximately 25% of irrigated land severely waterlogged (A. S. Qureshi 2005, Qureshi and 
Hirashima 2007 18). Nadeem (2007) reports the Government of Punjab to be developing a 5-
10-year Asset Management Plan prioritising the rehabilitation and maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure; an inventory of existing assets has also been undertaken. Budgetary allocations 
for maintenance have been increased from PKR 1.2 to PKR 2 billion (Nadeem 2007, 110). 
Nadeem (2007) further reports that steps are being taken to rationalise and improve the 
collection of abiana via farmer participation and the periodic adjustment of rates to reflect 
inflation. The government has been encouraging land levelling, watercourse lining, and the 
uptake of new technology although investment in these areas remains relatively low. 
Figure 16 The Punjab canal colonies (Source: Ali 1988) 
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The rice-wheat system is one of the most important cropping systems in Punjab contributing 
to foreign exchange earnings and domestic consumption (Khan and Hashmi 2004). However, 
there is a major gap between potential and realised yield (Sheikh et al 2000, cited in Khan 
and Hashmi 2004). This is in part due to the flooding of land required by rice irrigation 
compared to the well-drained conditions required by wheat. The incompatibility of these 
crops results in late planting delayed further by late rains. The delayed planting of wheat 
results in yield reductions of 1%/day/ha after mid-November (Hobbs et al 1988 cited in Khan 
and Hashmi 2004). Due to the effects of rice on soil, farmers have been banned from growing 
rice in drought prone areas, however enforcement is ad hoc. Frequent comparisons are made 
of low irrigated crop wheat yields in the Pakistan Punjab compared to the Indian Punjab, 
holding yield ratios of 3:6 per unit of land and 5:8 per unit of water (Briscoe and Qamar 
2006, 30); Ahmed (2005) finds that both regions have low yields compared to elsewhere 
(cited in Yu, et al. 2013).  
Further research is required on how to better manage crop type according to the availability 
of water and changing pattern of rainfall. This requires the enforcement of more efficient 
water management practices and the introduction of technologies and practices such as no 
tillage systems to reduce soil erosion. Although investment in canal maintenance to reduce 
seepages and salinity has increased, this is far below the level required to have a significant 
impact and little has been undertaken to improve management practices. There is also little 
evidence that abiana rates have been adjusted to make the new institutional system under 
IWRM more sustainable; this is an aspect explored further in section 3. 
4.4 Climate	Change	in	the	Punjab	
Punjab remains a semi-arid region and the effects of water scarcity and climate change are 
having a significant impact on agricultural production. At 51MA, Punjab covers a large land 
area crossing four agro-ecological zones (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). These are classed as 
the irrigated plains consisting of a mixed cropping zone, the barani (rain-fed) region, the 
Thal region, and marginal land (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016).  
The irrigated areas of semi-arid Central-South Punjab receive the second highest quantities of 
rainfall but in the main rely on irrigation infrastructure and groundwater. These areas have 
experienced the second greatest increase in mean temperature in Pakistan (Malik, Awan and 
Khan 2012). Climate data taken over the period 1980-2013 from the Faisalabad station, 
shows a decreasing trend in winter rainfall (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). This has led to 
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increased incidences of drought and conflicts over the limited availability of surface water 
(Abid, et al. 2016). The main crops grown are sugarcane, wheat, cotton, maize, and tobacco; 
and genetically modified wheat that has replaced conventional wheat in several areas since 
2010 (DOI 2012 cited in Abid, et al. 2016). The primary adaptation measure to higher 
temperatures in this region is to change crop type and variety (Ahmed et al 203, cited in Abid 
et al 2016). 
Rainfall is highest in the arid rain-fed (barani) areas of Punjab with the district of Gujrat 
receiving 697-1,401mm (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). Data taken over 1980-2013 from the 
Jhelum station, shows an increasing trend in temperatures and a decreasing trend in summer 
rainfall (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). Barani areas are vulnerable to climate change due to 
their reliance on weather and precipitation and agricultural productivity is low. The main 
crops grown are wheat, rice, and sugarcane, however, millet is replacing maize in areas due 
to water shortages (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). The primary adaptation measure in this 
region has been to change planting dates (Ahmed et al 2013, cited in Abid et al 2016). 
Agriculture was found to account for 26% of income in Abid, et al.’s (2016) study of farmers 
in district Gujrat (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). Barani areas contain the highest levels of 
poverty, found to affect 60% of households in Gujrat (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016).  
South Punjab is hot and arid and prone to periods of drought and flooding, due to this and 
low levels of socioeconomic development, it is deemed to be the second most vulnerable area 
to climate change impacts in Pakistan. Farmers in this region rely on partially non-perennial 
irrigation, rainfall, and groundwater with increasing incidences of areas left fallow due to 
water shortages. Increasing conflicts have been reported over the timing, allocation, and theft 
of irrigation water from canals (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). Temperatures in the southern 
districts vary between 6.8 and 49.7oC and annual rainfall averages 165mm; data taken from 
the Khanpur station from 1980 to 2013 shows an increasing trend in temperatures (Abid, 
Schilling, et al. 2016).   
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Consecutive flooding was 
experienced in this region from 
2010 to 2014 caused by high levels 
of rainfall, see figure 17. The 
region’s vulnerability to climate 
change is in part due to the 
predominant reliance on agriculture, 
accounting for 85% of income in 
Punjab’s largest southern district of 
Rahim Yar Khan (Abid, Schilling, 
et al. 2016). The principal crops 
grown in the south are wheat, 
cotton, and sugarcane, however, as 
temperatures increase, farmers are 
switching to genetically modified cotton (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). Abid, et al.’s (2016) 
study of climate impacts notes the greatest number of climate adaptation measures to have 
been taken in Punjab’s southern areas. 
Although flooding had a positive effect on sugarcane and rice yields in parts of Punjab, in the 
main, massive damages were inflicted. Punjab confronts ongoing threats due to annual 
flooding from multiple sources. Hill torrents are a threat due to their steep slopes resulting in 
flash floods of high magnitudes, districts frequently affected by flooding in central and 
northern Punjab are in the command areas of the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers, and in southern 
Punjab flooding comes from the River Indus.  
Due to flash flooding, 1.904 MH of land are affected by soil erosion (Qureshi and Hirashima 
2007, 24). The problem of land erosion is prevalent in the steep tracks of the Potohar region 
and surrounding areas. The loss of fertile topsoil, organic matter, available water resources, 
and root depth is affecting soil fertility and yield throughout the Punjab (Lal and 
Moldenhauer 1987 cited in Abid et al 2016). Problems associated with flooding have been 
made worse by deforestation, commercial tree lopping, unrestricted livestock grazing, and the 
need for firewood. Forest area in Punjab was 0.48 MH as of 2007 with uncultivated areas 
devoid of almost any vegetation (Qureshi and Hirashima 2007, 23).  
Figure 17 Flood map showing the river system in the 
Pakistan Punjab (Source: UNOCHA 2010) 
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Only minor efforts have been made towards adaptation in Punjab. Limited surface and 
rainwater resources are the primary constraint to adaptation measures preventing a switch to 
more heat or pest resistant crop varieties (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). Most farmers do not 
have access to information on water deliveries, weather forecasting, water conservation, or 
reliable inputs with 80% purchased from non-branded suppliers (Rana 2014 cited in Abid, et 
al. 2016). Although limited at present, cooperation prompting information exchange within 
farming communities was found to be one of the strongest factors in helping them to adapt to 
climate change (Abid, Schilling, et al. 2016). Cooperation between upstream and downstream 
farmers is stressed in the IWRM framework and further investment needs to be made in 
creating mechanisms to better implement this principle.  
4.5 The	Politics	of	Distribution	in	the	Punjab	
Punjab has traditionally been a divided region and can be broken up into three distinct socio-
political and economic areas: north-central Punjab, the Potwar region in the northwest, and 
southern Punjab (Lieven 2012). The different cultures, environments, and external influences 
in these areas have greatly affected resource distribution and levels of development. In north-
central Punjab the egalitarian culture of the Jats and mass migration of 5.28 million Muslim 
immigrants post-partition, constituting 25% of Punjab’s then population, eroded the power of 
autocratic landowners (Lieven 2012, 273). This has since contributed to higher levels of 
socioeconomic development in this area. Conversely, the Potwar region in the northwest is 
influenced by the hierarchical Pathan culture and remains dominated by the landowning clans 
(Lieven 2012) that hold strong resource monopolies. Only inheritance, land reform, and 
urbanisation, has aided the breakup of estates and eased the grip of landowners on politics. 
Many families continue to hold influence over law enforcement, administration, and local 
politics through clan leadership.  
 
Southern Punjab is the most isolated region from external influence and has seen less 
socioeconomic change. The south has closer cultural and language ties to Sindh containing 
Balochi tribesmen that continue to adhere to their autocratic chiefs (Lieven 2012). Southern 
Punjab was formerly part of the autonomous princely state of Bahawalpur until 1955, an 
aspect that incubated the region from changes in the remainder of the province. Sufism is 
more entrenched in this region with hereditary saints or pirs often forming the bases of 
reverence for older feudal families (Lieven 2012). Being predominantly Shia nobles this has 
exacerbate tensions since the 1980s (Lieven 2012). These marked differences between the 
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northern industrialists and southern feudal families have divided politics for decades. In part, 
due to its fragmented history, allegiance and identities in Punjab are drawn more from 
religion, clan, dialect, tribe, lineage, and Pakistan as a nation rather than provincial loyalties 
(Lieven 2012). Lievan (2012) states that cooperation and compromise are necessary for 
progress within Punjab, being essentially a ‘negotiated state’ (260). 
 
On the surface, Punjab was one of the few so-called ‘beneficiaries’ of colonialism (I. Ali 
1988). Its sub-economy underwent vigorous economic growth under the British driven by the 
expansion of the ‘agrarian frontier’ (I. Ali 1988, 5). However, these areas of agricultural 
growth emerged from a process of agricultural colonisation as the British migrated ‘well-to-
do yeomen’ from castes, clans, and tribes into the canal colonies (Chenab Colony Gazaetteer 
1904 quoted in I. Ali 1988, 13). The use of land grants as a reward for the loyalty of the local 
elite unhinged traditional village society further affected by the shift to individual property 
rights (I. Ali 1988). The significant disparities in economic development are seen in the 
juxtaposition of the wealthy canal colonies against vast underdeveloped areas. As of 2005, 3 
out of Punjab’s 36 districts, Faisalabad, Multan, and Sahiwal, accounted for almost 50% of 
agricultural production in the province with the dominance of landlords still apparent in this 
still predominantly rural province (Talbot 2005, cited in Lieven 2012). 
 
The reliance of the British on essentially landlord-establishment coalitions to control rural 
populations exacerbated disparities in resource ownership between wealthy landowners, poor 
cultivators, and the landless labourers (I. Ali 1988). These inequalities were entrenched in 
legislation. The critical nature of the role of landlord-establishment coalitions in the colonial 
administration is shown in paternalistic legislation such as the Punjab Land Alienation Act in 
1900 forbidding the passing of land from agricultural to non-agricultural castes (Darling 
1928, I. Ali 1988). The extent of reliance on canal infrastructure for water greatly enhanced 
the authority of the state and its representatives (I. Ali 1988). The provision of permanent 
access to vast land and water resources, the only means of employment and food security in 
many rural areas, has enabled the landowning class to dominate rural society until the present 
day. The strong coalitions between landlords and the administration entrenched their position 
within the political system consolidating and legitimising their power. In contrast the rural 
poor have no or limited access to resources and may remain in bonded labour to semi-feudal 
lords for life. In this way, allegiance to landlords is obtained through the generations via the 
provision of employment and food to the rural poor in exchange for votes. The failure to 
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redistribute resources breaking the power of landlord-politicians post-independence, 
preserved the monopoly of the rural elite over Pakistan’s resource base. This again shows the 
utility of the Advocacy Coalition Framework in highlighting powerful coalitions in 
Pakistan’s rural society that have the power to facilitate or block policy change and 
development at every level.  
 
Writing in 1988, I. Ali states that Punjab remains an essentially ‘undeveloped region’ with 
the ‘coexistence of significant growth with continued backwardness’ (vii, 6). Today, this 
monopoly is utilised to facilitate the accumulation of landlord wealth and maintain political 
power over the masses via their continued state of underdevelopment. Ali (1988) describes 
Punjab as a: 
 
 ‘truly hydraulic society, where patterns of dominance and subordination are pervaded by the 
fact that the water that sustains cropping comes not from the heavens but through human 
agency and human control’ (viii). 
 
Ali (1988) concludes that the ‘process of economic growth’ in Punjab created ‘structural 
resistances to change’ that has entrenched the province in a state of ‘backwardness’ (vii). 
Unlike the prescriptive path to the underdevelopment of the colonial ‘satellite’ states 
explored by Gunder Frank (1966, 5), in Punjab, this outcome was ‘predicated on economic 
expansion rather than stagnation’ (I. Ali 1988, 6). I. Ali (1988) emphasises that the effects of 
this ‘simultaneity of growth and underdevelopment’ were equally pervasive on poorer 
sections within Punjab as for those living in economically backward provinces (I. Ali 1988, 
7). This assertion is evidenced by the provincial population’s continued struggle to overcome 
their state of underdevelopment, even today standing in marked contrast to the success of 
other comparatively affluent regions of the world (I. Ali 1988).  
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Agrarian hierarchies entrenched by differential access to resources have slowed the 
modernisation of the agricultural sector. This is brought out in comparisons of yield in the 
Pakistan Punjab, Indian Punjab, and other 
agricultural areas where more stringent land 
reforms have taken place, and where there is a 
higher reliance on barani agriculture diluting 
the effects of resource monopolies (I. Ali 
1988). In Pakistan’s Punjab 19% of land area is 
cultivated by tenants showing the continued 
dominance of landlords (Gill 1989). Distortions 
in water distribution were found to be greater 
in the Pakistan Punjab than in India (Briscoe 
and Qamar 2006). This is indicated in the 
greater difference between yields in the 
Pakistan Punjab when compared to the Indian 
Punjab with the affect that total potential yield 
is lower, see figure 18.  
 
In an endeavour to make the warabandi system more transparent, the Government of Punjab 
has set up an Irrigation Management Information System and is publicising water 
entitlements and diversions at the main canal level (Nadeem 2007). It is planned that this 
system will be extended to distributary canals and to individual users. To this end, gauges are 
being installed along with an internal system of rotating distributaries and minors. However, 
water stealing is still largely overlooked. Due to the ongoing connections of landlords and 
sugarcane growers with politicians and law enforcement, it is difficult to see how penalties 
will be enforced. This will affect post-assessment activities e.g. following the planned 
inventory of tubewells to monitor groundwater depth and water quality noted by Nadeem 
(2007). Such analysis of power shows the extent to which policy implementation can be 
easily thwarted by local elites operating at the provincial and district levels. The influence of 
elites over water diversions and policy outcomes shows the importance of conducting a 
socioeconomic analysis before resource frameworks such as IWRM are adopted. 	
Figure 18 Differences in wheat yields across 
water distributaries in Pakistan and Indian 
Punjab (Source: IWMI, 2003) 
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4.6 Water	Resources	and	their	depletion	in	the	province	of	Sindh		
The alluvial plain of Sindh is Pakistan’s third largest province constituting 17.8% of its land 
area (Qureshi and Hirashima 2007, 197). The Indus River and its tributaries combine before 
entering Sindh making the Indus River its primary source of surface water (see figure 19). 
Prior to its annexation to the Bombay Presidency in 1843, farmers in Sindh ‘depended almost 
exclusively’ on the annual Indus river floods (sailiba) making agriculture an unpredictable 
and high-risk investment. Floodwaters formed natural channels or semi-perennial inundation 
canals which could be used for irrigation, and inundated the surrounding plain during the 
kharif season (Hunting and MacDonald 1965, cited in Perera 2003, 37). Other major sources 
of irrigation in Sindh were flash torrents from the Kirthar and Bugti hills with floodwater 
collecting into natural depressions (Perera 2003).   
 
The impacts of Sindh’s limited water supply on agricultural activities can be seen in the its 
distinct agricultural zones. The British characterised the left bank zone of the Indus River by 
low intensity agriculture limited to the kharif season; farming only expanded to the rabi 
season following the development of the Jamroa canal (Hunting and MacDonald 1965 cited 
in Perera 2003). More water intensive crops such as rice were grown on the right bank during 
the kharif season with lower water consuming crops grown in the rabi season (Perera 2003). 
The southern zone 
which sits at the tail-
end of the Indus was 
also utilised for rice 
cultivation and dry 
kharif crops, 
however, the 
cropping area was 
limited due to salinity 
and the lack of clean 
groundwater (Perera 
2003). It was only 
with the expansion of the irrigation system, that cropping areas were intensified and 
expanded (Perera 2003).  
Figure 19 Map of Sindh showing the path of the River Indus (Source: SIDA 
2012) 
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Despite Sindh’s extensive canal network, large areas remain cut off from reliable water 
sources and do not receive monsoon rains (Perera 2003). Large parts of Sindh continue to be 
affected by water shortages and permanent drought-like conditions made worse by wastage 
and upstream developments (United Nations 1999). By 2009 water levels in the River Indus 
were so low they no longer flowed into the delta for much of the year. Due to these lower 
levels of surface water, state supported private schemes for groundwater extraction have 
significantly expanded (Perera 2003). The rapid and uncontrolled growth of tubewells has 
excessively lowered water levels depleting supplies in water scarce areas. Numbering 28,079, 
one third of tubewells in Pakistan are situated in Sindh (Perera 2003, 112, A. S. Qureshi 2005 
204). The growth of tubewells only slowed in the 1990s due to the high price of diesel and 
frequent power cuts, a trend later countered by increased state subsidies. 
Further pressures on resources are added by rapid population growth with Sindh’s population 
increasing from 168,043 in 1842 (Perera 2003, 92), to approximately 47 million in 2017 
(Government of Pakistan 2017). Sindh makes up 22.6% of Pakistan’s population (Qureshi 
and Hirashima 2007, 197), growth that has been supported by state sponsored irrigation 
projects transforming arid areas into agricultural hubs. Sindh’s population is under threat with 
radical change required in the system of water resources management in the coming years if 
‘large scale human habitation’ is to continue (Lieven 2012 305, 336). The growing pressures 
of water scarcity are leading to large-scale migration and exacerbating conflict in the region 
(Lieven 2012). It is clear that a detailed analysis needs to be carried out into adaptation 
measures that can be adopted as water levels continue to drop in Sindh. The possible role of 
IWRM will depend on improving water storage in the province and upper riparian Punjab’s 
willingness to cooperate in the allocation of water resources. 
4.7 Water	Quality	in	Sindh	
It is reported that millions of people in southern Sindh consume contaminated water via the 
left bank canal system of the Kotri Barrage (Bisht 2013). Approximately 20-25 tons of solid 
waste from an area constituting 60% of Sindh’s second largest city of Hyderabad and its 
surroundings is dumped into the Phulelli Canal, Pinyari, and Akram Wah from this Barrage 
on a daily basis (Dawn 2011 cited in Bisht 2013 69). The impacts on local populations are 
evidenced in the recurring incidences of water related deaths in Hyderabad (Briscoe and 
Qamar 2006). 
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Only 28% of Sindh’s land area has access to fresh groundwater resources, from this area, 
large parts are affected by poor water quality (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 202). Unregulated water 
mining and drainage problems have contaminated aquifers and led to the intrusion of saline 
water exacerbated by sea intrusion. This latter factor has led to the permanent or seasonal 
submergence of agricultural lands (Bisht 2013). A Pakistan Drainage Sector Environmental 
Study undertaken in the 1990s found that salt is continuing to accumulate in areas irrigated 
by tubewells with reclaimed lands under SCARP moving towards re-salinisation (Perera 
2003).  
Ground and surface water is increasingly affected by pollutants. Sindh’s capital of Karachi 
contains two of the largest industrial trading estates in Pakistan, the Sindh Industrial Trading 
Estate and Korangi Industrial and Trading Estate. Neither of these industrial sites clean their 
wastewater before it is discharged into the Indus and harbour (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). 
There is also only one semi-private sewerage plant serving Karachi’s population of more than 
10 million residents (Briscoe and Qamar 2006). The effects of industrial discharges is 
significantly affecting levels of aquatic life in the sea around Karachi and in the Indus River 
(Briscoe and Qamar 2006). 
Further hazards stem from 
the drainage of pesticides 
and the presence of high 
levels of fluoride and arsenic 
in some groundwater areas, 
see figure 20. It is clear that 
the widespread problems of 
water quality in Sindh are 
significantly exacerbating 
water shortages in the 
region. 
The monitoring of industrial waste discharge clearly needs to be improved. In this respect the 
government must consider imposing penalties on heavy polluters if only as a means of re-
gaining the trust of water users in the quality of government water services. This need fits 
well into IWRM principles that prioritise the protection of water resources. Such penalties 
have already been successfully imposed in parts of India following the adoption of some 
IWRM policies. This shows that it may possible for countries such as Pakistan confronting 
Figure 20 Arsenic levels in groundwater in Sindh (Source: 
Steenbergen and Gohar 2005 cited in Briscoe and Qamar 2006 
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similar conditions in terms of industry dominance over government, to adopt similar 
practices. 
4.8 Water	Management	in	Sindh	
Sindh’s semi-arid environment was viewed by the British Administration as a barrier to the 
development of modern agriculture in the region. The British invested cautiously with 
projects in the 1850s and 1860s such as the Fuleli canal focusing on the repair and widening 
of inundation canals, the exception being the Sukkur canal under construction from 1865 
(Perera 2003). As in Punjab, infrastructural development aided in increasing the reliability of 
irrigation water prompting the switch from subsistence to more commercial agriculture 
(Perera 2003). However, the impact of investments was offset by the construction of barrages 
in upstream Punjab. The 
resulting volume of water 
withdrawals altered the 
resource balance, delaying the 
rise of the Indus River in 
spring and accelerating its fall 
in the autumn (Perera 2003, 
see figure 21). These changes 
led to water shortages 
effectively cutting the 
cropping season. Water 
shortages were such that by 
1879 under the Sindh 
Irrigation Act, the selling of 
irrigation water became illegal 
(Perera 2003). 
 
The Sukkur barrage was constructed in the 1930s, a weir that diverted water from the Indus 
into a canal network. This barrage delayed water shortages and supported the bulk of 
irrigated agriculture (Haines 2013). The Ghulam Mohamed (Kotri) barrage and Gudu barrage 
were constructed post-independence in 1955 and 1962 respectively, covering a command 
area of 5.2 MHA (Perera 2003, 133). The construction of these barrages led to a 300% 
Figure 21 Map showing number of barrages in Punjab and 
Sindh (source: Kamal, Amir and Mohtadullah 2012) 
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increase in cultivated area, and as exemplified by the colonial government before, were 
utilised to show the power of ‘state-led development’ (Perera 2003, 133, Haines 2013 xvi).  
 
‘Many of today’s water problems in the Indus have their roots in the colonial period- 
salinity, drainage, inadequate water pricing, poor maintenance, provincial conflict, 
and ineffective bureaucratic organisation’ (Alam, Sahota, and Jeffry cited in Haines 
2013 xxiv) 
 
Despite exacerbating the impoverishment of farmers, environmental degradation, and 
problems with the poor maintenance and overuse of water infrastructure received little 
attention under the British Administration (Perera 2003). The Administration remained 
focused on infrastructural expansion and flood protection with twentieth century irrigation 
techniques eventually exhausting Sindh’s fertile soils and exacerbating land salinization 
(Perera 2003, Haines 2013). More than 25% of cultivatable land in Sindh is affected by 
salinity and 60% severely waterlogged leading to a 40% reduction in crop production (Perera 
2003,109, A. S. Qureshi 2005 209, 215). Due to the growing rice market and price rigging, a 
considerable number of farmers have switched to rice cultivation worsening waterlogging in 
surrounding areas (Lieven 2012).  
Canal infrastructure has been overexploited with the command areas for the Sukkur, Kotri, 
and Gudu barrages exceeding their designed irrigation hectarage by approximately 50% 
(Perera 2003, 146). These command areas were reduced from the 1980s as increased 
discharges raised water tables causing salinity and waterlogging (Perera 2003). The problem 
of salinity was worsened by the construction of the Mangla and Tarbela dams in the 1970s 
increasing the Nara and Rohri canal discharges beyond their design capacity (Perera 2003). 
At present, irrigation water distribution plans fail to allocate water for soil leaching to reduce 
soil salinity. There are also a negligible number of drainage canals to remove excess water 
from land (Perera 2003). 
 
Poor maintenance causing sediment build-up and unlined watercourses has worsened the 
problems of waterlogging and water shortages. Due to the volume of silt deposits increasing 
flood levels, the maintenance of feeder canals, minor canals, and watercourses requires state 
support. This was a factor also recognised by the British who identified silt deposition as a 
source of major annual losses in the 1860s and 1870s (Perera 2003). These challenges remain 
significant constraints to economic development in the region. 
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At a cost of USD 963 million, the World Bank-ADB funded Left Bank Outfall Drain 
(LBOD) was implemented from 1985-2002 (Tirmizi 2011). Preliminary surveys indicated 
that productivity gains could be made by increasing the reliability of irrigation water and 
improving drainage, see figure 22. Based on these findings, the LBOD was designed to 
maintain the water table at an acceptable depth through additional drainage in the form of an 
outfall system comprising a Spinal Drain and Tidal Link. Saline waters and polluted waters 
from Punjab, Balochistan, and KPK were to be drained via Sindh into the sea (Bisht 2013). 
However, the drain was 
affected by design floors 
causing water to spill into 
neighbouring regions rather 
than being directed into the 
Arabian Sea (Tirmizi 2011). 
The Cholri Weir, part of the 
LBOD designed to prevent 
leakages, was also destroyed 
by a cyclone in 1999 
(Tirmizi 2011) and not 
repaired resulting in 
cumulative problems of 
salinity in districts Badin and Thatta.  
 
Further setbacks were experienced in the form of flood damages to the Tidal Link of the 
outfall system of the Spinal Drain, costing PKR 800 million (Perera 2003, 113). The Spinal 
Drain also flows against natural drainage patterns, a factor that cannot be amended since 
natural drainage would lead the flow into India (Perera 2003). The LBOD has faced criticism 
over poor planning, design, and maintenance and is contested by civil society groups 
claiming that lenders did not consult them prior to its construction (Perera 2003, Tirmizi 
2011). An Inspection Panel Report later found that the World Bank had violated 6 of its own 
binding policies on Environmental Assessment, Natural Habitats, Indigenous People, 
Involuntary Resettlement, Project Supervision, and Disclosure of Information (Scheider 
2006). The LBOD ultimately contributed to the loss of Southern Sindh’s freshwater barrier 
exacerbating sea intrusion now encroaching onto approximately 225km of land (Kamal 2009 
Figure 22 Map of LBOD and components, (source: Zardari et 
al 2015) 
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cited in Bisht 2013). Due to factors related to poor water management and the politics of 
irrigation and drainage between Punjab, Sindh and neighbouring India, farmers across Sindh 
continue to experience the effects of severe water shortages, waterlogging, and salinity 
(Haines 2013, Perera 2003). The LBOD exemplifies the lack of participation and inclusion of 
civil society into policy formation and investment decisions in Sindh. On a wider scale, the 
project also exemplifies the lax attitude of donors towards the need for consultation with 
local stakeholder. This is a need stressed under IWRM, however it is unclear if this situation 
has improved with no action taken as yet to rectify the damage caused by the LBOD. 
4.9 Climate	change	in	Sindh	
Sindh’s dry climate is not suited to intensive agriculture. Average annual rainfall is less than 
200mm being 128.7mm in northern Sindh and 209mm in the southern areas (Adnan and 
Khan 2009 and Muslehuddin and Faisal 2006 cited in Adnan, Ullah and Shouting 2015). 
There is also high intra-seasonal variability in rainfall causing cyclical drought prior to the 
monsoon floods. Sindh has been increasingly affected by lower levels of rainfall received in 
the wintertime and rising temperatures in the summer, these factors are worsening water 
shortages outside of the monsoon season (A. S. Qureshi 2005). For this reason, Qureshi 
(2005) advocates the establishment of minimum flows between the Kotri Barrage and Indus 
Delta as a means to mitigate some of the impacts of climate change (A. S. Qureshi 2005).  
 
During the summer season from May to September, temperatures in parts of Sindh reach 
above 50oC with district Jacobabad experiencing some of the hottest temperatures on earth 
(A. S. Qureshi 2005). The impacts of increases in temperatures have been explored by 
Masood and Ullah (1991); using 30 years of historical discharge data, their research finds 
significantly higher rates of evaporation from surface water resources (cited in A. S. Qureshi 
2005). This factor can have noticeable impacts in areas where water resources are scarce. 
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10 of Sindh’s 29 districts are classed as highly drought prone with district Tharparkar in 
southern Sindh experiencing drought once every 3 years, district Jacobabad is also frequently 
affected (Adnan, Ullah and Shouting 2015), see figure 23. 63 droughts were recorded in the 
province between 1965 and 2000 with 66% of livestock lost in the most severe drought from 
1997 to 2000 (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 216). Northern and southern Sindh experience drought in 
different ways, whilst the highest frequency of drought is experienced in northern Sindh, 
southern Sindh experiences higher 
incidences of extreme drought. 
With no canal or river network, the 
western and eastern parts of the 
province are the most vulnerable 
(Adnan, Ullah and Shouting 2015). 
Meteorologists cite the La Niña 
weather cycle as the predominant 
reason for the higher frequency of 
prolonged drought, warning that 
Pakistan has entered a dry cycle 
with drought conditions expected 
to return every 3-4 years (A. S. 
Qureshi 2005). 
The monsoon season contributes 72.4% and 82.1% of annual precipitation in northern and 
southern Sindh respectively (Adnan, Ullah and Shouting 2015). Higher than normal levels of 
monsoon rainfall received in the past six years has exacerbated annual flooding causing 
revenue losses (Government of Punjab 2012). Documentation on the financial impacts of 
flooding are found in the Sindh Gazetteer as early as 1874 (Hughs 1874). In recent years, 
flood damages have been made worse by the poor disposal of excess irrigation water 
combined with rising sea levels. If annual flooding continues at the level it has done since 
2010, much of Sindh’s agriculture may be reduced to subsistence levels.  
Parts of Southern Sindh are under threat from rising sea levels associated with climate 
change. This is resulting in permanent land inundation, coastal erosion, the degradation of 
water quality, and large-scale population displacement. Gauge data from the National 
Institute of Oceanography shows sea level rise along the coast to be 1.1mm/year indicated to 
reach 90cms by 2100 (MOE 2003 cited in A. S. Qureshi 2005). The impacts of rising sea-
Figure 23 Drought Hazard Map Sindh (Source: Adnan, 
Ullah and Shouting 2015) 
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levels are worst in coastal areas of southern Sindh. The lower freshwater barrier resulting 
from the overexploitation of water resources is leading to the ingress of seawater into 
drinking water resources, it is also rendering many agricultural lands barren.  
The coastline in the Indus Delta south of Karachi is retreating and the delta is expected to 
lose up to 25% of its land area by 2100 (climate.org, 2004 cited in A. S. Qureshi 2005, 223). 
Holding 10% of Pakistan’s population amounting to approximately 18 million people, and 
with 40% of its manufacturing units situated along the coast, the city of Karachi is vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 222, Lieven 2012). Karachi’s retreating 
shoreline is reducing areas for coastal drainage during the monsoon season (A. S. Qureshi 
2005). Further risks stem from the increased likelihood of cyclones, associated with high 
pressure gradients. The number of cyclones has increased from 0.86 cyclones annually in 
1881-1969 to 2.2 recorded per annum in 1992-1996 (A. S. Qureshi 2005, 224). These 
extreme weather events cause storm-surges or sudden sea-level rises which inundate low 
lying coastal areas, an aspect that is made worse now that storm-surges start from a higher 
sea level (A. S. Qureshi 2005).  
The combined impacts of water shortages, storm-surges, and sea level rise on rural 
populations are shown in the rapid pace of urbanisation and increasing rate of land sales and 
land abandonment. These latter aspects are evidenced in the rise of brick factories which can 
be viewed from Hyderabad to the coast. UN Agency studies suggest that the impact of 
climate variability has been most severe for low-income groups leading to the out-migration 
of entire communities (FAO, WFP 2002 cited in Sarwar 2008). Radical action is required if 
the situation in Sindh is to be improved. Policies such as IWRM would need to be combined 
with high levels of investment to reverse infrastructural damages. Such investments would 
need to be weighed against the ongoing impacts of climate change. This again highlights the 
need for the IWRM framework to be updated to enable a greater role for climate change 
analysis. 
4.10 The	Politics	of	distribution	in	Sindh	
Power relations in Sindh have been heavily influenced by its environmental conditions with 
access to irrigation infrastructure delineating the possibilities and limitations of  
development (Haines 2013). As explored in the Punjab case study, and brought out in Haines 
(2013) and Ali (1988), there is a strong link between the widespread reliance on artificial 
irrigation found in hydraulic societies and the development of strong centralised states.  
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The interventionist role of the British Administration in the agrarian economy brought 
hundreds of inundation canals under the management of the Public Works Department 
enabling the state to intervene in every aspect of rural life. However, the power brought by 
control of irrigation infrastructure was not used to curtail the power of the rural elite but to 
strengthen it in exchange for control over their followers. The Administration absorbed 
Sindh’s feudals into the ‘colonial state machinery’ awarding land grants to Pirs, Jagirdirs 
(holders of land grants), and Zamindars (Perera 2003). This legitimisation of feudal power 
served to solidify the monopoly of feudal lords over Sindh’s resources further suppressing the 
rights of Sindh’s rural poor. The state’s focus on technological approaches to modernisation 
and development at the expense of addressing Sindh’s social and political problems, 
continued after 1947 with the construction of the Ghulam and Gudu barrages (Bengali and 
Shah cited in Haines 2013). 
 
Due to the extent that the rights of Sindhi people have been repressed, coalitions between 
landlords and politicians are strong across in this province. The land and water rights of 
landless haris were suppressed by the decision of the British to resettle Punjabis, Pathans, 
and Khosa ex-military men in Sindh following the completion of the Jamrao canal in 1899. 
This act of agricultural colonisation was made in response to the Hur Rebellion against the 
British in the 1890s (Perera 2003). Further settlers in the form of military pensioners and 
hundreds of thousands of Punjabis were moved onto Sindh’s canal colonies with the opening 
of the Sukkur Barrage (Lieven 2012, 310). These policies were utilised to control who 
received resources and the terms of these agreements (Haines 2013). Post-independence, the 
Sukkur command area went onto absorb several thousand Muslim refugees. Post-
independence, land and tenure reforms were limited with land and water utilised by 
competing interests to maintain power.  
 
The suppression of Sindhis’ land and water rights as a means to disempower them and halt 
the rise of Sindhi nationalism continues today. This is evidenced in the continued domination 
of Kalhoras and Talpors over landownership and their continued close ties to state 
representatives (Lieven 2012). The slow pace of development in Interior Sindh has been 
exacerbated by its isolation being surrounded by the Balochistan deserts in the west, the Thar 
Desert in the east, and the marshland of the Rann of Kutch to the southeast (Lieven 2012). 
Sindhi politics has often been factional and inward-looking being disconnected from 
mainstream debate (Haines 2013). The rise of the PPP Bhutto government in 1971 that 
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continues to have widespread support was the first time that Sindhis held sway in a national 
political party. During his time in power, Bhutto established Sindhi as the official language of 
the province and created quotas for people from interior Sindh to enter into education and 
government. Despite the popularity of the PPP, the party provided landlords with a strong 
government lobby constituting an alliance between the rural elite, the bourgeoisie, and young 
radicals (Bisht 2013). They were later purged from the bureaucracy following the military 
coup led by Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s (Lieven 2012). 
 
Due to ethnic divisions, the predominantly urban Muhajirs domination of the MQM and the 
feudal base of the PPP, there has been little investment outside of Sindh’s cities of Karachi 
and Hyderabad (Lieven 2012). Ties to feudals continue to be a necessity, without which, 
farmers from weaker tribes are vulnerable to land seizures by local chiefs (Levien 2012). 
Feudals have little interest in development in Sindh ‘beyond traditional charity’ (quoted from 
a wadaro7 interviewed by Levien 2012). Rangers have taken control of 20 reservoirs in 
district Badin alone with the armed forces stated to run a ‘business empire’ (Dawn 2010 cited 
in Bisht 2013).  
 
Little has changed in interior Sindh in the past 5000 years (Lieven 2012). Up to 80% of 
Sindh’s rural population remains dependent on agriculture and associated businesses (World 
Bank 2005). Due to their isolation, rural communities tend to be distrustful of authorities and 
remain outside of formal systems (Lieven 2012). The feudals or Sardars which hold a 
monopoly over resources, often have no interest in education and few understand new 
agricultural technologies and practices (Lieven 2012). The prevalence of traditional irrigation 
systems has resulted in inefficiencies in water use and degraded land. With few incentives on 
the part of haris to invest in modern methods of cultivation, the agricultural sector remains 
largely underdeveloped with per acre yield at approximately 30-40% of potential production 
(Chaudhry, Malik and Hassan 2009). Change is needed in the form of technology and social 
and political structures. Lievan (2012) pessimistically concludes that ‘whether one of the 
most stagnant societies in Asia is capable of such change’ is ‘doubtful’ (305).  
 
The potential to introduce policy change in the form of IWRM in such a conservative and 
rigid environment is difficult to evaluate but without a doubt, due to the strength of landlord-
                                                             
7 A large landowner, and leader of a tribe or someone from a pir family 
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politician coalitions, these groups will need to be incorporated into the negotiation process. 
The belief of external donors that such entrenched systems can be bypassed is naive and can 
lead to negative consequences. This is seen in in the biased nature of aid distribution 
designed for drought and flood relief in the province (A. S. Qureshi 2005).	
4.11 Re-thinking	approaches	to	water	management	
Experts agree that given the ‘new ecological realities’ there needs to be a ‘fundamental re-
thinking’ about how water is managed and utilised (Blatter, Ingram, and Levesque 2001 cited 
in Ray 2010 xx). These new realities include increasing food-water requirements and the 
higher volumes of water consumption connected to intensive agricultural practices 
(Rockström, et al. 2009). The finite nature of water as a resource is being increasingly felt 
and global attention is gradually shifting towards demand management and improving water 
storage. Rockström et al (2009) estimate that improving water productivity would reduce per 
capita food-water requirements from 1,300m3 per capita per year to 1,000m3 per capita per 
year, this type of saving is vital for densely populated countries.  
 
As seen from the analysis of countries in South Asia, progress in the area of water resources 
management has been hindered by reliance on massive investments made in colonial 
infrastructure. Due to this colonial inheritance, many countries in this region remain focused 
on the mantra of unsustainable infrastructural expansion as a path to economic development 
(Yu, et al. 2013). However, even focusing on water infrastructure alone to meet the 
challenges of water and food security, little has been invested in maintenance, protecting 
water resources from the effects of climate change, and in minimising water losses through 
canal lining. The need for such investments have also been manipulated in recent years by 
China which has offered sizeable loans for new hydropower projects without proper 
feasibility studies being conducted. The ultimately unproductive nature of many of these 
projects has led to loan defaults and issues around the control of strategic assets (Abbey 
2018)8. It is only in recent years that Southern Asian countries have begun to research more 
cost-effective localised approaches to obtaining water security (White 1975, Merrey 2008, 
Mustafa and Wrathall 2011). 
 
                                                             
8 As referred to earlier this section references an article I have completed, as yet unpublished focusing on 
China’s involvement in the commissioning of large scale hydropower projects in Pakistan and India 
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As Pakistan’s population continues to grow at the fastest rate in South Asia (European 
Commission 2007), its ability to meet its food and water requirements are being placed under 
increasing uncertainty. This is in relation to surface water and groundwater resources with the 
net recharge of the latter negative in all provinces, increasing soil salinity which is positive in 
all provinces, and declining soil fertility (Yu, et al. 2013). Yet with one of the fastest rates of 
deforestation in the world, the country has yet to prioritise sustainable resource use as a cross 
cutting policy (European Commission 2007). Given the ongoing degradation of its natural 
resources, Pakistan may have already fallen into the poverty-environment nexus. This two-
way relationship occurs when natural resources are utilised in an unsustainable manner as a 
last resort livelihood strategy, in turn, increasing levels of vulnerability and the 
precariousness of livelihoods in the longer term. This pattern in resource use has come to 
form part of Pakistan’s wider path of unsustainable economic development.  
 
With the lowest rate of water productivity in the world at between 25% and 40%, Pakistan 
could make major savings by reducing water wastage (Rosegrant 1997 cited in Ray 2010 80). 
Little investment has been placed in research for water recycling, water-saving technologies, 
water storage, and water harvesting, the latter a cost-effective measure utilised in South Asia 
prior to colonialism. For localised solutions to work in such harsh conditions, a range of 
measures will need to be researched such as village tanks for livestock use and washing and 
the need to protect stored potable water from bacterial contamination (Ray 2010). Low 
energy precision application sprinklers (LEPAS) have proved more effective than drip 
irrigation taking soil, crop type, and climate into account (Postel 1993 cited in Ray 2010). 
Further savings could be made by adjusting crop type or placing a limit on the growth of 
sugarcane and rice and maintenance of single use fish ponds. Given the stagnation of the 
agricultural sector in Pakistan in recent years, higher level investments would not be feasible 
if the sector is to remain competitive (Goyal 2002 cited in Ray 2010).  
 
Strategic prioritisation and improved planning are required in the management of existing 
assets to mitigate the future impacts of climate change and demographic pressures. The 
availability and strategic use of budgetary resources will be critical in the assessment and 
mitigation of hydraulic and crop impacts and the interrelation of water and food security (Yu, 
et al. 2013). Given the cross-cutting causes and consequences of these impacts, an integrated 
framework will be required for the assessment of challenges and responses. Any such 
framework should allow for scenario analysis in the context of climate change and to identify 
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and understand key stakeholder priorities and sensitivities (Yu, et al. 2013). Using this 
integrated framework, it is hoped that a more robust set of mitigation and adaptive investment 
options can be identified for the agriculture and water sectors of Pakistan in the future (Yu, et 
al. 2013). 
4.12 Moving	forward:	the	need	for	an	improved	framework	for	water	
management	in	Pakistan	
This first section examined the relationship between the environmental and socioeconomic 
consequences of large-scale technology-intensive infrastructure and how this justified and 
contributed to the development of the centralised control of resources. Despite that this is 
both an environmentally and politically unsustainable path to economic development, 
successive administrations have continued to follow conservative mindsets in the 
management and exploitation of natural resources. This is seen in large investments to extend 
water infrastructure and its use to reinforce the power of unrepresentative Legislative 
Assemblies, in effect delaying representative government (Haines 2013). The continued 
monopoly of resources has served to preserve exploitative agricultural relations maintaining 
large sections of Punjab’s and the majority of Sindh’s society in a state of underdevelopment. 
However, as water and associated land resources continue to deplete with mismanagement, 
wastage, and unsustainable population growth, it is likely that significant spatial and 
demographic changes will be seen. These changes relate to the mass movement of 
populations from coastal zones, low lying areas, and politically weak administrative zones, 
rises in mortality related to water related diseases and malnutrition, and increasingly violent 
conflict as communities turn away from formal systems of grievance redressal.  
 
This environment has already reached its environmental tipping point in that widespread 
irreversible damage has been inflicted on land and water resources, affecting people’s coping 
strategies and survival. Within this context, supply cannot be augmented and single sector 
approaches to the control of water and land resources are not feasible. Trades-offs and 
negotiation are therefore required to prioritise the most efficient way to use all resources 
(White 1998). Strategic choices will need to prioritise decisions on the: continued feasibility 
of hydropower as an energy source in water stressed areas, the horizontal expansion of 
croplands versus resource status and the need for food imports, changing patterns and forms 
of irrigation where water is overappropriated, the extent that aquatic systems are left under 
severe pressure, and changes in agricultural land use versus food security and the spread of 
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industry and urbanisation (Rockström, et al. 2009). These decisions will need to be based on 
the better assessment of water availability and use that takes into account temporal and 
spatial variabilities in flow and demand. Information on water use in global value chains 
further needs to be made accessible to improve stakeholder scrutiny and monitoring 
(Mekonnen and Hoesktra 2016).  
 
It is imperative that a comprehensive policy framework is formed that realistically addresses 
the mounting problems associated with the continued mismanagement of critical water 
resources and their productivity. A major part of this will be identifying an integrative 
approach that includes the use of green water via water harvesting and conservation 
agriculture as part of a strategy to bridge inter-annual dry periods (Rockström, et al. 2009). 
More modern approaches to water resources management must move away from the 
conventional focus on blue water only (Rockström, et al. 2009). There is further a need for 
policy to address water-related shocks, expected to increase with higher variability in rainfall 
(Rockström, et al. 2009). Policies are required that focus on integrated management to 
improve infrastructural maintenance and the identification of alternatives to the use of large 
scale infrastructure, water storage, and its transportation to strengthen resilience and 
adaptation. Associated capacity building will be required to avoid ‘management related 
failures’ and ensure that production systems are not locked into a ‘low agroecological 
productive state’ (Rockström, et al. 2009).  
 
Cooperation will have a major role in increasing water productivity with two or more 
countries globally sharing 200 rivers, and approximately 40% of the world’s population 
depending on water from adjacent countries (Robert 1994, cited in Ray 2010 13). Sluggish 
progress in water management in South Asia contrasts with countries such as the US where 
per capita water use was found to have reduced in 2000, a trend that started from the 1950s 
due to local conservation efforts and the use of technology (Gleik 2000 cited in Ray 2010). 
This example demonstrates that despite rising demand for water, significant savings are 
possible.  
 
Given the scale of risk if adequate sums are not invested in improving decision making on 
water management, there should be a huge incentive for independent research and feasibility 
studies into the potential of policies such as Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM), resilience frameworks, or frameworks that incorporate adaptation to climate 
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change. To date, research findings have been either overly positive or dismissed as 
unworkable or too abstract where in fact a middle ground or tailored frameworks must be 
formulated in accordance to country context. Such frameworks must take into account the 
socioeconomic, political, and ecological environment of each basin area. Given the potential 
impact of water scarcity in already water scarce countries such as Pakistan, research must be 
utilised to ascertain what can be feasibly achieved, what is in the interests of society (Ray 
2010), and to start the process of steering mindsets away from short term approaches.  
Section	two:	Policies,	Frameworks,	and	Legislation	for	Water	Governance	
1 Chapter	One:	International	water	governance	
1.1 The	benefits	and	challenges	of	international	water	governance	
145 nations contain riparian territory in one or more of the world’s 263 international basins, 
with 40% of the global population dependent on shared water resources (World Economic 
Forum 2015, Wolf et al 2002 cited in Giordano and Wolf 2003). Competition over 
transboundary water bodies has frequently led to long term unstable country relations 
(Tongper and Barua 2014, UNDESA 2014). With the spread of water scarcity, the 
management of water resources is becoming a global concern with tensions extending 
beyond ‘historically conflicted or dry areas’ (McCaffrey 1997, cited in Giordano 2003). As 
the largest empirical investigation conducted into water conflict and cooperation, the 2001 
study by Oregon State University is frequently cited in analysis of the severity of water 
management issues (Giordano and Wolf 2003, UNDESA 2014). This study concludes that 
over the past 50 years, 507 conflict related events were recorded over water with 37 cases of 
acute water disputes (involving violence) documented (cited in Giordano and Wolf 2003). 
90% of water disputes were concerned with quantity and infrastructure (cited in Giordano 
and Wolf 2003).  
The studies of Tongper and Barua (2014) and Giordano and Wolf (2003) emphasise that the 
lack of proper sharing mechanisms and international institutions for water management are 
significant contributors to conflicts. International law offers one of the few means for the 
diplomatic and legal resolution of international water disputes. Water legislation is usually 
put into practice through the setup of joint bodies and institutions attached to country water 
sharing agreements, voluntary mediation, and enforced arbitration and adjudication 
(Cosgrove 2003 cited in Tongper and Barua 2014). Despite the need for urgent international 
 92 
action for the protection of water resources, 60% of the world’s 276 transboundary rivers 
remain without agreements on their cooperative management (World Economic Forum 
2015). Resistance to international agreements is typically from upper riparian countries due 
to the perception that they have little to gain. This was demonstrated by the objection of 
upper riparian countries and abstention of middle riparian countries, including Pakistan and 
India, to the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (Ray 2010).  
Further questions have arisen more recently over the nature of by external actors such as 
China in the management and development of water resources. China’s investment in 
contracts such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have been closely 
scrutinised. Numerous researchers to date, have highlighted weaknesses and recklessness in 
the evidence used to justify China’s infrastructural investments in major hydro-dam 
construction (Ansar, et al. 2014, U. K. Mirza, et al. 2008, Zeb, et al. 2014). In some cases, the 
legality of these activities have also been questioned due to poor transparency over expected 
social, financial and ecological impacts. With loan defaults expected due to the level of 
interest attached to loans, in the longer term, such investments could result in China taking 
control of strategic water infrastructure. This would have significant implications on the 
governance of water in the south-Asia region. This is in terms of whether existing water 
agreements are adhered to and whether compromises will be reached in the form of China 
taking a share of these waters. 
There are more than 3,600 international agreements governing how most of the world’s water 
resources are managed. Most of these international water agreements are predominantly at 
the bilateral level, with countries only recently shifting towards multilateral agreements also 
(Giordano and Wolf 2003). The 1997 UN Treaty remains the only international framework 
governing freshwater resources that has universal applicability (McCaffrey 1997). The extent 
of work proceeding this agreement shows the level of challenges confronted around 
international water cooperation with research for the 1997 Treaty being first initiated in 1959 
(McCaffrey 1997).  
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In terms of sectoral 
distribution, UNDP’s (2006) 
analysis of 145 agreements 
on Transboundary Water 
Resources, illustrated in 
figure 24, shows recent 
water treaties to be mostly 
related to hydropower. 
Giordano and Wolf (2003) 
further comment that 400 
treaties have been signed 
since 1820 alone. UNDESA (2014) concludes that the number of agreements signed in recent 
years shows a move towards further cooperation in all areas of water resources management.  
Analysis of longstanding treaties has shown that cooperation over water resources can 
improve inter-state relations encouraging trade, labour markets, and more efficient techniques 
for water storage and distribution (UNDESA 2014). International basins with established 
water treaties have significantly higher levels of cooperation than basins without treaties 
(Giordano and Wolf 2003). International agreements are in the main working, despite wider 
political conflict, as exemplified in cases of cooperation over the Jordanian River between 
Israel and Jordon since 1955 and broad adherence to the 1960 Indus River Treaty between 
India and Pakistan (UNDESA 2014). 
Despite progress made in terms of the number and type of agreements for water sharing, the 
number of shared basins has risen with the breakup of countries such as Hindustan, the Soviet 
Union, and the Balkan States (Giordano and Wolf 2003). Given the more complex 
administrative and ecological challenges confronted in international water management, an 
increasing number of international directives have shifted towards the basin approach. Also 
one of the main pillars of IWRM, this approach involves the removal of administrative 
boundaries in water planning and management placing the needs of basins first (Tongper and 
Barua 2014). However, such resource based management approaches require extensive 
institutional capacity building being reliant on a strong comprehension of ecological 
requirements and the changing status of water resources.  
Figure 24 Percentage Breakdown of Sectoral Distribution of 145 
International Agreements (Source: UNDP 2006) 
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1.2 The	ongoing	development	of	international	water	governance	
The last century has seen significant endeavours to develop international water regulations 
and legislation. In the latter half of the twentieth century, momentum gathered to address the 
global water crisis and improve water governance. This is evidenced in the 1976 UN Habitat 
conference in Vancouver and the 1977 Mar del Plata conference in Argentina, attended by 
116 states, outlined in Falkenmark (1977). Early recommendations focused on the need to: 
improve the assessment of water resources and demand, develop instruments for better water 
resources management in the way of legislation and pricing, strengthen regulations around 
distribution, improve land and water management, and improve awareness of sanitation and 
waste disposal. These efforts are summarised in the Mar del Plata Action Plan.  
 
Policy recommendations were further developed in the Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development at the 1992 UN Conference on Water and Environment  
(World Meteorological Organisation 1992). These recommendations called for a new 
approach to developing freshwater resources, stressing the critical issue of transboundary 
water management and encouraging the development of integrated water resource 
management institutions. The Rio Earth Summit on Environment and Development, held in 
the same year translated the Dublin Statement into a non-binding plan of action or Agenda 21 
(Giordano and Wolf 2003). This Agenda forwarded key IWRM principles and the plan 
prompted the establishment of several international freshwater resource institutions.  
 
The World Water Council (WWC) is among the institutions set up under Agenda 21 in 1996 
as a think-tank for global water resource issues. The WWC pushed the creation of the World 
Water Vision focusing on water management needs and the set up of agencies such as the 
World Commission on Water for the 21st Century and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) 
(Giordano and Wolf 2003). However, as yet, there is still no supranational agency for 
‘preventative hydrodiplomacy’ (Giordano and Wolf 2003). Legal frameworks therefore 
remain the guiding authority for the regulation and control of international water resources 
(Salman and Bradlow 2006). 
 
Further to Agenda 21, the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary and 
International Lakes was agreed. This served as the first international environmental 
agreement to strengthen endeavours to protect transboundary surface and groundwater. This 
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was followed by the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, outlined in detail by McCaffrey (1997). This legally binding 
international framework established principles for: the equitable and reasonable use of 
watercourses, all measures to be taken to do no harm to other states, the timely notification of 
planned measures, and the protection and preservation of watercourses (McCaffrey 1997). 
The 1992 and 1997 conventions entered into force in 2014 (Balinskij 2015). McCaffrey 
(1997) concludes that in light of increasing incidences of water scarcity, the influence of 
these conventions is likely to grow.  
 
Researchers state that the growing complexity of challenges connected to water scarcity has 
revealed key areas for further investigation (Giordano and Wolf 2003, UNDESA 2013, Ray 
2010). One such area is the lack of robustness of many treaties in regards to water allocations 
(Giordano and Wolf 2003). Where quantities are specified, allocations are usually in fixed 
amounts as seen in the 1960 Indus Treaty that ignores hydraulic variations and changing 
water needs (Giordano and Wolf 2003). Due to greater variations in flow due to climate 
change, the application of existing agreements has become more ambiguous (Ray 2010). 
Provisions for public participation have been largely absent.  
 
Cooperation over transboundary groundwater is major area which requires more research and 
enforcement. The number of shared aquifers is unknown and data is required on flow 
direction and recharge rates to achieve more integrative approaches for groundwater 
resources (Tongper and Barua 2014, Giordano and Wolf 2003). This highlights the 
problematic nature of monitoring and enforcing agreements relating to ‘invisible resources’ 
(UNDESA 2014). Strengthening international water governance is an ongoing process; 
agreements need to be renegotiated as political changes occur (Ray 2010, UNDESA 2013). 
Ray (2010), cites the example of the water scarce country Kenya’s tense withdrawal from the 
1929 Nile Basin agreement that guaranteed Egypt a flow of 55 BCM of Nile water. This 
agreement was deemed invalid, being signed by its colonial predecessors (Ray 2010 60).  
 
Each region confronts its own challenges over water resources management, and 
international treaty regimes need to be flexible enough to reflect the changing status of 
natural resources and impacts of climate change (Tongper and Barua 2014). Vinogradov et al 
(2003) cite changes in the natural status of water bodies as comprising droughts, flooding, 
and fluctuations in precipitation (cited in Tongper and Barua 2014). With many agreements 
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requiring scrutiny, international attention has shifted to the development of broader guiding 
policy frameworks. Improved cooperation will need to take into account societal values, the 
need for flexible water allocations, and the increasing frequency of extreme hydrological 
events (UNDESA 2014). 
1.3 Alternative	frameworks	for	water	management	
Tongper and Barua (2014) state the guiding principle in the formulation of international 
water frameworks is to achieve a balance between the core components of water governance: 
policy, legislation, and institutions (Tongper and Barua 2014). However, Giordano and Wolf 
(2003) cite that the presence of independent institutions for the monitoring, mediation, and 
enforcement of international water frameworks, as one of the most influential factors on 
riparian relations. This exceeds the influence of climate, water availability, political 
orientation, population density, and levels of economic development (Wolf et al., 2003 cited 
in Giordano and Wolf 2003). Giordano and Wolf (2003) recommend that the international 
community work to clarify roles and responsibilities of water management institutions within 
particular basins, mobilise financial support, and strengthen institutional capacity (UNDESA 
2014, Giordano and Wolf 2003). Tongper and Barua (2014), also stress the importance of 
tailoring institutional needs to particular basins, commenting that it is difficult to 
conceptualise an effective water governance framework that is universally applicable.  
Biswas (2008) is more sceptical stating international frameworks for water management to be 
in their infancy (Biswas 2008). There is strong evidence to support this assertion given that 
the 1997 Law on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses constituted the first 
global water law. Many of the principles from the 1997 framework have been transferred to 
the UN backed Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) Framework set up by the 
same participating organisations.  
UNDESA (2014) states that the IWRM Framework has now been ‘accepted internationally as 
the way forward for the efficient, equitable, and sustainable development and management of 
the world’s limited water resources’. The concept of IWRM evolved from the river basin 
management approach and utilises the basin as the core parameter of analysis (Petit and 
Baron 2009). Taken from the systems theory approach, IWRM applies the principles of 
integrated management to water resources (Petit and Baron 2009), single sector approaches to 
water management are viewed as damaging. IWRM integrates natural and human systems. 
Natural systems include: freshwater and coastal zones, land and water uses, surface and 
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groundwater management, the quality and quantity of water, and upstream and downstream 
flow (GWP 2000). Human systems cover: the mainstreaming of water priorities into 
government planning, cross-sectoral integration, major infrastructural developments, 
stakeholder participation, and wastewater management (GWP 2000). The most frequently 
cited international authority on IWRM is the Global Water Partnership that describes IWRM 
as a tool to address the management of supply and demand in a coordinated and equitable 
manner that does not compromise ‘the sustainability of vital ecosystems’ (GWP 2000 24).  
 
Regional water frameworks such as the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD), adopted in 
2000, contain strong elements of IWRM (Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 2006). Enforced by 
the EU Court of Justice, the Directive is widely accepted as the most ambitious European 
legislation to date, being designed to establish a framework for the future protection of 
European waters (Voulvoulis, Arpon and Giakoumis 2017). The EU Water Framework 
Directive replaced the former system that managed environmental components and pollutants 
in isolation using standard targets. This former system failed to take into account the effects 
of competing uses of water and the interconnectedness of water systems (Margerum 1995 
cited in Voulvoulis et al 2017). Integrating all components of the water environment and 
based on river basin planning, the Water Framework Directive signalled a move towards an 
approach based on systems thinking and catchment management (Voulvoulis, Arpon and 
Giakoumis 2017). The Water Framework Directive stresses ‘the interactions and 
interdependencies’ within systems ‘that form a functioning whole’ (Arnold and Wade 2015 
cited in Voulvoulis et al 2017). The WFD is also flexible enabling it to be adapted to targets 
within each member state (Von Homeyer 2010 cited in Voulvoulis et al 2017).  
 
The Water Framework Directive has been criticised for delays in implementation with 47% 
of EU surface waters failing to meet the key objective of good ecological status in 2015, 
ambitiously defined as the state of a system in the absence of anthropogenic activity 
(Voulvoulis, Arpon and Giakoumis 2017, European Commission 2016). Criticisms focus on 
the need to build capacity among authorities to understand the catchment approach, the 
unrealistic timeframe for the achievement of ‘good status’ for water bodies, and the poor 
transition from standard implementation and monitoring practices (Voulvoulis, Arpon and 
Giakoumis 2017). Vouvoulis et al (2017) state that the framework needs revision to make it 
more comprehensible. The authors conclude that the Water Framework Directive remains a 
revolutionary piece of legislation; however, they caution that time is needed for the required 
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fundamental shift in institutional mindsets to move towards more systematic means of 
incorporating integrated planning and modes of implementation.  
 
A more recent framework gaining in status is the Water-Food-Energy (WFE) Nexus, a 
framework forwarded in the Global Risks Report 2011 at the World Economic Forum Davos 
Summit. Water-Food-Energy stresses the impacts of global trends such as how the rising 
demand for food, water, and energy effects changing land use and ecological systems. It 
overlaps with IWRM in that it draws on the systems approach and analyses the 
interrelationships between major sectors at different scales (Balinskij 2015). It is also an 
ecosystem based, spatially specific framework. As in IWRM, Water-Food-Energy is 
grounded in the premise that closer sectoral cooperation strengthens co-benefits and lessens 
the costs of resource trade-offs, improving the sustainability of livelihoods (Wallington and 
Cai 2017, Bizikova, et al. 2013). Water-Food-Energy differs from IWRM in that whilst its 
proponents use the basin as a starting point of analysis, they vary this with some focusing on 
land investments or other national resources. Bizikova, et al. (2013) state that the multiple 
interpretations of the Water-Food-Energy, can make it seem complicated and watered down. 
Being as yet untested, the framework requires further research to clarify focus areas and 
feasible implementation strategies past the community level. 
 
The resilience approach, first introduced into ecological literature by C. S. Holling in 1973, 
varies more from IWRM, focusing on nonlinear dynamics within ecosystems (Gunderson 
2000). However, since its conception, a range of meanings for resilience have been 
developed carrying different policy implications (Gunderson 2000). Engineering resilience 
focuses on recovery to a previous state following a disturbance (Folke 2006) being typically 
utilised for disaster risk management planning, whilst ecological resilience provides a more 
detailed analysis of the capacity of ecosystems to withstand shocks before regime change is 
triggered (Brooke 2006 cited in Gunderson 2000). Ecological resilience requires more site 
specific research assuming the existence of multiple equilibrium (Gunderson 2000).  
Research on a third strain of the resilience framework, social-ecological resilience, has 
further begun to focus more on the adaptive capacity of social-ecological systems and 
continuous transformation (Daily, 1997, cited in Folke 2006). 
 
Despite their differences, overlaps are present in resilience and IWRM approaches. IWRM 
and resilience approaches essentially emerged from a rejection of the twentieth century 
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command and control approach to resource management that isolates variables of interest. In 
this respect, both resilience and IWRM approaches require large investments to restructure 
systems of water management and enable multi-level stakeholder participation (Olsson et al. 
2004 cited in Folke 2006, Grigg 2008). IWRM and resilience approaches both advocate 
institutional flexibility and embrace variability (Gunderson 2000, White 1998). Both 
approaches advocate integrative science and interdisciplinary collaboration (Lambin 2005 
cited in Folke 2006, Grigg 2008). Neither claims to have clear cut solutions with incomplete 
information assumed as a starting point. This ambiguity is one of the central criticisms of 
IWRM but currently embraced by researchers on resilience.  
 
The challenges of the frameworks analysed are numerous, requiring large-scale data 
collection, capacity building for monitoring, and the setup of local level institutions for 
ecosystem or water management to enable collective action. Important lessons can be drawn 
with the development of such frameworks itself representing a major step forward in 
deciphering more sustainable approaches to water resources management. The resilience 
approach, in particular, raises important questions such as the feasibility of applying 
economic instruments and valuation in unstable environments (Folke 2006). Its adaptive 
management approach accepts from the outset that not all the challenges of ecosystem 
management can be taken into account (Folke 2006). The importance given to adaptation 
holds key lessons for policymakers related to the assumption that unpredictable events are 
inevitable, that ecosystem resilience must be continually researched as natural resources 
change requiring reactive adjustments (Gunderson 2000), the acceptance of management by 
trial and error, and that systems may already be irreversibly changed. The acceptance of such 
principles would critically alter the level of financial and HR investments to set up 
appropriate systems for natural resource management and monitoring.  
 
The practitioner approach taken by the Water-Food-Energy can also be drawn upon with 
useful areas relating to its recommended analysis of historical water policy and lessons 
learned within specific country contexts to feed into planning. Lessons from 15 years of EU 
Water Framework Directive provide further evidence based examples of challenges in how 
integrative frameworks are interpreted. IWRM is selected for study here forming the base of 
many of the frameworks analysed. It is the most established framework for the management 
of water resources and likely to receive further investment. IWRM has already been tested as 
part of the EU Water Framework Directive and as a model that has fed into approaches such 
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as the Water-Food-Energy and more recent research on ecosystem resilience. The continuing 
influence of IWRM on international water law and policy warrants deeper academic research.  
1.4 The	Development	of	IWRM	on	International	Platforms	
In the last century, several regions have applied integrated approaches to water management 
long before IWRM was promoted at the global level. Prominent examples include France, 
Latin America, Australia, and the US (Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 2006) predominantly 
focusing on stakeholder participation. In-country initiatives comprise the frequently cited 
Murray-Darling basin and the Landcare movement for community involvement in water 
resources management in Australia (Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 2006). Within Europe, 
France set up regional water parliaments based on geographical basins as early as 1966 
(Allan 2006). Jeffrey and Gearey (2006) also highlight other examples in the Ruhr River 
Association in Germany and River Basin Authorities set up in the UK. 
 
The US was an early implementer of inter-sectoral planning for water resources management 
(as outlined in Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 2006). The Tennessee Valley Authority in 
1933 was the first authority to ‘transcend sectoral boundaries’ in its objectives (Petit and 
Baron 2009) working on flood control, power generation, public health, water supply, and 
regional economic stimulus (White 1998, Jeffrey and Gearey 2006). In his analysis of IWRM 
in the US, Platt (2006) states that a major turning point in the acceptance of approach can be 
seen in the 1965 Federal Resources Planning Act under the New Deal. Under this Act, river 
basin development shifted from engineered projects to water resources management 
involving ‘a broader range of goals, means, and stakeholders at the watershed scale’ (Platt 
2006 30). This shift in focus reflected the growing recognition of sustainable ecosystem 
management, and the need for increased citizen involvement (Platt 2006 30). 
 
At the global level, the UN has promoted IWRM as a major component of approaches to 
water management for the past 60 years (White 1998, Biswas 2004). Water resources 
management was the focus of the UN 1949 Lake Success Conference on the Conservation 
and Utilization of Resources (UN 1951 cited in White 1998), and integrated river basin 
management was reviewed by the Economic and Social Council in 1956 (White 1998). By 
the time of the first UNESCO International Conference in 1977, IWRM was advocated as the 
most feasible means of incorporating the competing uses of water resources (Jeffrey and 
Gearey 2006).   
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The 1992 international conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin and the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro cemented IWRM’s principles and approach as the global response 
to the pending water crisis, outlined in Agenda 21 (Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 2006). 
States were requested to begin implementing IWRM principles by the year 2000, the year 
designated for the second World Water Forum. The Dublin-Rio principles, as outlined in the 
GWP Technical Advisory Committee (2000 13-21) are that:  
1. Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development, and the environment.  
2. Water development and management should be based on a participatory 
approaches involving users, planners, and policymakers at all levels. 
3. Women play a central role in the provision, management, and safeguarding of 
water  
4. Water has an economic value in all its uses and should be recognised as an 
economic good.  
 
The Bonn Freshwater Conference in 2001 prepared a further agenda for the Johannesburg 
Summit. This agenda outlined the need for: water security for the poor, decentralisation of 
water management and partnerships, IWRM to create a platform for information sharing and 
decision making, and improved water governance. Many researchers believe the 
Johannesburg Conference to have been more comprehensive than the Rio convention in that 
it laid out concrete measures for implementation (Varis 2005). Agreed measures included: the 
need to develop IWRM and water efficiency plans by 2005 defining operational targets for 
implementation, developing national and regional strategies for IWRM, improving the 
efficiency of water use, facilitating partnerships, developing gender sensitive policies, and 
involving stakeholders in decision making (Varis 2005).  
 
The 1990s signalled a turning point for IWRM with the switch to demand side management 
away from supply side approaches and the focus on the basin (Petit and Baron 2009). 
However, Ghiotti (2005) asserts that IWRM re-emerged in 1992 with a neo-liberal agenda 
(cited in Petit and Baron 2009). Ghiotti (2005) cites evidence of this in the incorporation of 
IWRM into the agendas of the IMF and World Bank with the fourth principle of water as an 
economic good also stressed during this period. Such principles were reiterated at the 2003 
Third World Forum in Kyoto with IWRM placed within the policy of good governance based 
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on decentralised management and getting the prices right (Ghiotti 2005 cited in Petit and 
Baron 2009). This shift prompted the organisation of an Alternative Water Forum in 2003 
challenging the neoliberal principles attached to IWRM including its focus on privatisation 
(Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 2006).  
 
Despite ongoing discussion on IWRM in international forums, its principles only began to be 
realised in the latter part of the 1990s with the creation of the World Water Council and 
Global Water Partnership (GWP) in 1996 (Varis 2005). The GWP is mandated to build 
international support for IWRM and to facilitate its implementation. In their analysis of the 
emergence of IWRM in global water policy, Mollinga et al (2006) state that the creation of 
these international institutions documents the shift from the perception of freshwater 
management as a local or regional issue to a global one (Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 
2006).  
 
IWRM continues to be a central theme in international platforms shown in its prominent 
inclusion in the 2011 Dresden International Conference (Bordchadt et al 2011 cited in Hering 
and Ingold 2011). The management of water resources is also included under Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) 6 relating to the ‘availability and sustainable management of water 
and sanitation for all’ (UN Water n.d.). Many of the sub-goals under SDG 6 relate to IWRM 
including aspects of equitable access to water, water quality, water productivity, the 
protection of water-related ecosystems, cooperation over water and the capacity building of 
water related institutions, and community participation in water resources management (UN 
Water n.d.). SGD 6.5.1 relates specifically to the degree of IWRM implementation. Data is 
collected every 3 years via consultations with stakeholders including national, subnational 
line ministries, institutions, businesses, and NGOs.  
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Governments have not only agreed to implement IWRM but are actively following up on 
progress (Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 2006). Progress in implementation continues to be 
reviewed at the international level, exemplified in the Rio +20 Conference documenting the 
integration of IWRM into national policies and legislation (UN 2011 cited in Hering and 
Ingold 2012). Durham et al (2002 333) conclude that IWRM has come to be viewed on 
international platforms as the ‘only sustainable solution’ (cited in Jeffrey and Gearey 2006).   
1.4.1 The	IWRM	Model	
The IWRM model requires capacity building and large investment to reform legal, and where 
necessary, constitutional arrangements for water resources management, water policy, water 
management institutions and their financing, and managerial arrangements. These factors 
provide the enabling environment for reform, setting out the rules for stakeholder 
engagement at all administrative levels (GWP 2000) and managerial instruments. The IWRM 
model provides general guidelines against which countries develop their own tailored policies 
on water conservation, distribution, and processing (UNWWDR 2003 cited in Ray 2010). 
Ray (2010) states that any comprehensive review and recommendations for alterations to 
country water policies are expected to take at least 03 years to complete (161). 
 
Table 8 The thirteen key IWRM change areas (source: GWP 2004 11 cited in Petit and Baron 
2009) 
 
Enabling environment 
Figure 25 Map of countries participating in IWRM data collection for SGD 6.5 (Source: IWRM Data 
Portal) 
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1 Policies: setting goals for water use, protection and conservation. 
2. Legislative framework: the rules to follow to achieve policies and goals. 
3. Financing and incentive structures: allocating financial resources to meet water needs. 
 
Institutional roles 
4. Creating an organizational framework: forms and functions. 
5. Institutional capacity building: developing human resources 
 
Management instruments 
6. Water resources assessment: understanding resources and needs. 
7. Planning: combining development options, resource use and human interaction. 
8. Demand management: using water more efficiently. 
9. Social change instruments: encouraging a water-oriented civil society. 
10. Conflict resolution - managing disputes, ensuring sharing of water. 
11. Regulatory instruments: allocation and water use limits. 
12. Economic instruments: using value and prices for efficiency and equity. 
13. Information management and exchange: improving knowledge for better water  
   management 
 
 
1.5 Challenges	and	criticisms	of	IWRM	implementation	internationally	
UN Agencies have placed major investments in IWRM as part of a wider strategy supporting 
developing countries to tackle issues associated with the management of freshwater resources 
(GWP 2000). However, compared to other global environmental policy areas, there are few 
binding agreements on IWRM implementation goals (Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 2006) 
and the evaluation of practical progress has been limited (Biswas 2008, White 1998, Jeffrey 
and Gearey 2006). The 2012 UN Status Report on progress in implementation found that 
since the 1992 conferences set out Agenda 21and the later 2002 Johannesburg Plan, only 
52% of country members had started or had reached an advanced state of implementation for 
IWRM plans (UN Water 2012). Progress in key areas such as institutional reforms has 
primarily been made in countries with high HDI levels (UN Water 2012). Despite significant 
investment in IWRM by national governments (Westcoat 1992 cited in Jeffrey and Gearey 
2006), the 2011 Dresden International Conference concluded that ‘implementation in IWRM 
is lagging behind’ (Borchadt et al 2011 cited in Hering and Ingold 2012).   
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However, little was reported by the UN on specific challenges confronted and common 
problem areas were only brought to light following IWRM’s relatively recent application as 
part of the EU Water Framework Directive. Such findings, have prompted researchers to 
highlight the need to close the gap between theory and practice (Jeffrey and Gearey 2006, 
White 1998, Grigg 2008, Petit and Baron 2009, Gallego-Ayala and Juizo 2011, Biswas 2004, 
2008, Molle 2008, and Hering and Ingold 2011). 
 
Definitional confusion is a common barrier to IWRM’s effective implementation (Mollinga, 
Dixit and Athukorala 2006). Ferragina et al (2002) isolate the 2nd World Water Forum in The 
Hague in 2000 as a significant point in the broadening of the IWRM framework, shifting to 
encompass integration across sectors, water users, and environmental management. Molle 
(2008) states its ambiguities have made IWRM vulnerable to the neoliberal agenda (cited in 
Petit and Baron 2009). Challenges, in part, stem from the ongoing evolution of the 
framework under the GWP (Ferragina, Marra, and Quagliarotti 2002, Mollinga, Dixit and 
Athukorala 2006). Mollinga at al (2006) conclude that the global consensus on IWRM is 
more a compromise ‘sanctioned discourse in the making’ (28). 
 
Jeffrey and Geary (2006) comment that slow progress in implementation is primarily due to 
the reliance on principles rather than a specific blueprint. Biswas (2004, 2008) has written 
extensively on the need to clarify the geographical scope for IWRM, institutions, sectoral 
scope, and required processes within the framework. Biswas (2004, 2008) further stresses 
that sectors relevant to IWRM such as agriculture, energy, transportation, the environment, 
disaster management, and natural resources are major areas by themselves. Biswas (2004, 
2008) therefore raises concerns about the feasibility of management structures related to 
IWRM.  
 
Grigg (2008) contends that the major sectors encompassed by IWRM may already have 
mechanisms for integrated management and highlights pre-existing interdependencies 
encouraging cooperation. However, the 2012 UN Status Report also highlights gaps in the 
form of setting up systems to push institutions to share information (an area raised by Costa 
Rica and Armenia). Australia, in part, tackled the problem of institutional competition by 
placing the cooperative approach for all tiers of government and stakeholders on the national 
agenda (UN Water 2012). The feasibility of cross-sectoral coordination has been shown in 
the coordinated approach to federal water policy in the US (Grigg 2008). A 1988 study at 
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Harvard, Foster and Rogers (1988) found coordination to be a core pillar of US water policy 
with water, energy and environmental policy combined under the US Federal Power Act 
(cited in Grigg 2008).  
 
Falkenmark et al (2004) focus more on the need to outline a strategy for multi-stakeholder 
coordination, cited to encourage self-policing and reduce operation and maintenance costs, 
and currently one of the weakest areas in IWRM implementation (UN Water 2012). Just 22% 
of countries viewed gender mainstreaming relevant to water resources management (UN 
Water 2012). This raises further questions of the need to find pathways to adapt IWRM to 
varying country contexts, an issue also raised by Petit and Baron (2009) and Jeffrey and 
Gearey (2006). Due to the slow pace of change in institutional mindsets, in many cases, 
institutional frameworks have been set up but coordination between entities remains weak 
(UN Water 2012).   
 
Whilst acknowledging the challenges to achieving effective sectoral integration, Grigg (2008) 
and Jeffrey and Gearey (2006), emphasise that, IWRM’s core value is in shifting mindsets. 
This is in the way of pushing key institutional actors to recognise ‘shared values’ and begin 
the process of stakeholder communication (Grigg 2008 279). This realisation is very much in 
line with the Advocacy Coalition Framework that highlights the importance of analysing 
shared values in the reporting of progress towards policy change. The 2012 UN Status Report 
similarly highlights the role that increased awareness of problems related to water resources 
management has contributed to opening dialogue. 
1.6 An	alternative	approach	to	evaluating	IWRM:	The	Advocacy	Coalition	
Framework	
The calls for IWRM processes to be better defined, along with the criticism of weak 
outcomes to date, follows a larger shift in the analysis of public policy beginning in the late 
1960s and 1970s (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994). Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994) and 
other ‘bottom up implementation scholars’ (Berman (1978), Barrett and Fudge (1981) and 
Nakamura (1987) cited in Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994) 197), are critical of this stages 
heuristic model of analysis. They assert that this latter model of analysis fails to identify and 
analyse the influence of forces and causal factors that drive policy processes. They further 
state that a heavy focus on legalistic top down processes restricts the overall analysis of 
policy which tends to involve ‘multiple, interacting cycles’. These cycles are initiated by 
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actors at different levels as formulations of problems and solutions are conceived, tested, and 
reformulated against a background of change (Heclo 1974, Jones 1975, cited in Jenkins-
Smith and Sabatier 1994, 178).   
 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994), comment that it is the translation of policy into decisions, 
applied to very diverse situations by subnational implementing officers, that constitute the 
most important part of the policy process (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Barrett and Fudge 
1981 cited in Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994). Grigg (2008) also highlights the importance 
of ‘alignment’ across all institutional levels, meaning that employees understand the goals, 
responsibilities, language, and organisational mission of IWRM (285). Rather than focusing 
on fixed goals, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994) support the more recent advocacy coalition 
framework as a means to analyse policy processes. This framework shifts the focus to the 
analysis of influential forces and causal factors that drive policy change. The advocacy 
coalition framework is also advocated as a wider framework for the analysis of IWRM by 
Ingold and Hering (2009).  
 
The advocacy coalition framework was developed to provide a causal theory of policy 
processes focusing on the interaction of actors from different institutions and levels of 
government (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994). The framework advocates for the 
conceptualisation of public policy as a belief system, setting out value priorities and causal 
assumptions on how these can be realised (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994). This belief 
system involves value priorities, perceptions of causal relationships, and perceptions about 
conditions or the magnitude of a problem. The framework is based on the premise that the 
belief systems of various coalitions translate into administrative structures and coalitions held 
together by core beliefs. Beliefs governing these structures may include those held on human 
equality and individual value, followed by the division of responsibility between government 
and markets, the relative importance of economic development versus environmental 
protection, and secondary aspects such as desirable budgetary allocations which are more 
readily adjusted.  
 
Under the advocacy coalition framework, it is recognised that belief systems often resist 
changing their core beliefs regardless of policy changes. The only way to change policy 
attributes in practice is therefore an external shock which fundamentally alters the 
distribution of resources among coalitions (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994, 183). For the 
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purposes of this study, two external shocks are taken to instigate fundamental change, the 
change in climate conditions and the rapid changes in demographic pressures in South Asia 
and their joint impacts on the availability of freshwater resources. Evidence for the increasing 
priority of natural resources management and associated sector of disaster management, is 
cited in the significant levels of investment taking place to restructure and modernise 
government institutions in developing countries. It is forwarded that this change in priorities 
has created a policy window that must be exploited if systems of water management are to 
improve. Further to this, there has already been extensive research followed by a major shift 
in the policies of western governments towards the management of water resources in the 
latter half of this century. This is exemplified in the cases of the US, the Nordic countries, 
and the EU, showing this change in mindsets, that effectively amounts to a reversal of policy, 
is possible. 
 
The heavy emphasis placed by researchers such as Biswas (2004, 2008) on the form, scope of 
integration, scope of geography and institutions involved in IWRM is argued here to place 
too greater importance on outcomes rather than the process of internalising IWRM among 
officials and water users. This is also an aspect recently highlighted by the Asia Development 
Bank in relation to its work on IWRM in South Asia (Shah and Lele 2011). In response to 
criticisms on IWRM’s ambiguity, Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala (2006) argue that IWRM is 
a ‘working definition’ (1); its ambiguities therefore allow space for it to be adapted to 
regional, climate, and country priorities and norms (Mollinga, Dixit and Athukorala 2006). 
Deciphering a fixed prescriptive approach is argued to repeat the mistakes of the past rather 
than tackling the specific problems and challenges of each site (Platt 2006).   
 
Some of the key criticisms of IWRM are associated with the problems of coordination, and 
the political disincentives for collective action and inter-jurisdictional cooperation (as 
outlined by Costeau and Wolman in 1983, cited in Grigg 2008). Here it is argued that with 
the onset of climate change and the cumulative effects of demographic pressures and poor 
water management, the motivation to implement IWRM on a wider scale has been relatively 
recent. Prior to the recognition of the new environmental and demographic context, it is 
argued that political rivalries were institutionalised priorities, making it impossible to 
implement such approaches to water resources management in countries dominated by vested 
interests. The feasibility for countries to adopt IWRM practices must be reassessed within the 
lens of new environmental, resource, and demographic scenarios.	
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2 Chapter	Two:	Water	Governance	in	South	Asia	
2.1 The	benefits	and	challenges	of	strengthening	water	governance	in	
South	Asia	
According to Huda (2005), with proper management, the total quantum of water received in 
major basins such as the Ganga, Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) is enough to meet the 
requirements of all co-basin countries. However, in recent decades, South Asia has been 
plagued by tensions over how to manage water shortages with the Indus River and the River 
Ganges almost entirely utilised. Challenges remain on how to effectively store and 
redistribute monsoon waters ‘within a mutually agreed framework’ (Adhikari et al. 2000 
cited in Huda 2005 114). China’s future withdrawals on the Brahmaputra River are also 
likely to rise causing further tensions as the country confronts a major water crisis, this may 
have a knock-on effect on India’s withdrawals on the River Indus. Major transboundary 
rivers, the Indus, the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra are shared between multiple countries 
(see table 9 showing internal and external flows).  
 
Table 9 Freshwater flows and per capita water available in mainland South Asia in 2000 (Source: 
World Development Indicators 2003)9 
 Internal flows in 
Billion Metres 
Flows from other countries in Billion 
Metres [%] 
Pakistan 52 170.3 [76.6] 
India 1,261 647.2 [34.0] 
Bangladesh 105 1,105.6 [91.3] 
Nepal 198 12.0 [5.7] 
 
With a total length of 2900kms, the Indus Basin alone covers areas of Pakistan (47% of the 
basin), India (39%), China (8%), and Afghanistan (6%) (Franken 2012 cited in Ringler and 
Anwar 2016 16). Despite the extent of shared river basins in South Asia, only bilateral level 
agreements have been focused on to date (Merrey, et al. 2016). This lack of cooperation is 
exacerbating the effects of climate change with mitigating activities often reliant on trade-
offs. It also reduces water productivity by pushing the focus to supply and away from 
demand management. 
                                                             
9 World Development Indicators (2003), World Bank, cited in Ray (2010) 15 
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Ray (2010) cites the lack of regional planning as naïve considering China has undeclared 
rights to major transboundary rivers such as the Indus and the Brahmaputra (142). Ray (2010) 
further states that regional approaches cannot move forward without China’s participation 
(Ray 2010). Common barriers to regional cooperation and development are cited as the lack 
of trust, confidence, and or shared vision among government and the public in co-riparian 
countries (Biswas 2011, cited in Merrey, et al. 2016). This has, in part, contributed to an 
unwillingness to share data, the lack of shared systems to support regional development 
planning, and a reluctance to utilise external mediators (D. J. Merrey 2008).  
 
Countries in South Asia, have predominantly taken a defensive approach towards resource 
sharing impeding all forms of cooperation (Uprety 2012). James (1994) comments that South 
Asian countries have repeatedly exploited long-standing regional tensions over water 
resources management. James (1994) states that water has been consistently utilised as a tool 
to secure political allies with countries played off against one another. This approach has 
detracted from issues related to sub-national level biases allocations, waste, the cumulative 
impacts of climate change, and poor ecosystem management. This issue is exemplified in the 
repeated exploitation of tensions post-partition in both India and Pakistan (Sobhan 2000 cited 
in Ray 2010). In Pakistan this has been in the way that successive government have framed 
water shortages in lower riparian Sindh as being predominantly caused by India. Repeated 
media attention on the Indo-Pakistan water dispute has served to limit space for critiquing the 
poor transparency of Pakistan’s provincial water allocations. Internal tensions have further 
affected external country relations with the power and needs of individual states in India and 
Pakistan hampering cooperation at the national level. This is seen in West Bengal’s continued 
veto of the Teesta River water sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh (D. J. 
Merrey 2008, Basu 2017).  
 
The absence of regional level regulations for the use of groundwater, now a vital resource in 
South Asia, is further exacerbating water shortages as a result of over-extraction and 
pollution. There are scant regulations for pollution control being only mentioned as part of 
allocative agreements with little or no enforcement (Ray 2010). Further challenges to the 
protection of ground and surface water resources stem from issues related to governance, 
legislative overlaps, enforcement, and weak capacity among government institutions.  
Reporting on Southern Asia in 2000, Water Vision stated,  
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‘The issues in governance, policy, and institutions are so critical that without 
addressing them in adequate measure in each of the countries, integrated 
development and management of water resources for realising a sustainable water 
vision in 2025 will only be an academic exercise’ (cited in Varis 2005 22) 
 
Merrey et al (2016) conclude that there is a lack of understanding of the potential benefits of 
transboundary cooperation being viewed as a win-lose situation. However, they state that 
relatively recent initiatives such as the creation of an integrated South Asia power grid for 
hydroelectricity, have opened major opportunities for regional development planning and 
prosperity. Merrey et al (2016) also cite cooperation between India and Bhutan as 
demonstrative of the potential for integrated approaches in the region. Further initiatives such 
as the planned CASA-1000 power transmission line between Afghanistan, Tajikistan, 
Pakistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, illustrate tentative moves towards a more regional vision 
for development.  
2.2 The	ongoing	development	of	water	governance	in	South	Asia	
The division of basins in the latter half of the 20th century, due to partition and the separation 
of Bangladesh from Pakistan, led to a host of bilateral level agreements (Uprety 2012, Ray 
2010). Major treaties agreed upon post-independence have been in the main mediated by 
external partners, these include the:  
• 1960 Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan,  
• 1964 Kosi Treaty to address flooding in Nepal and India,  
• 1996 Sharda (Mahakali) Treaty between Nepal and India,  
• 1959 Gandaki, and the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty (Farakka) between India 
and Bangladesh  
These international agreements have led to the establishment of permanent commissions to 
monitor water levels and oversee implementation. These include the Indo-Bangladesh Joint 
Rivers Commission, the Mahakali River Commission, the Indo-Nepal Kosi Project 
Commission, and the Indus River Commission.  
 
However, country level stakeholders have repeatedly asserted that existing water agreements 
have only been loosely enforced. Tensions over the poor enforcement of agreements 
specifically relate to the failure of Bangladesh to secure its rightful water share as agreed 
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under the 1996 Farakka Treaty, the lack of compensation for Nepalise farmers for submerged 
land and the failure to set up implementation bodies for the Kosi and Mahakali Treaties, and 
security restrictions impeding monitoring under the Indus River Commission (BCAS 2015, 
Ray 2010, LIFE 2015, ISET-N 2015). Downstream riparian country populations have been 
further frustrated by developments occurring in upper basins, indicating the need to review 
and update treaties in accordance with changing land use and investments (Uprety 2012). 
Furthermore, due the weak enforcement of treaties and the subsequent overexploitation of 
water resources, civil unrest and protests have been reported over lower water flows 
throughout the region (BCAS 2015).  
 
International criticisms relate to the rigid and static nature of such codified agreements 
making modifications costly (Uprety 2012, D. J. Merrey 2008). Uprety (2012) and Giordano 
and Wolf (2003) stress the need for water agreements to be more flexible going beyond 
cooperation to integration improving resource trade-offs. Merrey et al (2016) further state 
that South Asia still lacks the necessary institutions and frameworks to support opportunities 
for negotiation and skills sharing on regional water governance. At present, the South Asia 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a weak entity and the Global Water Partnership in South 
Asia is viewed to have little authority (D. J. Merrey 2008).  
 
A series of studies into transboundary water agreements conducted by LIFE, ISET-N, and 
BCAS, commissioned by the Asia Foundation in 2015, highlight the key issue of limited 
space for public engagement in treaties. There is little public awareness of treaty conditions 
and few opportunities for participation in discussions with bilateral meetings declared on an 
ex post facto basis and little or no information on meeting agendas or outcomes (LIFE 2015). 
Local stakeholders frequently complain about obstructions to accessing up-to-date 
hydrological data on flow, pollution levels, and water levels in transboundary rivers with 
misinformation on infrastructural management driving cross-border tensions (BCAS 2015, 
LIFE 2015). This is in part due to some information being classified, the lack of any 
systematic documentation leading to discrepancies in the quality of data, and the fact that 
many authorities still work offline impeding information sharing (LIFE 2015, ISET-N 2015). 
These aspects make information requests a lengthy process at times requiring multiple 
sources (BCAS 2015). The problem of asymmetrical information between upper and lower 
riparian areas has further exacerbated tensions (D. J. Merrey 2008, Uprety 2012) with a need 
to set up shared platforms for data exchange (LIFE 2015).  
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The study completed by ISET-N (2015) in Nepal concludes that improved public access to 
information and participation is vital to strengthening support for regional cooperation. They 
state that it will raise awareness on the need for shared responsibility in managing water 
resources, improve public scrutiny, and reduce cases of media misinformation lowering 
cross-border tensions. Some progress has also been made with networks such as the South 
Asia Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies (SaciWATERS) bringing 
researchers and universities together; this represents a major step towards interdisciplinary 
research and planning. 
2.3 Case	Study:	The	1960	Indus	Water	Treaty	
The separation of Hindustan into Pakistan and India was an emotionally charged and violent 
undertaking (Lieven 2012). Britain’s rushed withdrawal meant that issues resulting from the 
division of Hindustan’s irrigation network were overlooked in the marking of country borders 
(Spate 1948, cited in Wescoat, Halvorson and Mustafa 2000). Poor decisions by the 1947 
Radcliffe Commission worsened conflict over land and water rights along the shared Indo-
Pakistan border which cuts 
across rivers and canal 
commands. Partition split the 
Indus River between India and 
Pakistan, the new lower 
riparian. Under the Radcliff 
Award, India became the 
owner of 2 head-works of 
Pakistan canals, an aspect 
which has caused ongoing 
tensions between the two 
countries (Palijo 2003).   
 
Negotiations were initially delayed due to the failure to demarcate the international boundary 
in the 1947 British Act of Parliament. A Standstill agreement was signed ensuring continued 
water flow until the end of the rabi crop in March 1948 (Ranjan 2012). East Punjab refused 
to renew this agreement in April 1948 halting the supply of water to Pakistan at the 
Madhavpur and Ferozpur headworks on the Ravi and Beas. This stopped the flow of water to 
Figure 26 The split of the Indus River and its tributaries (source: 
Al Jazeera 2011) 
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the central Bari Doab Canal, the Dipalpur Canal, and the Bahalwalpur distributary (Palijo 
2003). India utilised this move to question Pakistan’s rights to these waters demanding 
charges as a condition for their re-opening (Palijo 2003, Ranjan 2012). Over time, water was 
restored to the Dipalpur Canal and Central Bari and Doab Canals, however, water was 
withheld from the Bahawalpur distributary resulting in large areas of the Bahawalpur State 
reverting to desert land.  
 
In his analysis of the 1960 Treaty negotiations, Sindhi writer Palijo (2003) states that India’s 
actions in cutting Pakistan’s water supply, forced the country to give away its water rights. 
The majority of the formally united Punjab’s share of the Indus Basin’s eastern rivers were 
allocated to India, Pakistan further agreed to share the costs of running the Head Works. 
Palijo (2003) and Bisht (2013) state that questions surround the fact that Pakistan did not 
consult an International Arbitrary Tribunal once its water was cut off nor take recourse to the 
World Court at the Hague. This was justified by the ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan, Malik 
Feroze Khan by the priority need to restore the flow of water (cited in Palijo 2003). However, 
Palijo (2003) forwards that the process was part of a strategy to justify depriving Sindh, 
Punjab’s ‘traditional adversary’, of water by creating a new level for negotiations (42). It is 
therefore forwarded that the water dispute with India was utilised by the Pakistan Punjab as a 
means to suppress Sindh’s economic development. There remains distrust over the supply 
calculations utilised to justify the development of further barrages on the Indus River as part 
of the Treaty given the conditions of water shortages (Palijo 2003).  
 
Further tensions resulted from the 1960 Indus Water Treaty being negotiated without proper 
stakeholder representation from Pakistan’s provinces with the original negotiating team 
including engineers from Sindh and KPK being disbanded in 1955 (Palijo 2003). The team 
was replaced by members from the Pakistan Punjab only (Palijo 2003). The Indus Advisory 
Board (IBAB), formed in 1959 to forward a plan to the World Bank to compensate for the 
loss of the Eastern Waters to India, was also constituted of Punjabis only (Palijo 2003). In 
this respect, the Treaty negotiations disregarded the century long dispute over water between 
Punjab discounting all previous accords and negotiations (Palijo 2003). These previous 
investigations over water shortages in Sindh had critically led to legal limitations on the 
construction of further water infrastructure, a condition discarded by the 1960 Treaty. In this 
respect, Palijo (2003) states that the line between the ‘replacement’ of waters lost and 
‘development’ of further command areas should have been clarified (97). 
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The Treaty was negotiated during a turbulent period in Pakistan’s history further placing its 
ability to reach a representative solution into question. In this respect, Palijo (2003) highlights 
the imposition of Martial Law in 1958 by President Iskandar Mirza aided by Ayub Khan 
during which provincial cabinets and the central cabinet were dismissed. Although these 
developments were broadly accepted internationally, Palijo (2003) states that under such 
conditions, the negotiation process took limited account of historical rights and internal 
politics. Tensions within and between Pakistan and India over the Treaty conditions have re-
emerged in recent years as water levels lower. 
 
Mediated by the World Bank from 1952 onwards, the 1960 Indus Water Treaty constitutes a 
legally binding agreement. It replaces the 1948 Inter-Dominion Accord which apportioned 
water during the initial years of partition. The Indus Treaty gives waters from the eastern 
basin rivers, comprising the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas, exclusively to India (Article II). This 
enables the direct use of the Indus 
and its tributaries in the Indian 
states of Punjab, Himachal 
Pradesh, and Kashmir. Waters 
from the western rivers, 
comprising the Indus, Jhelum, 
and Chenab, are given 
predominantly to Pakistan 
(Article III). Here the River Indus 
and its tributaries flow through 
the administrative area of Gilgit 
Baltistan and provinces of KPK, 
AJ&K, Punjab, and Sindh. India 
is entitled to nearly 33 MAF or 
20% of the total water carried by the Indus River whilst Pakistan is entitled to almost 125 
MAF of water providing approximately 95% of surface water to its canal irrigation network 
(Perera 2003).  
 
Focused on water allocations and the impacts of engineering works, the Indus Treaty 
represents a concerted endeavour to cooperate on the management of the Indus tributaries 
Figure 27 1960 Indus Water Treaty (Source: World Bank n.d.) 
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(Article VII). To facilitate treaty management, India and Pakistan created Commissioner/ 
Engineering posts which now form the Permanent Indus Commission. This Commission is 
responsible for maintaining arrangements for implementation and for reporting problem areas 
(article VIII); representatives from India and Pakistan further exchange monthly data on the 
flow and use of the waters. The Commission meets annually, carries out compliance 
inspections every 5 years, and follows a set procedure to adjudicate disputes arising over the 
allocation of waters (Article X).  
 
Being led by engineers at the World Bank, the sharing of the Indus River waters was 
approached as a technical problem relying on the use of fixed time-bound allocations. These 
allocations are controlled by infrastructure in the form of barrages, link canals, and reservoir 
storage, and discharge observation stations (Article IV). This infrastructure was constructed, 
in part, to compensate areas left without water access being utilised to transfer 20 MAF to the 
eastern parts of Pakistan cut off from irrigation flow under the Treaty (Kahlown and Majeed 
2002 cited in Ringler and Anwar 2016). Long term financing came from the Indus Basin 
Development Fund Agreement, agreed between Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, 
the UK, and the US, alongside contributions from the World Bank, India, and Pakistan.  
 
The purely technical approach taken to the Indus Treaty led to the ‘partitioning of the rivers’ 
rather than the sharing of their waters. This methodology lay the foundations for a 
‘technocratic paradigm’ in the form of the centralised fixed rotation irrigation system for 
managing water resources in Pakistan and India that remains until today (Bisht 2013). The 
Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) now covers 15 million hectares with its infrastructural 
assets valued at approximately USD 300 billion (Ringler and Anwar 2016). This has resulted 
in a framework for water management that is supply focused being dependent upon water 
infrastructure and fixed bureaucratic measures (Bisht 2013). The system at present contains 
few IWRM principles due to its rigidity and the centralised nature of its management.  
 
Since the 1960 Treaty was ratified, the two countries have not engaged in any violent 
conflicts over water. Given that the treaty has survived 3 wars, it is considered one of the 
most successful agreements for water sharing today. However, disputes between the two 
countries are re-occurring as overall demand for water grows. Linking the Kashmir conflict 
to water has also served to divert attention away from provincial tensions over water rights 
(Bisht 2013). Presenting water as an external conflict has been further exploited by extremist 
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groups encouraging people to fight for their water rights, this is illustrated in the fact that 
some groups now include farmer organisations (Bisht 2013).  
 
Despite political manipulation, legitimate concerns have been raised from both countries over 
the years over the construction of further water related infrastructure. To date, Pakistan has 
contested: 
• India’s construction of the Wullar Barrage on the Jhelum River halting construction in 
1987 (Ray 2010),  
• India’s construction of the Baglihar dam on the Chenab leading to a reduction in the 
height of the dam,  
• India’s plans to construct more dams on the Indus River’s tributaries for water 
harvesting, and  
• The technical design features of India’s Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric power 
plants being constructed on a tributary of the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers which has 
been taken to a Court of Arbitration (World Bank 2017).  
• The development of the Upper Bari Doab canals in India have also worsened water 
shortages in the lower riparian province of Sindh in Pakistan forcing separate 
provisions to be made (Mohile 2005).  
 
India has contested: 
• Pakistan’s proposal to construct the Diamar-Bhasha dam on the Indus River in Gilgit 
in Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) for water harvesting.  
• Pakistan’s Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) which India cites as increasing flooding 
and contaminating water bodies in Gujarat, a lower riparian area of the Indus basin.  
 
In the aftermath of the 2016 Uri attack, India filed a public interest litigation in its Supreme 
Court proposing changes to the Indus Treaty (Perera 2003). It also challenged the validity of 
the Indus Treaty given that it was signed by the Indian Prime Minister and not the President 
of India as the head of the Indian Republic. 
 
Experts acknowledge the need to review and update the 1960 Treaty in terms of its conditions 
and scope. Varying views are forwarded for the need to update the Treaty with a key concern 
being its failure to account for the impacts of climate change on estimated minimum flow 
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(Ray 2010, Shah 2009). Further concerns centre on the need to improve the regulation of 
groundwater use and water quality. Palijo (2003) asserts that, alongside rainwater, even 
without the impacts of climate change, groundwater flow should be accounted for in the 
Treaty. Palijo (2003) has also voiced stronger concerns that the treaty was negotiated without 
representation from the lower riparian province of Sindh, the province worst affected by 
minimal environmental flows not being maintained. Conversely, Mohile (2005) overlooks 
current concerns over the treaty and the potential need for its renegotiation, advising that it 
should be expanded to include China and Afghanistan. Mohile (2005) forwards that in this 
way the Treaty can be utilised as a platform for cooperation on water resources management 
in the region, effectively becoming basin wide. These critical issues demonstrate the highly 
political nature of water politics and the importance of including key provincial and regional 
stakeholders in the development of water treaties. 
2.4 The	Development	of	IWRM	policy	and	legislation	in	South	Asia	
Mollinga (2006) asserts that IWRM initiatives in South Asia have predominantly been driven 
by international actors and donors such as GWP Asia and the World Bank. A host of 
international conferences have been held in countries across the region since 2002 pushing 
the IWRM agenda, and more recently, connecting it to the sustainable development goals 
(SDGs). Prominent among these are Regional Council Meetings held under GWP South 
Asia, and conferences organised by the GWP Technical Committee (GWP South Asia 2017) 
and held by the South Asia Water Research (SaciWATERs). These latter conferences have 
been held as part of the Crossing Boundaries capacity building project under the South Asia 
Water Initiative (SAWI) funded by the UK, Australia, and Norway (World Bank 2017). 
Much activity has been focused on encouraging regional cooperation, building capacity for 
interdisciplinary approaches to water management, stakeholder inclusion, and planning (P. 
Mollinga 2006, World Bank 2017, GWP South Asia 2017) 
 
The Crossing Boundaries initiative has been instrumental in prompting research on IWRM 
and transboundary cooperation in the region, as referenced in Mollinga (2006). GWP and 
Country Policy Support Programme (CPSP) have also significantly contributed to research on 
IWRM in South Asia with a series of water resource assessments undertaken from 2002 
onwards. These assessments aided in understanding the nature and scope of current and 
future challenges associated with water resources, identifying priority areas and potential 
solutions (CPSP 2006). However, in the case of Pakistan, only a snapshot is provided with 
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the country assessment focusing on the most drought affected province of Balochistan only. 
Further international research studies on IWRM in South Asia have, in part, been instigated 
by the increasingly multi-sectoral nature of disputes over water resources (P. Mollinga 2006). 
More local research initiatives are evidenced in the work of the Delhi based Centre for 
Science and Environment setup by Agarwal and the International Crop Research Institute for 
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). 
 
Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel (2006) highlight earlier ad hoc endeavours made by actors 
within countries such as India with the Damodar Valley Authority setup in 1948, based on 
the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority. IWRM has in fact been incorporated into 
policy documents in India since 1987 and undergoing review in 2002 (Shah et al 2006). 
Despite the incorporation of IWRM into policy documentation in several South Asian 
countries, minimal efforts have been placed in their operationalisation (P. Mollinga 2006). 
Evidence of challenges in reaching government consensus on water policies is shown in the 
fact that groundwater laws have been debated among Indian states for more than 30 years and 
remain in draft form (Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel 2006). Despite a bill for the regulation 
of groundwater being passed in Gujrat in 1974, the Chief Minister refused to pass this into 
law due to envisioned challenges in enforcement and concerns over creating windows for rent 
seeking. In Sri Lanka also, its Water Resources Board was setup in 1964 to promote 
integrated water resources planning and trans-basin development (Shah, Makin and 
Sakthivadivel 2006). However, Shah et al (2006) state that Sri Lanka is yet to enact any water 
legislation, an issue that has been debated since the 1980s.  
 
A central reason for slow progress in forming effective water policies and legislation in South 
Asian countries is the continued emphasis on technocratic approaches to water management 
(P. Mollinga 2006, Mustafa and Wrathall, 2011). Investment in this region continues to 
largely focus on the centralised control of water resources, increasing agricultural output, and 
power generation at the expense of concerns over the environment and equality (Allan 2006). 
Accordingly, government water bureaucracy has been reluctant to listen to local voices 
seeking more diverse and complex planning processes (P. Mollinga 2006). Shah et al (2006) 
highlight how in reaction to continued government focus on irrigation and municipal water 
supplies, civil society organisations and NGOs in India have aided public movements for 
rainwater harvesting and groundwater re-charge.  
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Despite decentralisation and devolution gaining increasing support across South Asia, over 
the past 25 years, the concept of participation in policy formation has been slow to evolve 
remaining centred on the legitimisation of community involvement in resource management 
(P. Mollinga 2006). Participation has also been viewed as a threat, displacing the importance 
of engineering, this aspect is documented in the World Bank’s endeavours to implement 
water users’ associations in Pakistan (P. Mollinga 2006). 
 
The notion of water as an economic good has been largely rejected in developing countries 
where a high number of people live below the poverty line (Allan 2006). For this reason, and 
due to the fact that most water users are not registered with service providers, the use of 
economic instruments for the control of water use remains contentious (Petit and Baron 2009, 
GWP 2000). Shah et al (2006) highlight that millions of farmers already pay for pump and 
surface water irrigation services in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. India has also 
successfully set stringent standards for the discharge of effluents into natural waters and 
managed to apply associated penalty fees under a policy of the polluter pays (Thatte 2005). 
India has further adapted IWRM principles to make economic criteria less stringent for areas 
containing large tribal populations with separate arrangements for financing and monitoring 
(Mohile 2005), an approach that could also be applied in the tribal areas of FATA in 
Pakistan.  
 
Despite these successes, due to the large number of small scale stakeholders with few 
linkages to government institutions, the enforcement of water legislation is generally weak 
(Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel 2006). Shah and van Koppen (2006) are therefore critical of 
the efficiency of water pricing in economies where the bulk of water diverted is in the 
informal sector where users have little or no contact with formal water agencies (cited in Petit 
and Baron 2009). Challenges with enforcement relate to monitoring water use, preventing 
illegal water diversions, and in ensuring that transparent water charges are applied for water 
use across sectors and for water of varying qualities (Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel 2006). 
Further challenges stem from endeavours to remove subsidies to discourage the informal and 
unregulated pumping of groundwater across South Asia’s 20 million tubewell owners (Shah, 
Makin and Sakthivadivel 2006). Groundwater is now the most threatened resource in the 
region and Shah et al (2006) recommend the use of Aquifer Management Councils to 
improve monitoring. Most governments have chosen to rely on direct regulation and the 
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GWP (2000) concedes that in some countries, the use of economic instruments may be 
unrealistic.  
 
Due to land titling predominantly belonging to the head of the household, women continue to 
confront major barriers to participation in water management in South Asia. Despite having a 
strong interest in health, sanitation, and drinking water for the household, women are not 
entitled to water rights (Huda 2005). Ray (2010) states that the need to increase the 
participation of women was missed in India’s water policy with no inclusion of the country’s 
‘unique social context’ (xviii-xix). Despite not being landowners, Mohile (2005) suggests the 
election of female family members to Participatory Irrigation Management committees. The 
Gender and Water Alliance (GWA), formed in 2000 to push the representation of women in 
water resources management was the first regional strategic planning event to mainstream 
gender into IWRM held in 2007. However, at present the GWA appears to be a weak force 
acting predominantly as a platform for sharing research. 
 
Shah et al (2006) comment that 
many barriers to policy change are 
expected to recede as the water 
crisis intensifies and the opportunity 
costs of not adapting mount. They 
draw on environmental theory 
which shows that the social, 
political, and, economic costs of 
correcting water mismanagement 
will be reduced as country dynamics 
alter to become ‘post-agrarian 
societies’ (Shah et al 2006 135). This eases pressures on irrigated farming as people migrate 
to urban areas or develop farming into a supplementary form of income for industrial 
employment.		
The relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation is defined in the 
environmental Kuznets curve, illustrated as an inverted ‘U’ (cited in Shah et al 2006, see 
figure 28). This is based on the hypothesis that as economies grow, they exploit natural 
resources for wealth creation but as per capita income increases, demand for, and the capacity 
Figure 28 Kuznets Environmental Curve (Source: 
Kuznets cited in Shah et al 2006) 
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of people to collectively demand environmental amenities grows; this pushes environmental 
protection and ecotourism into policy agendas. Shah at al. (2006) argue that whilst research 
on this hypothesis is not yet conclusive, it is supported by studies on Bangladesh, Burkina 
Faso, the industrial revolution in Europe, and countries that experienced a more rapid growth 
curve including Japan and Taiwan (Shah et al 2006).	
2.5 Challenges	and	criticisms	of	IWRM	implementation	in	South	Asia	
In practice, few activities have taken place under IWRM in South Asia (GWP 2006 cited in 
Mollinga 2006). The most recent UN Water Report on IWRM implementation, published in 
2012, finds that since the agreement to develop country water plans in 2002, just over 50% of 
country members in Asia and the Pacific are in various stages of implementation (UN Water 
2012). Mollinga (2006) states that the slow progress in policy implementation is primarily 
due to the extent of politics around water management hindering the internalisation of IWRM 
in management institutions. Allan (2006) further comments that government is frequently 
unwilling to address problems related to water allocations due to strong coalitions between 
local politicians, vested interests, and national leadership. The factor of internal politics 
around water resources management is not only common to South Asian countries but also 
brought out in Moss’s (2006) study of Europe. In Europe, the landed aristocracy were 
initially suspicious that IWRM was being utilised by new wealthy farmers to undermine 
traditional water regimes. Moss (2006) stresses that it is critical to view challenges with the 
institutionalisation of IWRM through the lens of potential winners and losers of change. 
 
Instances of where IWRM has been implemented are more isolated cases rather than as part 
of any wider national or regional policy. Examples of IWRM implementation include: the 
systematic transmission of data on flood levels between India and Bangladesh and the 
integration of hydropower and irrigation in the Indus river basin (Bhakra-Nangal, Beas-Sultej 
diversion, Pong dam-Rajasthan Canal). Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel (2006) also highlight 
feasibility studies conducted in the late 1990s that emphasise the challenges in more basin 
wide projects in the region. Highlighted issues included difficulties in coordinating 
authorities and in controlling pesticide application, challenges in ensuring the removal of 
vegetation, and the poor education of resource users (Hu 1999 cited in Shah, Makin and 
Sakthivadivel 2006). Given the extent of challenges, the translation of IWRM policy into 
tangible measures may be largely contingent on the extent of environmental and demographic 
pressures placed on the political establishment to instigate changes. 
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In analysing the feasibility of IWRM, South Asian writers stress that funding for institutional 
infrastructure, water protection measures, and associated administrative tasks must take into 
account the differing budgets in developing and developed country economies. Shah et al 
(2006) cite the examples of the USD 1 billion budget operated by the Califormia State 
Department of Water Resources (Svendsen 2000) and the less than USD 10 million Gujarat 
Department of Water Resources. HR budgets must also account for the largely dispersed 
rural populations found in many South Asian countries (Mohile 2005). Implementing IWRM 
is therefore a huge undertaking, this is evidenced by the example of Bangladesh where the 
realisation of the National Water Management Plan for the period from 2002 to 2025 was 
estimated at USD$18 billion (Huda 2005). However, given the increasing impacts of the 
global water crisis and the prominent role that agriculture still plays in South Asian 
economies, donor funding may be forthcoming (Blignaut 2009, cited in Hering and Ingold 
2012).   
 
India is often cited as a case study for IWRM, however there are differing accounts on the 
progress in implementation. Mohile (2005) is relatively optimistic about progress stating that 
India has achieved partial integration via its implementation of watershed management, the 
integration of surface and groundwater uses in Utter Pradesh, and the integration of flood 
control and conservation in the Hirakud reservoir of the Mahanadi basin. However, D’Souza 
(2006) finds that India’s water policy has been largely ignored and that the National Water 
Resource Council (NWRC) has no statutory power (cited in Ray 2010). D’Souza (2006) 
evidences these findings in the: absence of any means of enforcing limits on groundwater 
extraction resulting in the drying up of village wells in Maharastra10, failure to set up river 
basin authorities, and continuance of inter-state conflicts over water.  
 
India’s recent USD 125 billion investment in the national river linking project to store and 
transfer surplus water from the Himalayan Rivers to the rain-fed Peninsular Rivers also goes 
against IWRM’s principles. Constituting the largest infrastructural project in the world, 200 
large dams will be constructed and 10 major rivers connected displacing 450,000 people and 
submerging 79,300 hectares of forestland (Ray 2010 90). The river-linking project is driven 
                                                             
10 Sugarcane cultivators occupy 10% of the state’s farmland butt consume 50% of the irrigation water (Clarke 
1991, cited in Ray 2010) 
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by engineering and politics and has forged ahead without consultation with affected countries 
in the region (Balachandran 2015, Ray 2010). This project demonstrates the Indian 
Government’s continued commitment to supply-side solutions with little understanding of 
environmental sustainability.  
 
In order to achieve its holistic approach to water resources management, IWRM requires an 
unprecedented level of institutional cooperation (Allan 2006, GWP 2000). However, at 
present the water sector in the form of government institutions in South Asia is very 
fragmented (Varis 2005) with the exception being the sectors of irrigation and hydropower. 
Due to the required level of institutional transformation, it will not be feasible for all 
countries to fully adopt all IWRM principles unless realistic goals are set out based on 
institutional capacity and political context. Sectors associated with IWRM including 
agriculture, energy, transportation, the environment, and disaster management, are all 
established areas in themselves, making integration difficult (Biswas 2004). Entrenched 
institutions often resist changes and are reluctant to take on new responsibilities (Moss 2006). 
This is seen in the refusal of irrigation departments in India to direct more reliable water 
supplies to municipal water users, even after being converted to the water resources 
management departments (Mohile 2005). Due to the continued dominance of the irrigation 
sector, significant barriers remain to integrating the management of irrigation and domestic 
water (Mohile 2005). Such institutional mindsets previously pushed donors such as the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank to withhold funding until national water councils are 
formed (Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel 2006).  
 
There are further challenges surrounding the autonomy and competence of local level actors 
in South Asian countries to implement IWRM, as raised by Biswas et al (2005). This is due 
to the traditional dominance of the state in the management of natural resources, meaning 
there is little experience of water resources management planning at the subnational level. An 
example of this assertion is the process of decentralisation in Pakistan under the 18th 
amendment in 2010 which exposed major capacity gaps in provincial level institutions during 
the 2010 floods (World Bank 2014). Reforming provincial and district level institutions 
towards catchment based approaches via the redistribution of responsibilities presents 
considerable challenges (Moss 2006). There are also criticisms that the promotion of river 
basin organisations enables the continuance of technocratic agencies at the provincial level 
with institutions ‘re-inventing themselves as basin organisations’ (P. Mollinga 2006). 
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Conversely, creating new institutions for the purpose of IWRM raises questions of their 
compatibility and relationships with existing institutions for water management (Moss 2006).  
 
Despite the advantages of provincial level pacts on water resources, inter-provincial/state 
conflicts are common in India and Pakistan being separated by language, sub-cultures, or 
even sub-nationalities (Mohile 2005). Mohile (2005) highlights how despite the advantages 
of long distance water transfers between states in the east and west of India, initiatives have 
been hindered by interstate tensions. Exceptions can be seen in the creation of interstate 
reservoirs in the Narmada basin in India and storage reservoirs for flood relief downstream 
(Mohile 2005). Mohile (2005), concludes that cooperation could be improved with the 
establishment of an independent authority for conflict resolution and monitoring. 
 
At the community level, Water Users Associations have been set up in the provinces of KPK, 
Punjab, and Sindh in Pakistan as part of the Global Irrigation Management Transfer initiative 
funded by the World Bank. This is, in part, driven by the need to bring water users into the 
formal sector (Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel 2006). The concept of communal 
responsibility for water resources management is already established in India’s southern 
peninsula and Sri Lanka. This is largely due to the need for the artificial management of 
catchment areas and the pre-monsoon management of water infrastructure (Shah, Makin and 
Sakthivadivel 2006). A notable example of grassroots participation can also be found in 
Nepal in the Arun III multipurpose dam project. Following stakeholder inputs, the 
government went against World Bank recommendations opting for more cost effective and 
environmentally sustainable smaller dams (Ray 2010). As a result, the production cost 
difference per KW was reduced from USD 5000 to USD 700 (Bell 1994 cited in Ray 2010 
183). 
 
Criticisms focus on the extent to which stakeholder participation can take place in 
environments with a long history of centralised management (Petit and Baron 2009). This is 
exemplified in countries such as India and Pakistan that hold entrenched socio-political 
hierarchies with many rural areas still dominated by semi-feudal structures (Tai 1974).  
Mollinga (2006) also implies that local level multi-stakeholder participatory approaches are 
naïve in their assumption of the removal of politics from discussions. These assertions appear 
to be supported by the lack of meaningful land reform in Pakistan and the development of 
more transparent systems for irrigation monitoring in both countries.  
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Despite ongoing challenges, the experience of IWRM to date in South Asia has been mixed 
with progress taking place more in isolated cases rather than as a concerted movement. 
However, such examples have enabled policymakers to prioritise areas for further research 
and investment. These areas include institutional cooperation, enforcement, changes in 
mindsets away from supply-side technocratic solutions, the need for sustainable groundwater 
management and transparent water charges, and in encouraging the storage of rainwater. 
2.6 Re-evaluating	IWRM	in	the	South	Asian	Context	
The challenges presented in adapting and implementing the IWRM framework to countries 
within South Asia are formidable and can expect to take years of investment, capacity 
building, and bargaining between relevant stakeholders. Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel 
(2006) emphasise that in Europe also, the development of regional cooperation on water 
resources management has been a long process. They cite the example of the Rhine 
Commission taking more than 200 years to push its 9 member countries to agree to a set of 
management rules for the river as a shared resource. In light of such experiences and 
strengthening support for approaches such as the advocacy coalition framework in analysing 
IWRM implementation, Moss (2006) stresses that the processes involved in developing river 
basin management are more important than the achievement of set goals such as the 
placement of an ‘organisational model’ (77). Writing about Bangladesh, Huda (2005) also 
stresses that the importance of IWRM lies in changing mindsets over time. Mohile (2005) 
concludes in his case study of India, that IWRM must not be evaluated as a onetime activity 
but a continuous process requiring review as the framework is adapted to changing priorities.  
 
Several case studies from South Asia show that endeavours to transfer blueprints of river 
basin management as tried in India with the unsuccessful setup of the Damodar Valley 
Authority are unrealistic (Moss 2006, Shah et al 2006). Shah et al (2006) stress that it is 
counterproductive to impose institutional models in ‘vastly different socio-ecological 
contexts’ (139). They elaborate that developed countries have different priorities to 
developing countries, the former prioritising e.g. wetland preservation and the inter-sectoral 
allocations of water compared to formalising the water sector to improve regulation, urban 
water supply, food security, and financial viability. Shah et al (2006) further elaborate this 
point in criticising the work of Saleth and Dinar (2000). This study looks into institutional 
changes in the water sector within 11 countries using water law, water policy, and water 
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administration as the core points of institutional analysis. This selected methodology for 
analysis isolates institutional change to unhelpful ‘quick fixes’ driven by government and not 
society (Shah et al 2006). They conclude that analysis must focus on whether institutions are 
functional with clear negotiation and coordination mechanisms, whether legislation is 
enforced and effective, the redesign of economic instruments to effect user behaviour, and the 
effective monitoring of water use. 
 
This is a view supported by the GWP (2000), Moss (2006), and Mohile (2005). GWP makes 
it clear that regional institutions are expected to ‘develop their own IWRM practices’ using 
IWRM as ‘a collaborative framework’ (GWP 2000 24). Moss (2006) and Mohile (2005) go 
further arguing for the need for a ‘contextually sensitive approach’ that respects political and 
cultural traditions (76). The EU’s WFD also recognises the need to adapt elements of the 
framework to environmental context stating that no two rivers are the same, pollution 
standards are therefore adjusted to location and river type (Moss 2006). Citing the work of 
Mitchell (2000), Moss (2006) comments that contextual approaches have a greater chance of 
gaining broad support across institutions, fostering coordination and integration. Highlighting 
the need to focus on country priorities and more challenging areas for negotiation, Mohile 
(2005) also draws on the example of India where the principle recognising water as a finite 
resource has led to stringent standards for pollution control, however, little action has been 
taken to address low flow, an area requiring more difficult trade-offs.  
 
Funding for water resource management initiatives may be stepped over time and found from 
multiple sources other than specifically IWRM funded programmes. Possible sources include 
conservation, river management, the environment, and sustainable agriculture (Moss 2006). 
Further funding sources may include the environment, disaster management, and climate 
change resilience programmes. Cross-provincial level funding may also be considered for 
measures such as the linkage of upstream activities to downstream impacts on water quality. 
Internal funding via contributions to water service costs may be evaluated in accordance to 
the cost of the each category of water use: domestic, industry, and agriculture (Moss 2006).  
 
IWRM requires multi-level governance involving institutions at the supernational, national, 
and subnational levels lending more political legitimacy to locally elected water management 
institutions. Inter-state cooperation may be in the form of working groups of state water 
authorities for each major river system such as employed in Germany, rather than formal 
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institutions. In Germany, these are utilised to produce non-legally binding actions plans, 
designed to provide guidance to water authorities e.g. in the form of assigning values for 
pollutants. Due to frequent problems with coordination between the federal and state levels in 
South Asia, Moss (2006) proposes the use of an inter-state working group with close ties to 
federal level government, as implemented in Germany. 
 
Water management in South Asia has traditionally followed an administrative model with the 
unit of analysis having no relation to geographical envrionment (Shah, Makin and 
Sakthivadivel 2006). The spatial organisation of water resources management should 
therefore be altered to facilitate coordination across administrative boundaries (Moss 2006). 
However, it is uncertain whether this will be feasible in South Asia due to regional tensions. 
River basin commissions set up to date, as new organisations, often have little authority being 
formed on the basis of compliance only (Shah, Makin and Sakthivadivel 2006). Shah, Makin 
and Sakthivadivel (2006) state that approaches that have succeeded in developed countries 
have been ‘adaptive, gradual and problem focused’ (112). Moss (2006) highlights the case 
study of Germany where looser methods of coordination are being employed in the form of a 
river basin secretariat for day-to-day planning and regular meetings of representatives from 
water authorities. The activities of coordination bodies for basin districts are limited to data 
collection, drafting basin plans, and communciations ensuring no loss of power from 
government bodies, a model that seems more suitable to the South Asian context. 
Alternatives may be in the form of river management organisations as employed in Europe 
rather than basin wide organisations.  
 
With the focus shifted to the subnational level, states/ provinces will be expected to play a 
much more active role in water resources planning and regulation (Moss 2006). However, the 
set up of basin organisations is flexible and in many cases down to individuals states/ 
provincies to decide. The maintenance of watercourses and flood protection measures are 
already the responsibility of provincial level government, however more innovative planning 
will require extensive capacity building. Further cooperation may be encouraged via 
institutions at the inter-municiple level along river catchments with membership compulsory 
for local authorities, municiple water utilies, and private companies (Moss 2006). Voluntary 
groups of water specialists may also be set up to raise awareness on ecological issues via 
training, seminars, and exposure visits. These would further require the set up of uniform 
methods of reporting. 
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Forms and strategies for public participation in water resources management are also 
purposefully vague in the EU WFD with each country able to adopt their own procedures 
(Moss 2006). Moss (2006) highlights that what constitutes the public is also unspecified e.g. 
whether it is residents or any affected parties. Participation in IWRM may therefore be 
limited to simply providing information to the public and taking feedback into consideration 
or may involve more interactive processes including inputs in decision-making.  
 
 
130 
 
3 Chapter	three:	Water	Governance	in	Pakistan	
3.1 The	benefits	and	challenges	of	strengthening	water	governance	in	
Pakistan	
Water governance in Pakistan is currently very weak with outdated legislation in the form of 
the Canal and Drainage Act of 1873 guiding the sector. This legislation has been critiqued by 
numerous researchers including Mustafa (2002), and more recently by Bisht (2013), Anwar 
and Haq (2016) and Akram (2016) for ignoring critical areas requiring regulation and policy 
development. Being essentially a legacy of British colonial policy, the Act is focused on 
prescriptive approaches to water management with the IBIS designed and managed by 
engineers (Akram 2016). This reliance on engineering and mathematical measurements for 
water resources management is exemplified by the inflexibility of the warabandi system. 
Meaning ‘fixed turns’ relating to the discharge of irrigation water, this is designed as a self-
regulating system that is uniformly applied (Anwar and Haq 2016, Akram 2016, Hafeez 
2001, Mustafa 2002). As forwarded by Mustafa (2002), the Canal and Drainage Act allows 
little room for stakeholder participation, innovation, or flexibility in its application providing 
negligible rights to water users.  
 
The Canal and Drainage Act was last revised in 1967 and emphasises investment in areas 
such as hydel power that may no longer be appropriate given Pakistan’s pending water crisis 
(Mustafa 2002). A major problem area of the Canal and Drainage Act is that it was designed 
before the Green Revolution and supports an extensive irrigation system rather than intensive 
irrigation. Bisht (2013) states that the Act was designed for the provision of irrigation waters 
to approximately 64% of cropland, due to inequalities in distribution, Kamal (2012) estimates 
coverage in reality to be even lower at 45% of cropland (cited in Anwar and Haq 2016 62). 
Despite the warabandi cycle being designed to begin at the head of watercourses and 
progress to tail-end areas, in practice, due to temporal variations in the availability of water, 
official scheduling is often bypassed by informal agreements with landowners. Such 
modifications in the scheduling of water discharges are pushed by influential landlords who 
often partake in illegal water withdrawals (Akram 2016, Bisht 2013). When placed within the 
context of water scarcity, this does not result in equitable rationing (Anwar and Haq 2016).   
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Mustafa (2002) highlights a major loophole in the 1873 Act under Section 6 that empowers 
canal officers on behalf of provincial government to close water channels deemed to obstruct 
flow. This clause may be easily abused with no proper system of oversight or monitoring for 
the IBIS. Due to poor maintenance and widespread tampering, Merry (1997), concludes that 
the warabandi system is dysfunctional in that its infrastructure is no longer capable of 
delivering reliable or equitable services (cited in Ahmed 2015). Current performance 
monitoring indicators for canal management and the equity of distribution are not reliable 
taking only two measurements of discharge relating to delivery performance and tail gauge 
into account (Ulhaq 2010 cited in Anwar and Haq 2016, IWMI 2014). Such practices date 
back to the colonial era and require updating in line with new technology. IWMI (2014) find 
a three-fold difference in volumes of water received at different distributaries on the Hakra 
Branch Canal. IWMI (2014) therefore recommends the introduction of a system of metric 
measurements based on water volume to improve transparency (IWMI 2014). IWMI (2014) 
forwards that this information can be obtained by developing software algorithms that 
produce ‘volumetric management reports’. Programme Monitoring and Irrigation Units 
already hold a digital database of flow records in each canal meaning these reports may be 
feasibly produced, on a seasonal basis and at different spatial scales at a small cost. This 
would improve corrective actions and enable managers to improve flow to target water scarce 
areas (IWMI 2014). 
 
In the context of system wide abuses of power, resentment towards irrigation authorities is 
inevitable with the continued enforcement of fixed abiana payments based on land size, 
regardless of whether water is received or not (IWMI 2014). Bisht (2013) and Ahmed (2015) 
state that pricing to cover O&M costs is now a critical challenge although political will for 
this is lacking. Hafeez (2001) is more openly critical of the fact that water continues to be 
treated as a public good given the level of inefficiencies in controlling its use. Water charges 
have been maintained at a very low level and in some areas it is considered free. In addition, 
the government subsidised the installation of tubewells from 1978 being charged at a flat 
monthly rate and low electricity tariffs leading to significant waste and low water 
productivity (Hafeez 2001). In contrast, the price of traded water, a practice that occurs on 
approximately 70% of watercourses despite being illegal under the Canal and Drainage Act, 
ranged from PKR 100 to 700 per acre foot in 2001, as reported by Hafeez (2001). Hafeez 
(2001) concludes that this indicates that farmers are willing to pay more for a reliable water 
supply. 
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There is no provision for inter-sectoral coordination in the Canal and Drainage Act with 
domestic and industrial water use at present heavily reliant on groundwater pumping. This is 
an urgent issue with sectoral conflicts expected to increase as water becomes increasingly 
scarce. Ray (2010) forwards that priority areas will be balancing municipal needs for water 
with those of agriculture and industry. As competition increases, sectoral coordination and 
integration may also become more difficult. To date, the only sectors integrated in Pakistan 
are irrigation and hydropower, the potential for integrating flood prevention with irrigation, 
and domestic water use require review. Information sharing across sectors at present is weak 
and also needs improvement. As in other countries in the region, there has been no endeavour 
to move towards a more regional approach to water management with Pakistan’s water policy 
developed in isolation (Ringler and Anwar 2016). 
 
The financial viability of the IBIS is a critical weakness in Pakistan’s management of water 
resources with a major gap between investment and revenue generation (Briscoe and Qamar 
2006, Bisht 2013, IWMI 2014). This is largely due to the use of the government apparatus for 
employment creation leading to low HR salaries and an inadequate budget for infrastructural 
maintenance (Bisht 2013, Briscoe and Qamar 2006). This is part of a wider problem of 
underinvestment in infrastructure in the sectors of ‘water, power, and transport’ that the 
World Bank comments is ‘essential for sustained growth and competitiveness’ (cited in 
Bajoria 2009). One of the few recent projects forwarded focusing on improving existing 
infrastructure is a canal lining project planned in Sindh on the Rohi, Dadu, and Rice Canals, 
estimated to bring 492,000 acres of land under irrigation (Chowdhry 2010 cited in Bisht 2013 
97).   
 
Previous endeavours made to invest in drainage illustrated under the Left Bank Outfall Drain 
(LBOD) project led by the World Bank largely backfired (see section 1). Meanwhile, 
government investment confusingly remains focused on the expansion of command areas. 
Examples of recent projects include: the Greater Thal project to create a new command area 
of 1.5 million acres criticised by Sindhi writer Palijo (2003), the Kacci canal project to create 
a command area of .71 acres in Balochistan, and the Rainee canal project to create a 
command area of .41 MA in Sindh (Bisht 2013, 97). This shows that major flaws in the IBIS 
and its management continue to be ignored with the old mantra of increasingly agricultural 
productivity at all costs predominant in government thinking. 
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The design problems and a failure to invest in the maintenance of existing irrigation 
infrastructure has exacerbated petty corruption and caused large scale leakages and drainage 
problems throughout the system (Perera 2003). Over the longer term, these issues have 
resulted in a culture of water theft, large scale waterlogging, and salinity, making large tracts 
of land unproductive (Bisht 2013). The World Bank has estimated that water delivery 
efficiency from canal level to root zone to be approximately 30-40% (cited in Hafeez 2001). 
Approximately 38% of Pakistan’s land is affected by waterlogging with projects for the 
pumping of excess water such as SCARP costing the government more than USD 1 billion 
(Kamal 2009, Bisht 2013 95). Bisht concludes that the consistent failure to invest in the IBIS 
or alternative strategies for water distribution has inculcated a culture of poor accountability 
at all levels (Bisht 2013).  
 
Due to defensive riparian relations resulting from perceived imbalances in water distribution 
between the provinces and international territorial disputes, the critical need to increase water 
storage is also still to be addressed. Policies to date have focused on the construction of large 
dams only which is questionable in light of high siltation loads, a problem that has already 
reduced existing storage capacity by more than 30% (CPSP 2005). The placement of 
proposed projects for the construction of dams has proved highly controversial to date 
resulting in long delays in implementation. Forwarded projects include: the Kalabagh Dam, a 
hydroelectric dam proposed for construction on the Indus River in KPK in 2004 and expected 
to create a capacity of 6.5 MAF, and the Diamer Bhasha Dam on the Indus River, proposed in 
2006 and expected to create a capacity of 6.4MAF (WADPA 2010 cited in Bisht 2013 97, 
Perera 2003). The Kalabagh Dam has since been rejected by all provinces with the exception 
of Punjab due to its potential impact on lower riparian areas and the high levels of 
sedimentation in KPK. Construction work on the Diamer Bhasha Dam was halted in 2011 
with the location disputed by neighbouring India. 
 
A further critical area for regulation is private groundwater mining with groundwater lacking 
structures of ownership or management (IWMI 2014). Balochistan passed its own Water 
Ordinance in 2000 to tighten regulations on groundwater pumping that oversaw the 
installation of water metres on private tubewells in Quetta. However, these have been largely 
ignored (Bisht 2013) representing the wider problem of weak enforcement across the country. 
Bisht (2013) suggests synchronising tubewell withdrawals with aquifer recharge to alleviate 
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these problems. However, this policy would require close monitoring and strong 
enforcement, aspects that to date have been largely absent in Pakistan’s management of water 
resources. IWMI (2014) further suggests utilising and expanding groundwater observation 
wells, at present operated by the Punjab Irrigation Department to monitor water quality and 
depth. IWMI proposes that inventories of tubewells are monitored and maintained by farmer 
organisations as long term stakeholders in water resources, their participation in the 
maintenance of water resources is also supported under the 1997 Irrigation and Drainage Act. 
However, this may overlook the role of political actors involved in the use of groundwater 
resources with politicians often swayed by the influence of large commercial farmers. 
 
At present, water governance is overseen by a range of government agencies at the federal 
and provincial levels with areas of overlapping responsibilities resulting in competition over 
financial resources (Ringler and Anwar, 2016, Varis 2005). Hafeez (2001) states that this 
administrative quagmire has hindered the development of water resource planning and 
distribution in accordance with crop requirements. At present, most departments are held 
back by a lack of resources, poor staff incentives, a lack of transparency in HR appointments, 
and entrenched bureaucracy (Paul 1990 cited in Ray 2010, Bisht 2013, Hafeez 200). 
Responsibilities between old and new departments need to be reviewed with some older 
ministries effectively defunct despite continuing to consume resources (PDMA Punjab 2018). 
Many authorities recognise the need to create operational linkages between different water 
related institutions (PDMA Punjab 2018) but this is hindered by differing institutional 
systems and structures. As an example of this, Hafeez (2001) highlights the critical need for 
joint planning between PIDs and agriculture departments, at present hindered by the fact that 
the administrative structure of PIDs operate at the level of canal commands whilst agriculture 
departments operate at the district level. Due to this, the process of estimating water 
requirements for canal commands receives little input from agricultural departments (Hafeez 
2001).  
 
The central agencies involved in water management include the: Foreign Ministry that deals 
with international water disputes, Ministry of Agriculture that controls on-farm water 
management, Ministry of Finance that oversees water related investments, and Ministry of 
Water and Power that manages water allocations and controls water related institutions. Key 
institutions under the Ministry of Water and Power include the: Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA) a parastatal organisation that manages the planning, 
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O&M, drainage, and construction of large water related infrastructure (Bisht 2013), also 
assisted by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the Federal Flood Commission, and Indus 
River System Authority (IRSA). A further Ministry for National Food Security and Research 
has been recently established (Ringler and Anwar 2016).  
 
Each season, IRSA makes an assessment of water availability against water requirements 
communicated by Provincial Irrigation Departments. IRSA then allocates waters from the 
Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma reservoirs to Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authorities 
(PIDA) based on 10-day projections of demand during the rabi and kharif (National Water 
Policy 2004, Bisht 2013). PIDs manage and maintain water allocations and O&M within each 
provincial canal command with costs being partially recouped through abiana or drainage 
cess. If a province disagrees with a decision by IRSA, it can appeal to the Council of 
Common Interests (CCI), set up in 1973 to resolve provincial disputes. Provincial 
governments are responsible for domestic water supply, drainage, sanitation, irrigation and 
canal management, embankments, and water storage (Ringler and Anwar 2016). Due to inter-
provincial competition, provinces have a tendency to exaggerate the potential productivity of 
land under irrigation by including unsuitable land in allocative calculations (Ram 1994 cited 
in Ray 2010). Such attitudes have contributed to waterlogging and salinity and exacerbated 
ongoing tensions around provincial water apportionments.  
 
Provincial cooperation over the sharing of water resources has been limited and politically 
contentious. Despite endeavours to address issues in the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord, 
signed by the provincial chief ministers in 1991, defensive approaches to water management 
have re-emerged in recent years. The 1991 Accord has also been criticised for exacerbating 
tensions due to ambiguities in its terms (A. Anwar 2016, Palijo 2003). This pattern of 
defensive and competitive behaviour over water resources is repeated at the village level with 
people preferring to overwater their lands rather than divert water to other villages (Wade 
1988 cited in Ray 2010).  
 
The costs of continuing state centric colonial style approaches to water governance post-
independence has held back capacity development at the provincial and district levels. 
Problems in coordination and information sharing between the federal and provincial levels 
was shown in the government’s delayed and confused response to the 2010 floods (criticised 
by the World Bank 2013 and later by Bell, et al. 2016). Poor institutional capacity and weak 
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regulations have also held back adaptation to the changing environmental context. The UN 
(2006) defines the lack of capacity for strong water governance as ‘the inability and/ or 
unwillingness to alter patterns of resource allocation, use and management, despite clear, 
uneconomic behaviour and abiding poverty and social inequality.’ (cited in Tongper and 
Barua 2014, 326). Stronger institutions are required that are backed by political commitment 
if the challenges confronted are to be brought to manageable levels. However, due to the 
political clout that control over water supply brings, more subjective decision-making based 
on sustainable irrigation planning may take decades to achieve. 
 
Pakistan has also been let down by international donors in the form of funding for regressive 
projects. Priority areas for investment outlined have only recently been reflected in UN 
funding being previously focused on increasing crop yield, dam construction, and drainage 
via infrastructural expansion, even at times without the support of local populations (see 
section 1 on LBOD). Increases in agricultural productivity, albeit parred with improved 
efficiency in water use, is still the focus for the agricultural sector in the Framework for 
Economic Growth 2011 (GOP 2012 cited in Ringer and Anwar 2016). Ringler and Anwar’s 
(2016) study, also finds that the emphasis remains on ‘increasing cropping intensity and 
developing new irrigation facilities’ (22). These approaches seem impractical within a 
country where drinking water shortages are prominent in rural areas and using a system 
designed to support up to 45% of its cropping area. The declining productivity of canal-
irrigated lands has also been almost entirely ignored. In this respect, Ray (2010) states that 
both international and national policymakers have, until very recently, failed to recognise and 
educate stakeholders on treating water as a scarce resource.  
 
The involvement of the private sector in the provision of water services can expect to draw 
problems due to weak regulatory structures and high levels of corruption (Varis 2005). Whilst 
farmers are responsible for the maintenance of watercourses, due to unreliable irrigation 
supply, few are motivated to invest in this. The challenges associated with endemic poverty 
and widespread illiteracy have further contributed to local water users’ poor access to 
information (Varis 2005) discouraging the development of transparent institutions. Weak 
institutional capacity has also hindered the enforcement of legislation with large farmers 
often paying officials for additional water or resorting to illegal pumping (Hafeez 2001). 
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Asymmetrical access to government officials puts into question the fact that the monitoring 
of water use, contamination, and water related infrastructure remains heavily based on 
community policing (Bisht 2013).  
 
Bisht (2013) concludes that the Canal and Drainage Act encourages water politics rather than 
cooperation for water security (Bisht 2013). The major challenges in water governance 
remain the implementation of updated legislation and that of changing institutional mindsets. 
These mindsets continue to be based on outdated state-centric approaches to water 
management. The realisation of more participative, equitable, and cost-effective ways to 
manage resources within the country’s still largely semi-feudal setup is expected to involve a 
difficult transition for Pakistan’s hierarchies of power. 
3.2 The	ongoing	development	of	water	governance	in	Pakistan	
The Government has invested in a series of measures to modernise water governance since 
the launch of the 1979 Revision Action Plan (RAP), outlined in the work of Perera (2003) 
and Hafeez 200111. Perera (2003) states that, supported by the World Bank, the RAP was the 
first time that policy was not entirely focused on the supply of water but sought to improve 
user management. This is seen in the incorporation of participatory management as an 
objective with the aim of transferring O&M costs for watercourses to farmer groups (Perera 
2003). The government further planned to develop a basin level water management 
programme, integrating the management of rivers, reservoirs, and groundwater for irrigation 
(Perera 2003). The main projects under the RAP included: the On-farm Water Management 
Project (OFWM) (1981-92) to set up Farmers’ Groups to improve irrigation management, the 
Irrigation System Rehabilitation Project (1982-87), and the Command Water Management 
Project (1984-92). This latter project sought to both improve crop management and alter the 
organisational model for water management with the setup of Water User Associations 
(WUAs). The RAP was the first time that ‘technical and social’ solutions were combined in 
Pakistan’s water policy (Perera 2003, 107).  
 
Due to the radical shift in approach to water management that the RAP demanded, a number 
of challenges were confronted in its implementation. Perara (2003) states that major obstacles 
                                                             
11 Reported to be held in the Lahore Planning Division, the original planning document was not available online 
or with the Agriculture and Irrigation Departments in Islamabad when request was made to view this in 
February 2015 
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stemmed from the unreliability of irrigation supplies reducing incomes and the widespread 
culture of distrust of towards irrigation officials. From Pakistan’s 107,000 watercourses, by 
1990 just 17,000 WUAs had been registered with provincial authorities and worked on 
improving local water infrastructure. Farmers were reluctant to take on O&M costs or 
cooperate with irrigation officials, perceived to be shifting accountability to the lower levels. 
Communities also preferred their own systems of collective decision-making through village 
committees with WUAs becoming dormant at the close of the projects (Perera 2003, Hafeez 
2001). Due to corruption and distribution issues, further policy actions such as the removal of 
subsidies on tubewells and the implementation of a river basin wide framework proved 
politically too contentious (Perera 2003).  
 
Perera (2003) states that efforts were hindered by weak political commitment with the 
government preferring to invest in short term packages for civil works yielding quick 
political returns. The lack of long term funding for the RAP is linked to the wider problem of 
underinvestment in water resources management. The problem of underinvestment in public 
services was exacerbated by the 1985 Pressler amendment12 that eventually led to the end of 
the US-Aid period and donor disengagement in 1991, the increasing importance of debt 
servicing, and the higher returns on investment in industry (Ahmed 2015, Akhtar 2017). This 
is shown in consecutive annual reductions in the relative share of the water sector within 
Five-Year Plans, falling from 15% in 1978 to 8% in 1988 (Perera 2003, 115). Perera (2003) 
concludes that the RAP was primarily driven by donor pressure to improve the efficiency of 
water use and had little political ownership.  
 
Due to the extent of waterlogging and salinity, water policy shifted to large scale drainage 
programmes in the 1960s (Perera 2003). Moving on from international border problems 
associated with drainage projects in the 1970s and the design flaws of the LBOD, 
implemented from 1985 to 2002, the National Drainage Policy (NDP) was launched in 1997 
at a cost of USD 785 million (Perera 2003, 115). Hafeez (2001) stresses the ambitious nature 
of this 25-year programme stating that it required significant ‘revisions in institutional 
structure’, shifting revenue collection and the development of water resources to private 
farmers’ organisations (FOs). FOs were envisioned to coordinate for water trading with the 
policy geared towards the creation of private water markets and the formation of public 
                                                             
12 The Pressler amendment made US aid conditional on Pakistan not possessing nuclear explosive devices 
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utilities around canal commands. NDP also increased provincial budgetary allocations and 
encouraged the setup of autonomous Provincial Irrigation Authorities in canal command 
areas further strengthening decentralisation (Perera 2003, Hafeez 2001). Perara (2003) states 
that by formally bringing water users into management structures, the NDP represents a 
significant step in moving away from traditional technocratic approaches to water resources 
management. 
 
More far-reaching reforms aimed at improving local participation in governance and service 
delivery were undertaken under the Musharraf military regime, explored in the work of S. A. 
Khan (2015) and Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf (2010). It should be noted that the establishment 
of local government has been a focus of successive military governments in Pakistan, an 
aspect explored in the last part of this section. Musharraf’s programme of devolution was 
focused on strengthening public accountability, resource distribution, and institutional 
responsiveness, as set out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (S. A. Khan 2015). 
Legislated in the 2001 Local Government Ordinance, the programme devolved key 
responsibilities to three levels of local government: district, union council, and tehsil level 
(Bisht 2013, Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010). They also included a quota for 33% of posts to 
be filled by women at the local government level (S. A. Khan 2015). In spite of quotas for 
women being later reduced due to their political controversy, many female representatives 
went on to be elected to the National Assembly (S. A. Khan 2015).  
 
Despite the repeal of the Devolution Plan in 2008/09 prompting the removal of local level 
institutions, key aspects of the policy remain. These include the clause that almost all 
provincial service delivery departments, with the exception of Irrigation and Power 
Departments, were placed under control of District Coordination Officers (Mezzera, Aftab 
and Yusuf 2010). This placed Agricultural Departments and Irrigation and Power 
Departments on different levels, a factor that continues to hinder inter-sectoral coordination. 
The Devolution Plan and RAP also triggered tensions between local level government and 
provincial level government in the form of competition over resources and influence (S. A. 
Khan 2015). The Devolution Plan further promoted privatisation within all sectors as a means 
to push economic growth, an aspect that can be seen in the formal shift in the exploitation of 
groundwater to the private sector (Bajoria 2009). 
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Bell et al (2016) focus their analysis on the impacts of Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT). IMT reinforces the endeavours of earlier reforms to shift water governance from 
provincial irrigation departments (PIDS) to the grassroots level proposing a four-tiered 
management structure. IMT is designed to enable participatory irrigation management with 
responsibilities divided between13:  
• Water User Associations (WUAs or khal panchayat): farmers participate and manage 
delivery to individual properties within watercourses using variants of the fixed 
rotation system (warabandi). WUAs are further involved in the assessment and 
collection of abiana retaining 5% of payments. 
• Farmer Organisations (FOs): FOs are attended by agreed representatives from WUAs 
that manage delivery to watercourses within distributaries and minors. FOs ensure the 
equitable distribution of water at Mogha (outlet) level to watercourses, undertake 
O&M at the distributary level, support flood protection, and guarantee minimum 
drinking water for non-agricultural users. FOs are further involved in the assessment 
and collection of abiana retaining 40% of payments, a further percentage is deposited 
for AWBs. 
• Area Water Boards (AWB): AWBs are attended by agreed representatives from FOs 
that manage delivery to distributaries and minors within canal commands. They 
maintain large drainage tubewells and other infrastructure and carry out flood 
protection works. AWBs are further responsible for forming FOs and maintain 60% 
of abiana payments for their operations. 
• Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authorities (PIDA): these are autonomous 
authorities that manage the delivery of water to Pakistan’s 43 canal commands and 
maintain barrage outlets. PIDAs undertake independent revenue collection. 
 
Bell et al. (2016) state that progress in IMT implementation has been confusing and slow. 
Bell et al (2016) highlight confusion between the roles of provincial irrigation departments 
(PIDs) and provincial irrigation drainage authorities (PIDAs) that operate in tandem within 
different command areas. The field team ultimately find little difference between the 
institutions with HR shifted from PIDS to PIDAS with both institutions demonstrating ‘a lack 
of downward accountability’ to their constituents (Bell et al 2016 34).  
 
                                                             
13 Adapted from the summaries of Asrar-Ulhaq cited in Bell et al. (2016) and Bisht (2013) 
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Since the passing of the 1997 Provincial Irrigation Authority Act legislating IMT institutions 
AWBs and FOs have been set up in one fifth of command areas in Punjab and Sindh, and 1 
AWB has been established in KPK (SIDA 2012, PIDA 2012, cited in Bell et al, 2016). 
AWBs struggle with the cost of abiana collection which exceeds 60% of the amount 
collected, this makes collection counterproductive for them once FO funds are taken (Ahmed 
2015). The institutions’ measly funding resulting from low water charges14 and poor rates of 
payment recovery are insufficient to cover O&M costs (Kamal 2009 cited in Bell, et al. 2016, 
Briscoe and Qamar 2006). In his analysis of FOs and AWBs, Ahmed (2015) draws on other 
South Asian studies of irrigation institutions showing that performance is directly linked to 
funding with stepped crop based or volumetric fees recommended. In the case of Pakistan, 
further problems with funds collection and management stem from the influence of rural 
hierarchies that limit FO independence (Bell, et al. 2016). Farmers also have little experience 
in funds management and O&M aside from Cash Desilting Programmes and require 
comprehensive training (Ahmed 2015). Motivation for O&M is further reduced by the fact 
that ownership of the infrastructure remains with government with no conditions for 
inspection (Ahmed 2015) 
 
The performance of Area Water Boards and Farmers’ Organisations has been further 
hindered by the fact that farmers still have very little power or access to information on canal 
flows. In many cases, it has been reported that Area Water Boards have been formed without 
Farmers’ Organisations, being registered as an administrative exercise only (Bell, et al. 
2016). Formal authority over Area Water Boards still comes from the Agricultural 
Department, not PID, neither PIDA nor Farmers’ Organisations have formal authority. 
Ahmed (2015) emphasises the somewhat patronising attitude of government officials towards 
Farmers’ Organisations, in large part managed by illiterate farmers, viewed as incapable of 
managing an irrigation system. Ahmed (2015) goes on to state: 
 
…..“One should not expect that a person, who is used to manage the irrigation system for a 
long time the way he was learned to do it, turn quickly to a person who can deal with farmers 
groups and see FOs as equal partners in irrigation management.” (17) 
 
                                                             
14 Water charges are just PKR 85 per irrigated acre in kharif season and PKR 50 in rabi season which reduce by 
half in tail-end areas (Raza cited in Bell, et al. 2016). 
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Ahmed (2015) stresses that the recognition of Farmers’ Organisations by officials will require 
time and training with for the present, PIDAs remaining involved in irrigation administration 
rather than management. Ahmed (2015) states that a key failure of IMT has been the 
inadequate preparation of departments and FOs and the failure to take on-board the lessons 
learned from previous policies such as RAP. Ahmed (2015) concludes that clear long-term 
commitment and ownership is required from government if the transfer of responsibilities is 
to be successful.  
 
Echoing the Advocacy Coalition Framework argument, Ul Hassan (2011) reinforces these 
findings, stating that there has been too much focus on the design of irrigation reform rather 
than the processes and incentives driving it (cited in Bell et al 2016). Bell et al (2016) further 
elaborate that a key weakness of Irrigation Management Transfer is that the same authorities 
that stand to lose the most from sectoral reform, provincial irrigation departments, are 
responsible for its implementation (Bell, et al. 2016). Perara (2003) and Bell et al (2016) both 
highlight that the project’s participatory model has inadvertently opened legitimate avenues 
for the transfer powers over water distribution to the landed elite. This is achieved by utilising 
of Farmer Organisation and Water User Association membership to access provincial 
government officials and influence irrigation policy, although these institutions may also be 
bypassed altogether (Bell, et al. 2016). This aspect is reminiscent of the largely ineffective 
land and tenure reforms implemented post-independence to alleviate the poor conditions of 
landless tenants that in many cases led to a worsening of conditions due to landlord’s 
exploitation of legal loopholes.  
 
These findings illustrate Peters’ (1999) hypothesis that understanding the relationships 
between political actors and those with a direct and indirect interest in the control of water 
resurces is critical to the success of water policies (cited in Ray 2010, Jairath and Ballabh 
2008). Ul Hassan (2009) stresses that there is a fear of sectoral reform by all stakeholders, 
this includes: irrigation departments unwilling to lose authority to PIDAs, larger landlords 
who fear the loss of unfettered access to irrigation water, and smallholders who fear further 
exploitation and price rises (cited in Bell et al 2016). Bell et al (2016), conclude that due to 
ongoing challenges in its implementation, the role of Irrigation Management Transfer in 
water governance remains ambiguous and that revised legislation is required.  
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A wider reaching shift in responsibilities between federal and provincial authorities came in 
the form of the 2010 18th Amendment to the Constitution passed by the civilian government 
under Zardari. Passed into Act in 2011, this Amendment transfers 44 subjects including 
environmental pollution into the domain of Provincial Assemblies. It also strengthened the 
power of the Council of Common Interests to resolve both inter-provincial disputes and those 
between federal-provincial governments (Alam 2012). The 2010 Amendment further 
removed the ‘concurrent legislative list’ allocating overlapping legislative functions 
exclusively to provincial or federal administrations or the Council of Common Interests 
(Shah 2012 cited in Bell, et al. 2016). Despite this endeavour to clarify responsibilities, much 
of the parallel research structures and institutions at the federal and provincial levels have 
been maintained. Under the Act, the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MINFA) were dismantled being replaced by the Ministry of Climate Change and 
Ministry of Food Security and Research (MSFR). However, the MINFA has remained 
functioning with a third of its responsibilities transferred to provincial level authorities, a 
third absorbed into a new Ministry of Food Security and Research (MSFR), whilst almost a 
third have been maintained, showing ongoing influence of institutional politics.  
 
The transfer of responsibilities to the provinces has strengthened linkages between provincial 
government and donors although there is still ambiguity in government funding allocations 
(Bell, et al. 2016). Specific responsibilities transferred to provincial assemblies include the 
mandate over environmental pollution covering water quality and industrial effluents, disaster 
management, and ecology (Alam 2012). Alam (2012) questions how the provinces will 
coordinate on National Environmental Quality Standards (NEQs) with each establishing their 
own Environmental Protection Agency to set these under the 18th Amendment. Previously, 
NEQs were set at the federal level by the Environment Protection Council (Alam 2012). In 
light of such issues, the Amendment established a Ministry for Inter-Provincial Coordination 
to promote cooperation and trust. Both Bisht (2013) and Bell et al. (2016) conclude that the 
18th Amendment remains a relatively new reform and its potential impact on Pakistan’s water 
resources has yet to be seen. Bisht (2013) stresses that much of the reform’s potential impact 
will depend on Pakistan’s political culture in ‘facilitating or impeding these reforms’ (63). 
 
Funding for district level administrations remains unclear and local experts continue to be 
excluded from policy research. Centralised scientific approaches to water management are 
still used today to justify the exclusion of local knowledge and inputs on land and water 
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management systems, without which, the government has failed to notice the extent of 
deterioration in soil capacity, salinity, and waterlogging (Gilmartin 1994 cited in Ray 2010). 
Improving capacity and cooperation at the district level downwards is remains a critical 
policy area. 
 
Despite international donors actively promoting participation in irrigation management, the 
governance of water systems and the absence of farmer participation in water resources 
management are major issues (Wescoat, Halvorson and Mustafa 2000). Grassroots 
involvement in irrigation management projects has proved difficult in light of the continuing 
grip of large landlords on natural resources enforcing their powerbase. The power of this 
group is evidenced with policies on land and water allocations proving to be some of the most 
politically difficult to implement (Hinton 1969 cited in Ray 2010). Ahmed (2015) also states 
that due to the increasing financial requirements of the IBIS the sustainability of Farmers’ 
Organisations is a major area for investment. Ahmed (2015) concludes, that the public sector 
can no longer afford to subsidise irrigation services and that, in the coming years ‘there will 
be no other option than to transfer irrigation management at the distributary level’ to farmers. 
In light of this, Pakistan cannot afford its policy of decentralised water governance and 
Farmers’ Organisations to fail (Ahmed 2015).  
3.2.1 Case	Study:	The	Water	Apportionment	Accord	Sindh-Punjab	
No Indian state comes close to the Pakistan province of Punjab ‘in terms of relative weight’ 
(Lieven 2012, 256). Punjab is the base of the Pakistan Army in a praetorian state where the 
military continues to hold significant influence. Further to this, Punjab has a critical role in 
economic growth in the country holding 56% of the country’s population (Ranjan 2012), 
generating 65% of internal revenue and 53% of agricultural GDP. This is compared to Sindh, 
Pakistan’s second most populous province, that contributes 30% to revenue and 23% of 
agricultural GDP (Lieven 2012, 267, Abid, et al. 2016, 449, FAO 2011 cited in Bisht 2013 
68). The source of Punjab’s rapid development, perennial irrigated agriculture, has come at 
the expense of downstream areas leading to a now century and a half old dispute over water 
allocations (Perera 2003, I. Ali 1988, Palijo 2003). According to estimations taken in 2007, 
Punjab has freshwater available in approximately 79% of its total area whilst in downstream 
Sindh this is only 28% (Hayat 2007 cited in Bisht 2013 64). Favouritism in resource 
allocations is frequently justified by statistics on Punjab’s large population that fail to take 
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into account existing conditions and development needs, land size, and population dispersion 
(Lieven 2012).   
 
Southern Sindh suffers the worst effects of water shortages with its delta rarely receiving 
minimal environmental flows. This has led to the decimation of ecologically fragile sites and 
the inundation of seawater onto agricultural lands (Perera 2003, Kamal, Amir and 
Mohtadullah 2012, Bisht 2013). Ongoing allocative biases has fuelled Sindhi nationalism in 
recent decades. The level of emotion attached to the injustices of water resources 
management in Pakistan is brought out in the work of Sindhi lawyer Palijo (2003). In his 
detailed exploration of the Sindh-Punjab water dispute, backed up by multiple legislative 
documents, Palijo (2003) likens Sindh’s ‘imposed water famine’ to an act of ‘genocide’ 
(introductory note). The inter-provincial dispute between Sindh and Punjab is now ‘the 
longest surviving unresolved water dispute in recent history’ (Palijo 2003, 5). 
 
Inter-provincial tensions over the supply of surface water between Sindh and Punjab began in 
the 1850s as a result of infrastructural expansion under the British (Bisht 2013, Perera 2003, 
I. Ali 1988). These were a part of wider endeavours to increase agricultural productivity. Due 
to Sindh’s flat terrain and its reliance on a single water source, British investment in irrigation 
infrastructure was predominantly made in Punjab. The resultant canal diversions failed to 
take into account the riparian rights of Sindh and did not adhere to international laws on river 
waters (Palijo 2003). The extent of water diversions required for new command areas 
significantly affected the operation of Sindh’s inundation canals, delaying the rise of the 
Indus waters in the spring and reducing its flow in the autumn (Perera 2003, Bisht 2013). 
This shortened the crop season in Sindh resulting in artificial water shortages and food 
insecurity. In light of the negative impacts of diversions on its agro-based economy, Sindh 
objected to a series of infrastructural developments in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
including: the Bari Doab Canal, the Sidhnai Canal, the lower Chenab Canal, and the lower 
Jhelum Canal. In the early twentieth century, Sindh forwarded further objections to the 
Paharpur Canal, the Upper Swat Valley Canal, and the triple canal project (Perera 2003, Bisht 
2013, Palijo 2003).  
 
In consideration of Sindh’s objections, the Government of British India formed the Indian 
Irrigation Commission that conducted investigations from 1901-1903. The Commission 
Report outlined the potentially negative impacts of canal diversions on Sindh’s water supply 
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and forced Punjab to seek its permission prior to the construction of further irrigation works 
(Scott-Moncrieff 1903, Palijo 2003). The British Government subsequently rejected the 
Sutlej Valley Project proposed by Punjab in 1919 on the grounds of inequity. The Cotton 
Committee was set up the same year to investigate Punjab’s provincial claims and water 
rights (Palijo 2003). The Cotton Committee concluded that no further waters should be 
diverted to Punjab until the impacts of the Sukkur barrage on water and food security in 
Sindh became evident (cited in Palijo 2003). The serious nature of the dispute is shown in the 
further decision of the committee that every action made in regard to the Sindh-Punjab water 
dispute would require the approval of the Viceroy of India (Water Politics 2013). The 
Viceroy accordingly utilised these powers to reject Punjab’s proposal for the Thal canal in 
1925 (Ranjan 2012). Despite these actions, the extent of continued diversions from barrages 
in Punjab led to a downward trend in irrigated agriculture in Sindh in the 1920s (Perera 
2003).  
 
Against the objections of Punjab, the Sukkur Barrage was constructed in the 1920s and 1930s 
(Perera 2003). This large scale investment in Sindh, marked a shift towards a more balanced 
analysis of water apportionment in Pakistan by the British Administration (Bisht 2013, Palijo 
2003). This more balanced approach was legislated in the 1935 Government of India Act, that 
stated no province should be permitted unfettered access to any common water resource 
(cited in Palijo 2003, Bisht 2013). The 1935 Act granted considerable autonomy to the 
provinces and further established Sindh as a separate province in the British Raj. Perera 
(2003) states that these actions raised expectations within Sindh of more equal water 
allocations and further infrastructural developments within the province.   
 
Punjab strongly opposed the 1935 Act stating that, as an upper riparian, it had the legal right 
to divert required water from the Indus River (Water Politics 2013). In response to claims for 
further infrastructural developments from both Punjab and Sindh, the Anderson Committee 
was set up in 1935 to investigate the ‘Distribution of Waters of the Indus’ focusing on the 
Sutlej Valley and Sukkur Barrage command areas (Perera 2003, Kendra 2005 A4). In 
contrary to the findings of the Indian Irrigation Commission, the Anderson Committee 
recommended that allocations should be increased for both provinces in a manner ‘acceptable 
and equitable to all parties’ (cited in Palijo 2003, Ranjan 2012). Sindh opposed the Anderson 
recommendations on the grounds that further diversions to Punjab would significantly impact 
its water levels. Sindh went onto object to the construction of the Bhakhra Dam on the Indus 
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River in 1939. In his detailed analysis of the Bhakhra Dam proposal, Kendra (2005) states 
that due to its infeasibility, the need for the dam was exaggerated by Punjab being utilised as 
a negotiating tool to push through the preferred Thal and Trimmu projects (Perera 2003, 
Kendra 2005).  
 
The Rao Commission was formed in 1939 to examine Sindh’s complaints against the 
proposed irrigation projects. The Rao Commission reiterated the earlier findings of the Indian 
Irrigation Commission that further projects in Punjab would cause substantial damages to 
Sindh’s inundation canals turning the province into a desert (cited in Palijo 2003, Perera 
2003). The Commission further ordered the construction of two new barrages in Sindh and 
ordered Punjab to pay PKR 20 million to comenpsate for Sindh’s losses (Ranjan 2012). 
However, Sindh’s hopes for a realignment in infrastructural investments were somewhat 
dampened following the quashing of the second Hur uprising in rural Sindh in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s. Despite ongoing political instability, the Rao Commission recommended an 
agreement be negotiated between the chief engineers of Sindh and Punjab to protect the water 
rights of both provinces (cited in Palijo 2003 4).   
 
The draft 1945 Sindh Punjab Agreement prioritised the sharing of water for existing 
infrastructure, effectively discouraging new developments (Perera 2003). The Agreement 
allocated the majority share of 75% of water flow from the Indus River to Sindh and 25% to 
Punjab, that also received 94% of water from the 5 eastern tributaries (Palijo 2003, Bisht 
2013 51). It further set out that no water infrastructure could be built without the consent of 
Sindh. The agreement also provided scheduling for the sharing of supply when water levels 
were lower than agreed allocations (Palijo 2003), a major omission of the later 1991 
Provincial Water Accord. Although Palijo (2003) acknowledges that the 1945 agreement was 
not ratified on the grounds that it could harm farmers in both provinces, he argues that it was 
followed in practice. In support of this argument, Palijo (2003) cites examples of Punjab 
limiting the size of the B.S. Link in line with the agreement and Sindh restricting the size of 
the G.M. and Gudu Barrages (Public Works Department 1945 cited in Palijo 2003). Despite 
this, the 1945 Sindh-Punjab Agreement was not legally recognised during the negotiation of 
the 1960 Indus Water Treaty with India.  
 
Under partition, Punjab was divided into two provinces/ states; East Punjab in India became 
the newly formed upper riparian, Pakistan’s West Punjab the second lower riparian, and 
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Sindh the third. Committee B was formed in 1947 by the Government of India to negotiate a 
bilateral water treaty with negotiating teams forwarded from both countries. However, only 
representatives from West Punjab were forwarded from Pakistan with the Sindhi member of 
the team removed under the One Unit policy implemented in 1955. Under this policy, all 
provinces and princely states were merged into West Pakistan. For this reason, negotiations 
are largely perceived to have been between the two Punjabs with consent from Sindh not 
sought over any of treaty conditions (Palijo 2003). The One Unit policy was not dissolved 
until 1970 with provincial secretariats set up in 1971-72 following the separation of East 
Pakistan. Further complications for water apportionment stem from internal changes within 
India and Pakistan with the latter’s provinces only formally established in 1973 under its new 
constitution (Hussain and Wegerich 2016).   
 
Figure 29 The altered map of Pakistan from 1946 to 2014 (source: Hussain and Wegerich 2016) 
 
 
Due to the agreement being negotiated by a largely unrepresentative military government 
under General Yahya Khan, Palijo (2003) states that the 1960 Treaty is invalid under 
international water law, whereby all riparian stakeholders must be heard. Palijo (2003), 
forwards that the timing of the 1960 Treaty was utilised by Pakistan’s Punjab to act in a ‘neo-
colonial’ manner, protecting its vested interests at the expense of its wider population (34).  
Bisht (2013) also comments that the agreement to divert waters from the eastern rivers to 
India, negotiated by West Punjab, exacerbated tensions with Sindh (Bisht 2013). Sindh 
largely resented that compensation for the loss of Punjab’s eastern rivers was provided at its 
expense. This was seen in the construction of storage and link canals to direct ‘replacement’ 
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waters away from the 3 western rivers, formally allocated to Sindh (Palijo 2003, Bisht 2013). 
Punjab received these replacement supplies from the Jhelum and Chenab, it also received 
water from the Mangla Dam, constructed as part of the Treaty to feed canals that had been 
adversely affected. The Trimu, Islam, and Panjnad Canals were specifically affected by the 
Treaty with replacement infrastructural works, completed in 1968, at a cost of approximately 
USD 1.1 billion (Palijo 2003, 107). 
 
Palijo (2003) highlights that following these replacement works, further infrastructural 
development for water diversion was constructed as an extension to the Treaty plan. These 
works are in the form of the Tarbela Dam and Taunsa-Punjnad (TP) and Chashma-Jhelum 
(CJ) link canals. Completed in 1973, this infrastructure was constructed on the pretext of 
storing surplus water from the Indus River at a cost of USD 200 million (Palijo 2003, 113). 
With a capacity of 11.62 MAF, the Tarbela Dam replaced the more modest Rohtas Dam 
holding 2 MAF, originally proposed by the Word Bank for expansion purposes (Palijo 2003, 
129, Water Politics 2013). From the early 1970s engineers were already forwarding that the 
extent of flow re-directed to Punjab under the 1960 Treaty significantly increased its former 
allocations beyond replacement waters alone (Shaikh 1971 cited in Palijo 2003).  
 
Authorised by Ayub 
Khan, Palijo (2003) 
forwards that the Treaty 
amounted to the transfer 
of more than a billion 
dollars in engineering 
works, almost solely to 
West Punjab. Punjab’s 
allocations increased 
from 25% of the Indus 
River in 1945 to 47%, 
with Sindh’s allocations 
decreasing accordingly 
from 75%, received in 
1945, to 42.5% (A. 
Anwar 2016). The link canals constructed under the Treaty continue to operate at full 
Figure 30 Colour coded map of Pakistan Water infrastructure 
coded by province (source: Indus Basin Authority n.d.)
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capacity reducing Pakistan’s water storage and exacerbating Sindh’s ‘asymmetrical 
relationship’ with Punjab (Palijo 2003, Bisht 2013 65). In recent years, Sindh has further 
criticised the use of the Mangla and Tarbela Dams for hydropower generation given the 
conditions of water scarcity in the province (Water Politics 2013).   
 
The extent of ongoing water shortages have further caused tensions between Sindh and 
Balochistan over the proportion of diversions to the latter from the Sukkur Barrage through 
the North West Canal (at present 62% of this water goes to Sindh and just 37% to 
Balochistan) (Bisht 2013, 72). Due to the concentrated geographical location of new 
infrastructure, the Indus Treaty further marked the beginning of the south Punjab-north 
Punjab divide. The southern Seraiki belt asserts that, despite replacement flow and new 
infrastructure being provided for Punjab, the majority of its canals remained non-perennial 
(Dawn 2010 cited in Bisht 2013). Mustafa and Wrathall (2010) further support these findings, 
stating that it was during the critical juncture of partition that issues developed in relation to 
the equality of water distribution, water resources management, environmental concerns, and 
the availability of potable water. Tensions were also increased with the shift from provincial 
irrigation management to planning and management at the national level post-independence 
(Michel 1967 cited in Wescoat, Halvorson and Mustafa 2000). Bisht (2003) asserts that this 
centralised approach to water resources management had a devastating impact on 
downstream areas.  
 
The continued controversy of the Sindh-Punjab dispute is shown in the number of 
committees set up to review water allocations on the Indus River. The Water Allocations and 
Rates Committee was formed in 1968 under Akhtar Hussain to review barrage water 
allocations, reservoir releases, and groundwater use (Ranjan 2012). However, the 
Committee’s report was largely ignored (Ranjan 2012). The Fazal-i-Akbar Committee was 
then set up in 1970 to review water apportionment under the Indus River with no decision 
taken on its recommendations. The Anwar ul Haque Commission was then set up in 1977 
comprising chief justices of the High Courts to examine water apportionment again yielding 
no results. In 1983 there was further dissention with the report submitted by the Haleem 
Committee, issued with a note of dissention by the Chief Justice of Peshawar High Court. 
This record of dissention weakened the Committee’s recommendations resulting in further 
inaction (Perera 2003).  
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With increasing pressure for a formal plan for water apportionment, the Pakistan Water 
Accord of the Indus River System was signed between all four provinces in 1991 under the 
Nawaz Sharif government. The Accord was ratified by CCI and IRSA, created in 1992 to 
oversee its implementation between Punjab and Sindh. Members of IRSA come from 
provincial and federal level government under a Chair person from WAPDA or their 
nominees (Bisht 2013). Under the 1991 Water Accord, Punjab was allocated 47% of the 
Indus waters, Sindh 41.5%, KPK 8%, and Balochistan 3% (A. Anwar 2016, Bell, et al. 2016, 
32, Perera 2003 29). Palijo (2003) is critical of the Accord in that it confirms the allocations 
set out the 1960 Indus Treaty by West Punjab and does not guarantee Sindh the minimum 
environmental flow required to protect its coastal belt (A. Anwar 2016). Palijo (2003), 
Ranjan (2012), and Anwar (2016) further forward the argument that the 1991 Accord was 
forced on Sindh being signed by PPP representative Jam Sadique Ali. Jam Sadique Ali who 
was imposed as Chief Minister of Sindh, despite being implicated in a number of political 
murder cases.  
 
Interprovincial tensions have worsened in recent years with annual water supply significantly 
less than the volumes allocated in the 1991 Accord (Bell, et al. 2016, 32, Perera 2003). 
Unlike the 1945 agreement, there is no guidance in the 1991 Accord on how to adjust 
provincial allocations if the stipulated amount of 117.35 MAF under Clause 2 for allocation 
is not available (A. Anwar 2016). Anwar (2016) forwards that the 1991 Accord requires 
revision to prevent its subjective interpretation in the case of worsening water shortages 
brought on by climate change. Punjab’s position is that regardless of water levels, the 
province should receive its due share, an assertion disputed by Sindh (Bisht 2013). The 
Punjab government state that its position is justified by the fact that no part of the 1991 
Accord can be applied without the implementation of a verbal agreement for the Kalabagh 
Dam. Punjab claims this agreement was made on the signing of the Accord (PILDAT cited in 
Bisht 2013). Further controversy surrounds the fact that IRSA was dissolved in 1998 
following renewed plans to build the Kalabagh Dam. IRSA was revived in 1999 as an agency 
attached to the Federal Ministry of Water and Power to facilitate operations, losing its 
autonomous status as an interprovincial bargaining platform (Ranjan 2012).  
 
Perera (2003) raises doubts that Punjab has adhered to the agreement since the impacts of 
water shortages have taken effect. This is shown in the unauthorised re-direction of water 
documented by the Irrigation and Power Department from 1991-92 onwards (Perera 2003, 
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150, Ranjan 2012). IRSA also reported an increasing ‘volume balance error’ on an annual 
basis (water that cannot be accounted for), a trend that Anwar (2016) is highly critical of 
given the conditions of water scarcity. Following objections raised by Sindh in 1994, 
WAPDA based allocations on historical use rather than the 1991 Accord (A. Anwar 2016, 
Ranjan 2012). The required re-negotiation of the Accord would need review by the Council 
of Common Interests. However, as a court, Anwar (2016) states that the council would 
review whether the legal terms of the Accord have been adhered to rather than the Accord 
itself.   
 
The Sindh-Punjab dispute has been aggravated by the number and scale of multipurpose 
projects on the River Indus. The extent of projects is shown by the fact that pre-partition there 
was one barrage on the Indus River and post partition there are 19 (Ranjan 2012). This has 
led to further subnational disputes between Punjab and the Mirpur region in AJ&K, 
Balochistan, KPK, Gilgit Baltistan and Potohor. These are over issues including the Mangla 
Dam that is contested by the Mirpur region, demands by populations in Gilgit Baltistan and 
Potohor over their exclusion from hydel power profits generated from their region, and the 
proposal for the Kalabagh Dam, rejected by Sindh, Balochistan and KPK (Ranjan 2012). The 
Kalabagh Dam entails the submerging of 35,000 acres of land, and has proved to be the most 
controversial proposal to date (Ranjan 2012, 117). A host of further projects are proposed in 
Pakistan’s Water Vision 2025, including the construction of the Diamer-Bhasha on the Indus 
River with a capacity of 6.4 MAF, expected to finish in 2019 (Ranjan 2012, 116). For this 
reason, Water Vision 2025 has been heavily criticised by Sindh (Ranjan 2012, 116).  
 
Ranjan (2012) concludes in his analysis of the provincial dispute, that Punjab has continued 
to act in a colonial manner over its water resources since independence. Ongoing biases in 
water allocations have fuelled militant movements for the establishment of provincial rights 
over indigenous natural resources (Ranjan 2012). Punjab’s predatory behaviour over natural 
resources has been linked to wider theories on the ‘denial of economic resources’ by a 
dominant groups to others, leading to revolt within deprived regions (Gellner and Homer-
Dixon cited in Ranjan 2012 106). This is seen in ongoing resentment over the perceived 
dominance of Punjab in the state apparatus, strengthening regional independence movements 
and terrorist activities, most notably in Sindh and Balochistan. It is clear that the dominance 
of the rural elite in Punjab and their grip on state resources will have to be reined in if the 
provincial water apportionment is to be clarified and enforced and stability attained. 
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3.3 The	development	of	IWRM	policy	and	legislation	in	Pakistan	
Pakistan’s National Water Vision 2025 is essentially a mix of an integrated water resource 
management and hydropower development plan. Outlined by Bisht (2013), Water Vision 
2025 is focused on increasing dams in Punjab for water storage and developing capacity for 
hydropower at a cost of approximately USD 50 billion. The draft policy aims to strengthen 
the country’s water institutions, to provide opportunities for public private partnerships, 
promote public education programmes on water issues, and promote schemes to reduce water 
logging and salinity (Bisht 2013). The policy is praised in the work of Ringler and Anwar 
(2016) in addressing critical issues related to Pakistan’s water storage capacity, deteriorating 
water quality and environmental conditions, supply gaps, distribution biases, and the need for 
stakeholder participation.  
 
The effectiveness of the draft policy will need to be evaluated in more detail once it is in 
force. However, it has been criticised by Kamal (2009, cited in Bell at al 2016) as comprising 
more a ‘list of actions’ rather than as a comprehensive policy document (Bell, et al. 2016). 
No food or agricultural policies have also been updated based on the National Water Vision 
2025 at the federal or provincial levels with issues still addressed in isolation (Ringler and 
Anwar 2016). As highlighted by Ringler and Anwar (2016), such policies could address 
irrigation pricing and management, food procurement, electricity subsidies and import and 
export tariffs. Further to this, water legislation and institutional structures have not been not 
updated in line with the 2025 Water Vision or the use of new technologies (Ringler and 
Anwar 2016). Despite the challenges in implementing the vision, Ringler and Anwar (2016) 
comment that the draft policy must go further to strengthen its emphasis on groundwater 
management, water recycling between sectors, and demand management. These key areas are 
summarised as critical avenues for the country to achieve a sustainable water sector in the 
studies by Briscoe and Qamar (2006) and Ray (2010).   
 
Encouraged by international donors, Pakistan previously introduced aspects of IWRM to 
encourage farmer participation in the agricultural and water sectors under the Revised Action 
Plan, the Devolution Plan, the National Drainage Policy, and Irrigation Management 
Transfer. However, the required institutional arrangements in the form of Farmers 
Organisations and Water User Associations, proved challenging to implement, in part, due to 
what Ranjan (2015) refers to as the culture of ‘perfect’. This translates into a rejection of 
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changes to a system perceived to be working without flaws. A further problem stems from the 
fact that this new set up has been introduced in tandem with the continuance of the old set up 
leading to resistance to change, and institutional rivalries, an aspect documented in the 
fieldwork of Bell et al. (2016). These aspects are bought out to a greater extent in the field 
research conducted as part of this study (see section 3). Despite significant challenges, 
Ahmed (2011), highlights that FOs have had some success in reducing cases of water theft in 
Punjab and are cited as the most successful area of Pakistan’s water reforms to date (Ahmed 
et al 2011 cited in Bisht 2013). However, if IWRM is expanded in Pakistan, greater 
investment will be required in instilling ownership on the part of Irrigation and Agricultural 
Departments to prevent the system essentially freezing.  
 
Levels of integration between the agricultural and water sectors of Pakistan are documented 
in a 2014 FAO report, commissioned by the Government of Pakistan. This report analyses the 
progress of integrating disaster risk reduction systems and procedures into the agricultural 
sector and water sectors. This includes an analysis of coordination mechanisms across 
institutions linked to irrigation, land revenue, water resources management, livestock, the 
environment, and farming. This study concludes that there are large variations in the capacity 
for sectoral integration between the provinces. Government institutions within Punjab show 
the strongest capacity for adaptation and sectoral integration whilst more neglected territories 
such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan, where education 
levels are lower, lag behind by a significant margin. In this respect, progress in institutional 
development has been slow. The report cites the reasons for this as a prescriptive and 
competitive institutional culture, a lack of merit based positions, the latter aspect being only 
legislated in 1973 and that served to encourage the need for ‘political patrons’ for promotions 
(Wilder 2010 cited in Hussain and Wegerich 2016 670), and the long term underfunding of 
institutions. 
 
There are several international institutions working on contributions to integrated water 
resources management for policy initiatives in Pakistan. The most prominent among these 
are: the Integrated Water Management Institute (IWMI), the Country Policy Support 
Programme (CPSP), and the Global Water Partnership (GWP). Funded by US based CGIAR, 
IWMI, an independent think tank that aims to influence water management policies has been 
active in Pakistan since the mid 1980s. IWMI’s basin level research has fed into policies such 
as Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM), and 
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problems related to reducing salinity (IWMI 2014). Further recent research focuses on the 
performance of the new institutional set up under IMT, strengthening the financial 
sustainability of the IBIS, local participation as a means to improve the monitoring of 
groundwater use, and means to improve measurements of equity in the distribution of 
irrigation water. Much of this work has been published in Water International and collated in 
the 2016 book Water for Security: Challenges for Pakistan by Ringer and Anwar. 
 
Water resources in the Nari River Basin in Balochistan have been assessed as part of a series 
of studies initiated by the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID). These 
were conducted from 2002-2005 under the Country Policy Support Programme (CPSP) 
(PANCID 2011, CPSP 2011). The objective of this research was to ascertain a sector-wise 
quantification of water needs and to develop means of improving water resources 
management by 2025. This was within the broad sectors of food, people, and nature (CPSP 
2011). The Balochistan assessment utilises the Basin-Wide Holistic Integrated Water 
Assessment model (BHIWA) providing a computational framework of water resources 
(CPSP 2011). BHIWA considers human impacts on water resources with data analysed to 
assess future availability and needs under varying policy options (CPSP 2011, CPSP 2005). 
The assessment predicts considerable stress to groundwater resources recommending 
rainwater harvesting, soil management, delay action dams, storage dams and diversion 
channels to improve recharge (CPSP 2005). The report further recommends: the integration 
of surface and groundwater uses, integrating flood control with irrigation, and integrating 
food, agriculture, and irrigation. National level discussions on the report largely dismissed its 
findings due to its reliance on secondary data and failure to include stakeholders in the 
assessment process (CPSP 2005). This highlights the importance of including stakeholders in 
tool development where the use of shared resources needs to be negotiated (CPSP 2005).   
 
With a growing interest in Balochistan’s water crisis, the World Bank commissioned the 
Balochistan Integrated Water Resources Management and Development Project in 2016 at a 
cost of USD 209 million (World Bank 2016). Focusing on the Nari and Porali basins, this 
project aims to strengthen provincial government capacity for the management and 
monitoring of water resources via institutional restructuring and the implementation of multi-
agency river basin information systems providing public access to data. The project further 
encourages community managed irrigation schemes via social mobilisation and local 
participation (World Bank 2016).  
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Further research and projects related to water resources management are collated from around 
the web in the Pakistan Water Gateway with research organised by province. Prominent 
among these is research on pilot water ATM scheme set up to provide clean drinking water in 
Punjab in 2017. It is planned that water ATMs will be remotely controlled and utilised to 
improve service delivery and monitor water quality. At a cost of 374,599 USD, this 
collaboration between the University of Colorado and the University of Lahore may indicate 
a shift in views towards the privatisation of water services (Pakistan Today 2017). 
 
GWP and the Pakistan Water Partnership (PWP) are more focused on improving stakeholder 
coordination and capacity building. As such they have launched a series of stakeholder 
workshops and initiatives in recent years. Prominent among these is the urban water 
partnership launched in 2007 that focuses on stakeholder coordination and building the 
capacity of institutions working on water management (GWP South Asia 2018). A critical 
workshop was also held in 2017 to review progress under Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG) 6.5.1 relating to the degree of IWRM implementation. Progress under this SDG is 
assessed against indicators relating to the enabling environment, institutions, levels of 
participation, management instruments, and financing (UN Water n.d.). Pakistan scored an 
average of 50 from a possible score of 100 for each category (GWP South Asia 2018). At the 
close of the workshop the Joint Secretary for Water Resources stated that the scoring will be 
utilised as a baseline for assessing future progress in IWRM implementation in Pakistan 
(GWP South Asia 2018).  
3.4 Challenges	and	criticisms	of	IWRM	implementation	in	Pakistan	
Despite Water Vision 2025 representing a major step towards integrative planning, there are 
doubts over the extent this aspect will be transferred into Pakistan’s National Water Policy. 
Bisht (2013) is skeptical of whether Vision 2025 will be implemented at all, stating that it 
was put together by officials who do not have the mandate nor political clout to enforce 
proposed changes. Based on Vision 2025, the original draft water policy drawn up in 2002 
has proved controversial experiencing repeated setbacks in its finalisation resulting in an 
increasingly watered-down version of the document. On the advice of the World Bank, a 
revised draft was produced in 2005 by the Ministry of Water and Power but following 
controversy, this was updated in 2010. A committee was later formed to finalise Pakistan’s 
water policy comprising: WAPDA, Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC), and Water Sector 
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Capacity Building and Advisory Services (WCAP) (Kiani 2017). Despite being finalised in 
2012, the policy was blocked from coming into force by the Ministry for Law and Justice 
with officials stating that there was no provision in the 1973 Constitutional Legislative List 
for water policy (Kiani 2017).   
 
Treated as a provincial matter, broad consensus was sought from the provinces and reached 
in 2017. However, Kiani (2017) states that the policy was significantly watered down 
excluding the major areas of: irrigation and drainage, land reclamation, water productivity, 
salinity control, on-farm water management, and the control of waterlogging being already 
under provincial management. Much of the remaining areas in the draft are already covered 
by legislation with areas addressed including: transboundary water and inter-provincial 
conflicts, glacier management, river ecology, large-scale water related infrastructure, and 
mechanisms for cost recovery (Government of Pakistan 2005). Kiani (2017) reports that 
recent delays to the draft’s approval by the CCI are due to influence from Prime Minister 
Shahid Abbasi with the draft policy being re-examined by the newly formed Ministry of 
Water Resources. Previous support for the draft policy came from former Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif, the former Minister for Water and Power, and the Lahore High Court (Kiani 
2017).  
 
Pakistan has since been highlighted in the UNWater Status Report 2012 as a country 
confronting significant challenges to obtaining agreement on new water policies or legislation 
that reflect IWRM. The report further highlights the lack of prioritisation given to water 
resources management. This is in spite of ongoing conditions of water scarcity, largely 
resulting from management issues including the overexploitation of ground and surface water 
resources and pollution. Potential reasons for the low prioritisation of water resources 
management are cited as: political priorities, inadequate consultation, resistance from elites to 
change, and a ‘fear of losing benefits’ (UNWater Status Report 2012 15).  
 
There are further criticisms of the motivations behind Pakistan’s programmes for 
administrative decentralisation that Giordano and Shah (2014) describe as IWRM in all but 
name only. Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf (2010) and Khan (2015) state that the Devolution Plan 
implemented in 2001 under Musharraf’s military regime largely failed being driven by the 
need for ‘regime legitimisation’ and ‘clientelistic politics’, rather than a genuine push for 
decentralisation. Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf (2010) further state that devolving power within 
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a dysfunctional system meant that predatory power structures were simply reproduced at 
lower levels of government. In this way, devolution was utilised to side-line provincial 
authorities enabling state actors to control local politics (Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010). 
This was achieved with the hijacking of processes by local mediators via the rigging local 
elections for e.g. FO representatives using intimidation and the culture of ‘clientelistic 
networks’ (Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010). Further problems stemmed from inadequate 
training provided to local government officials and weak intergovernmental coordination. 
They conclude that participatory democracy was on paper only.  This finding is supported in 
the 2012 UNWater Status Report15 that states, stakeholder involvement is viewed as ‘a threat 
to existing power relations, limiting participation to a consultative role’ (24).  
 
The findings of Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf (2010) are supported by field research conducted 
by IWMI in 2014. This research identifies significant capacity gaps among local water bodies 
with slow rates of institutional operationalisation. IWMI (2014) states that the slow rate of 
knowledge acquisition by institutions setup under the 1997 Irrigation and Drainage Authority 
Act, is largely due to the fixed short-term tenure of 36 months for elected FO leaders. As a 
result, many FOs and AWBs spend up to an average of 32 months with key posts vacant 
whilst they complete formal processes (IWMI 2014). IWMI (2014) further question the 
motivation of elected leaders stating that such posts have become politicised with local water 
institutions viewed as an initial step towards a political career. The use of non-party elected 
candidates also exacerbates sectarian tensions in areas, reinforcing traditional hostilities (ICG 
2004 cited in Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010). IWMI (2014) conclude that tenures of at least 
48 months with an additional president-elect period are required to discourage short-term 
opportunistic behaviours and support the handover of skills and linkages.  
 
The participation of women in water management institutions continues to be poor despite 
their prominent role in water collection and sanitation for the household. Low rates of 
participation among women in water bodies, in spite of their involvement in community level 
institutions across the country, may be linked to land ownership. It may also be linked to the 
conservative nature of Pakistani society with education and employment primarily dominated 
by men. The effect of Pakistan’s conservative culture on rates of women’s participation, is 
                                                             
15 The 2015 UN Water report is not currently available online and the 2018 UN Water report on IWRM is in 
progress 
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illustrated in the fact that although women were elected to seats in local government as part 
of the 2001 Devolution Plan, in practice, many did not participate in council meetings. 
Council meetings were instead attended led by male family members on their behalf 
(Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010). This puts into question how women can be genuinely 
involved in water governance projects. 
 
The 2012 UNWater Status Report further looks into the lack of management instruments to 
support IWRM implementation. Management areas identified as weak include: access to 
information on Pakistan’s ‘resource base, water quality, and users’, preparedness for 
flooding, the failure to issue permits and licensing for pollution control, data analysis to 
support decision making, and performance monitoring systems (34). The 2012 Report 
specifies that although Pakistan has management instruments in place, it lacks the capacity to 
implement them effectively. The 2012 Report states that little has changed in the way of 
planning in relation to the management of water resources in Pakistan since investments on 
IWRM were initiated. Planning processes for areas such as infrastructural development 
remain much the same with wider sectoral stakeholders excluded. This section of the 2012 
Report concludes that the multiple uses of water infrastructure are not being considered 
indicating a slow pace of sectoral integration and continuing sectoral power imbalances. 
 
Low levels of revenue generation are identified in the 2012 UN Status Report as a major 
reason for slow progress in IWRM implementation. This finding is supported by research 
conducted by IWMI into abiana payments conducted in 2014. Abiana is charged at a fixed 
rate of PKR 85 per acre foot of water in Kharif and PKR 50 per acre in the Rabi or Intl 
USD1.97 per unit (IWMI 2014). IWMI (2014) states that in Peru, a country of similar 
economic status, this volume of water is charged at Intl USD 11.76 per unit. IWMI (2014) 
further notes that if a farmer purchased the same volume of water from a groundwater 
tubewell it would cost an average of PKR 7,000 per acre. Significant budgetary gaps are 
further brought out in IWMI’s research in KPK, that finds for every PKR 100 collected in 
abiana, PKR 170 is required in the form of HR salaries for collection. In 2011, the gap 
between abiana and O&M alone is recorded as -376.13% for Punjab, with the province 
meeting only 20% of O&M costs (IWMI 2018, Planning Commission 2012).   
 
These gaps remain in spite of the stipulation in the 1997 Irrigation and Drainage Authority 
Act, that institutions should aim for all O&M costs to be recovered by 2007 (IWMI 2014). 
160 
 
IWMI (2014) forwards that abiana rates should be linked to the State Bank of Pakistan’s 
Retail Price Index (RPI) of inflation, plus a 2.5% premium. This would, at the minimum, be 
used to signal a situation of water scarcity to service users, a view also advocated by Ray 
(2010). The reliance on government budgetary allocations to cover O&M costs could also be 
linked to subsidies. Ray (2010) states that such irrigation policies may soon be challenged by 
industrialised countries as they remove their own subsidies. Ringler and Anwar (2016) also 
criticise the government for its active role in the agricultural sector stating that it should be 
more of a ‘facilitator’ than an ‘actor’. The authors further comment that interventions such as 
the government’s strong role in the allocation of farm inputs and irrigation water reduces the 
scope of opportunities for private investors. However, Mustafa and Wrathall (2011) caution 
that monitoring mechanisms for groundwater use are virtually non-existent under the Canal 
and Drainage Act, making further private sector involvement unwise until regulations are 
strengthened. Furthermore, within a system where corruption is endemic, higher payment 
amounts for surface water may open further avenues for hierarchical based politics with 
payment amounts linked to relations with enforcement officials.  
 
Water rights also need to be strengthened, under the canal system, water allocations are 
provided according to land ownership being currently the only proxy for water rights (Bisht 
2013, Anwar and Haq 2016). This gives tenants no rights over canal water with water rights, 
at present, loosely defined and in most cases non-existent under current legislative 
documents. Knapp et al (2003) further states that private water rights must be recognised 
separately from land rights if water regulations are to be strengthened (cited in Akram 2016). 
Akram (2016) states that such issues will need to be clarified prior to the involvement of 
further stakeholders. Due to this aspect, from a legal perspective, proposals such as water 
trading are severely restricted under the Canal and Drainage Act. Despite this, Akram (2016) 
highlights that informal water trading already occurs at the watercourse level, being most 
prevalent in Punjab (Meinzen-Dick 1996 cited in Akram 2016).   
 
Akram (2016) further argues the case for the formalisation of water markets. He states that 
this would strengthen aspects of IMT by passing more decision making powers to the 
grassroots level. He states that under IMT, Khaal Panchayat (or WUA) presidents already 
meet at the distributary level putting them in a position to facilitate water trading via this 
platform. Perera (2003) also comments that water trading already works at the higher level of 
canal command area (CCA). He highlights that if a CCA does not want their full share of 
161 
 
water, they can obtain credit for the saved allocations for later use. The 1992 study, 
Willingness to Pay for Water in Rural Punjab, conducted by Altaf et al., also highlights the 
large amounts already invested in multiple water systems at the household level. Altaf et al. 
(1992) conclude that the level and frequency of these investments show a strong willingness 
to pay for reliable water access, an aspect that formal water trading could facilitate.  
 
Despite his clear support for the development of formal water markets, Akram (2016) 
acknowledges challenges to their development. Current challenges are in the form of the 
absence of strong monitoring mechanisms required to trade water shares across watercourses, 
variances in canal discharge, the need for reliable forecasting, and ‘transmission losses’ (97). 
A further legislative barrier is that the 1991 Water Accord currently prohibits water trading 
and would need updating as a condition for this practice to develop (A. Anwar 2016).   
 
The growing water crisis in Pakistan indicates that radical changes in planning and 
investment are necessary if long term solutions are to be successfully implemented. However, 
few genuine efforts have been made towards IWRM in the country with progress hampered 
by institutional politics and conservative mindsets. In this respect, it is useful to draw vital 
lessons from previous programmes aimed at decentralisation such as the RAP in the 1970s 
and Devolution Plan in 2001. These include the need for donors to better analyse the 
motivations behind reforms, an aspect that links into issues connected to government 
ownership over externally funded programmes. Previous reforms and repeated setbacks 
further show that a new approach is required that builds in stronger checks on the activities of 
state, provincial, and elected bodies in connection to water resources management. Above all, 
approaches to reforming Pakistan’s water sector must be identified that can better address the 
challenges associated with dealing with an entrenched bureaucracy that is unaccustomed to 
change (Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010). 
3.5 Re-evaluating	IWRM	in	Pakistan	
The pace of Pakistan’s progress in moving towards a more integrated national water policy 
should be assessed against the major political changes which have taken place within the 
country since 1947. These transitions are primarily seen in the varying forms of government 
in the country. Until 1956, Pakistan had a heavily bureaucratic setup with the pool of HR 
greatly expanding following independence, this was followed by periods of presidential 
democracy in the 1950s and 2000s, 3 military dictatorships under Martial Law in 1958-71, 
162 
 
1977-85, and 1999-2001, and periods of parliamentary democracy experienced in the 1970s, 
late 1980s, and today (Hussain and Wegerich 2016). Haque (2017) states that the economic 
impacts of this political uncertainty on foreign direct investment, made worse by structural 
adjustment policies and economic mismanagement, helped mould Pakistan into a heavily 
indebted country. Pakistan had a net debt equivalent to 66.50% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2016 with an average net debt amounting to 69.39% of GDP from 1994-2016 
(Central Bank of Pakistan 2016).  
 
By the end of 2017, there were growing fears of a default, pushed by a more hostile 
environment among international lending agencies dominated by the US (Haque 2017). The 
country’s budget is further stretched by its large population reaching nearly 200 million in 
2018 (World Population Review 2018). In consideration of these factors, internal capacity for 
major investments in the form of a system and institutional overhaul has been limited (World 
Bank 2002, cited in Ray 2010 59). 
 
Pakistan is also a country still in the shadow of its colonial legacy with water resource 
decisions often based on conservative thinking manipulated by its rural elite. In Punjab alone 
where 90 million people reside, almost 70% of people are based in rural areas making the 
influence of landlords on elections, and in turn their political influence, substantial (Mustaque 
et al 2011 cited in Hussain and Wegerich 2016). Such cases highlight the tensions outlined in 
Gilmartin’s (1994) study between ‘political privilege’ supported by state actors and 
‘irrigation efficiency’ (cited in Hussain and Wegerich 2016). Bisht (2013) also cites 
institutional resistance against moving forward from traditional practices for managing water 
resources and a reliance on archaic laws as key reasons for the slow pace of institutional 
development.  
 
Giordano and Tushaar (2014) stress that in complex political environments such as in 
Pakistan, it is vital to expand analysis to include change processes as well as outcomes, as 
incorporated in the Advocacy Coalition Framework. This argument links in with the wider 
literature on institutional change that looks more into the motivations and processes of 
change. The importance of these aspects comes out in much of the analysis on Pakistan’s 
progress in decentralisation. Khan (2015) states that this focus on the mechanisms involved in 
institutional change, can aid in highlighting less obvious variables that contribute to differing 
outcomes, further contributing to wider research on change theory. In this respect, Mezzera, 
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Aftab and Yusuf (2010) question why donors failed to investigate the reasons that endeavours 
at decentralisation were primarily pushed by military governments in Pakistan. Examples 
include the Devolution Plan under General Musharaf in 2001, Basic Democracy under 
General Ayub in 1959, and Local Bodies under General Zia in 1979 (S. A. Khan 2015, 
Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010).   
 
Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf (2010) conclude that in the case of Pakistan, the process of 
decentralisation was frequently motivated by a desire to diminish the powers of provincial 
level governement and consolidate the power of the centre. They further state that the 
counterproductive nature of these reforms is shown by the fact that after 9 years of the Local 
Governance Ordinance, decentralisation had little legitimacy at the grassroots level. Such 
policies also served to exacerbate tensions between provincial, local level governments, and 
community institutions. This was a significant factor in the decision to suspend local bodies 
between 1993 and 1998 (Cheema et al 2005 cited in Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010). In part 
for this reason and due to parties’ differing structures and bases of support, until the 2010 18th 
Amendment, policies aimed at decentralisation were reversed by democratically elected 
governments. Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf (2010) assert that Pakistan continues to be a two-
tiered state with local level government serverely underfunded and not incorporated as a 
constitutionally recognised third level. 
 
Due to such complex issues, unique to each country context, Giordano and Shah (2014) are 
critical of the implementation of IWRM as a global policy, that takes a universal and 
apolitical approach. They state that such rigid donor programmes and solutions should not be 
forwarded prior to the analysis of national priorities and water problems. They further 
elaborate that IWRM should not become the end goal in itself. Such an apolitical approach 
can undermine the functioning of existing water management systems by creating plural 
systems. It can also hamper the identification of pragmatic solutions, can lead to weak 
government ownership over programmes to improve service provision, and is vulnerable to 
political manipulation (Jensen 2013 cited in Giordano and Shah 2014). Examples of such 
cases are seen in the manipulation of FOs by the local elite in Pakistan as an avenue to 
influence water allocations, institutional resistance to IMT viewed as an externally imposed 
reform, the re-packaging of previous construction programmes under the 2025 draft Water 
Policy, and the setup of PIDAs whilst maintaining PIDs leading to overlaps and confusion. 
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Giordano and Shah (2014) further state that the type of scoring in international surveys 
conducted by the GWP and UNWater, has pushed the focus onto the inclusion of IWRM 
terminology in policy documentation rather than linking it to impacts and water outcomes. 
More in-depth approaches were only included to a limited extent in surveys from 2012 
(Giordano and Tushaar 2014). Despite these challenges, IWRM is an approach prioritised by 
ADB in its Water for All policy focusing on fostering the integrated management of water 
resources. Integrated management in this policy is described as river basin organisation, 
decentralisation, transferable water rights, pricing, and cost recovery (Giordano and Tushaar 
2014). This illustrates how water sector funding at present, is often contingent on following 
set pathways linked to IWRM. A further area of concern is that the debate remains solely 
around water excluding the issue of land rights, despite encouraging inter-sectoral 
management. Giordano and Shah (2014) forward that IWRM should return to its focus on 
processes without formulas aiming to be context specific rather than donor led.  
 
Giordano and Shah (2014) conclude that there are multiple paths to achieving improved 
water outcomes, many of which veer from one or more IWRM principles. This is due to 
multiple reasons including the difficulties of obtaining participation within feudal setups, the 
cost of creating institutions to manage water at the basin level, and the controversial nature of 
using pricing as a management instrument. In light of these challenges, flexibility is 
necessary with subsidies provided where needed and fees applied where possible e.g. for 
groundwater use as opposed to standard rationalised pricing. Giordano and Shah (2014) also 
highlight that top-down approaches may be required to force farmers to increase the 
productivity of water use e.g. by simply discharging less water in areas and moving this to 
other sectors. This forces farmers to respond and adapt, and may push them to use water in a 
more efficient manner where possible.  
 
Giordano and Shah (2014) support a ‘problem shed’ approach that incorporates some of the 
less controversial aspects of IWRM and builds in an understanding of physical, 
socioeconomic, and political environments (Giordano and Tushaar 2014). Ostrom, Stern, and 
Dietz (2003) also state that there should be no single best solution for the governing of water 
resources with a need to put tangible problems first and then work towards pragmatic 
solutions (cited in Giordano and Shah (2014). They conclude that this should ideally be 
applied whether they incorporate all aspects of IWRM or not, an approach that seems more 
viable for Pakistan. 
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Section	Three:	Field	analysis	of	the	potential	for	IWRM	in	Punjab	and	Sindh	
1 Chapter	One:	Fieldwork	objectives	and	methodology	
1.1 Fieldwork	objectives		
Due to the scant information on IWRM implementation in Pakistan at present, it is 
impossible to address the research question on which aspects of IWRM may be realistically 
implemented using secondary data alone. This section therefore draws on the research gaps 
identified in sections 1 and 2 to select specific areas for data collection and analysis. These 
research gaps are focused on the conditions in which a new water policy would need to be 
introduced, evidence was therefore collected that supported or rejected the potential 
feasibility and acceptance of policy change. This evidence is in the form of actors that 
facilitate this change being government actors including law enforcement, influential 
landlords, and those expected to participate in the new institutional setup.  
It was recognised early in the study that policy changes in the governing of natural resources 
are a highly controversial area since they affect rural power structures and therefore may 
disrupt or enforce mechanisms for domination over highly vulnerable populations. The 
impacts of IWRM implementation on rural power structures and avenues for dominance are 
therefore of particular interest in this study.  
Further areas that this fieldwork aimed to assess are:  
• the sustainability of new water institutions set up under IWRM, cooperation between 
new and older institutions for water management,  
• whether and how the new institutional setup is changing the role of women in 
irrigation management and barriers to their involvement, and  
• the type of challenges and levels of institutional resistance to each aspect of the 
IWRM framework.  
In this way, the fieldwork undertaken significantly contributes to primary data on the impacts 
of donor driven IWRM policies in Pakistan. The fieldwork undertaken to answer this 
overarching research question is therefore extensive and completed at four levels in order to 
analyse the extent of IWRM implementation and coordination among the new institutional 
setup and existing institutions at all administrative levels.   
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1.2 Methodological	approach	
The methodological approach and design of tools for data collection in this third section 
is informed by the contextual analysis conducted in section 1. Contextual analysis that 
had fed into the methodological approach includes the recognition of existing feudal 
power structures meaning that questions and analysis will need to take into account the 
factor of influence. In this way, analysis will take into account that answers provided by 
both institutional representatives and water users may be those that are politically 
acceptable rather than truthful. Data collection methodology will further take into 
account the cultural situation in the country and the accepted role of women. In this 
context it should be recognised that women may not publicly acknowledge undertaking 
tasks that are perceived to be the role of men. 
 
In order to triangulate findings and obtain a more holistic analysis of the success of 
IWRM implementation to date, data was collected at several administrative levels. These 
levels are:  
• Provincial level: information is analysed on provincial priorities for water 
management, the perceptions of participatory irrigation management, the 
relationship between PIDs and new IWRM institutions in the form of 
PIDA/SIDA and levels of cooperation. Provincial findings are also compared to 
identify differences in: government and community attitudes, the nature of 
government-community communications, and the implementation of the new 
institutional setup.  
• District level: information is analysed on district level priorities for water 
management, the perceptions of the scale of water problems confronted and the 
causes of these issues, and institutional capacity for cooperation. District findings 
are also compared. This comparison is utilised to decipher the extent to which 
differences in the extent of problems confronted and success of Farmers’ 
Organisations and Water User Associations is due to local landlord dominance. 
• Village level16: information is collected on the role of women in local water 
bodies, the financial management of Farmers’ Organisations, and whether they 
are able to carry out their mandated roles 
                                                             
16 Villages usually consist of a cluster of communities in the same geographical area 
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• Community level: information is collected on perceptions of how water problems 
are being managed by government, the perceived causes of water problems, 
coping mechanisms, willingness to share information, willingness to approach 
government officials to resolve water issues, and the impacts of water problems 
on household income, health, and welfare. 
1.3 Positioning	as	a	researcher	
It should be noted that I was able to gain access to high ranking government officials via 
my network of colleagues in Pakistan. This network aided me in obtaining my initial 
research visa, access to high security areas on two occasions with a double police escort, 
and interviews with provincial and district level government. My work with the National 
Rural Support Organisation further aided me to gain access to communities, farmers’ 
organisations, and water user associations. In other areas where communities were more 
reluctant to be interviewed due to the sense of futility, in that they have accepted they 
will never receive access to water sources, I was able to gain access through colleagues 
who had relatives in these areas.  
 
I also have contacts within government from my previous work with the Government of 
Pakistan and the World Bank. The fact that I was introduced to higher ranking contacts 
through government and army persons made interviewees more open in discussing 
controversial issues. It is unlikely that someone perceived as an outsider would gain the 
same access or openness in interviews. My previous work in rural areas of Pakistan 
further provided me with an in-depth understanding of cultural norms towards 
hierarchies, greetings, language, and the position of women.  
 
My understanding from years of work in Pakistan and my network further pushed me 
towards conducted a mixed methods study. This is due to my contacts enabling me to 
conduct and gain access to both qualitative and quantitative research. My contextual 
understanding of Pakistan’s social and institutional culture further enabled me to 
undertake more in-depth interviews resulting in richer data for analysis. 
1.4 Methodology	for	fieldwork	
Primary data was collected using tools designed to collect both qualitative and 
quantitative information. Closed questionnaires were used to conduct surveys at the level 
168 
 
of Farmers’ Organisations and Water User Associations. Types of quantitative analysis 
undertaken were focused towards the institutional assessment of new water management 
organisations and how they operate within the existing institutional setup. Quantitative 
analysis therefore focused on indicators showing the financial sustainability of 
organisations, institutional maturity in the way of inclusion, professionalism, and 
participation, HR and operations and the understanding of roles and responsibilities 
against institutional mandates, and institutional accountability and transparency. 
 
More qualitative data was collected from provincial government officials and 
communities using semi-structured questionnaires and open discussion. Data was 
therefore collected via 3 key sources comprising government, farmers’ institutions, and 
communities. Key informant interviews were utilised to collect information from 
Irrigation Department officials, the Agricultural Department, and Patwari, a survey was 
used to collect data from AWBs, Farmers’ Organisations and Water User Association, 
and focus group discussions were used to collect feedback from communities. Qualitative 
analysis is utilised to analysis focus group discussions held with communities and key 
informant interviews with government. Type of analysis undertaken include word 
searches looking into the frequency words are utilised such as ‘political’, word trees are 
used to contextualise associations and links between common words such as ‘political’ 
and canal ‘outlet’, scripts are also analysed for the percentage of time that issues such as 
‘corruption’ or ‘water stealing’ are discussed. 
1.5 Practical	limitations	and	reflexivity		
Practical limitations to the fieldwork were predominantly driven by financial 
considerations and security. Despite having good relations with security personal, there 
were still occasions when I was only permitted 24 hours within high security areas 
limiting options for interviews with government were appointments are required and 
agreed advance and based on schedules. In such locations I chose to conduct interviews 
with at least one representative from government working in a department related to 
agricultural and irrigation and at least one interview with communities. This strategy was 
a compromise but ensured that high security locations were not excluded. Government 
holidays were a further obstacle to interviews meaning I had to analyse scheduling and 
logistics in a very efficient manner. Efficient planning was also required to ensure I did 
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not to waste resources such as the car, security, translators, and driver provided by 
NRSP. 
 
Further limitations stemmed from the political nature and sensitivity of the topics 
discussed. The political nature of water management at times limited access to canal 
maps, and on many occasions prevented photographic evidence of illegal infrastructural 
changes such as the number and size of direct canal outlets. Some officials also refused 
interview due to previous negative reporting in the media on aspects of water 
management. On these occasions, I interviewed officials from related departments or 
other officials in the same department. I also stressed that my research is designed to be 
balanced and that my questions and analysis did not have a preconceived negative or 
political slant. I also stressed that I was coming from a neutral non-government or media 
related funding body outside of Pakistan. I believe that this open and transparent 
approach on my research aided me to gain the trust of officials for interview further 
contributing to the depth of data obtained. 
 
I learned during the course of my research the extent of politics surrounding water 
management. I also learned the importance of analysing what is not discussed meaning 
the importance of analysing why certain issues are deemed too political or controversial 
for discussion. The politics behind water also showed me the differing impacts on 
communities according to their own perceived sense of power or defeatism. Some 
communities were defiant and very willing to be interviewed, they also adapted relatively 
quickly to their new environment organising themselves into groups and forming 
advocacy networks pushing for the reinstatement of their water supply. Others were more 
fearful of police involvement and therefore more reluctant to voice their problems 
creating a culture of silence and acceptance. I believe this is an aspect that warrants 
further investigation in the future in related to the management of finite resources. 
1.6 Research	ethics	
Due to the political and sensitive nature of discussions around finite resources, research 
ethics was a significant area taken into consideration at all times in the design, planning, 
and implementation of data collection. To ensure the appropriate approach was taken to 
research ethics, I attended sessions on this subject provided under the SSRMC 
programme at Cambridge University. These sessions provided me with a good 
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understanding of ethical procedures, how the perceived importance of research ethics 
was evolving within the university, and enabled me to discuss potential ethical issues 
with my research with a specialist in this area. This course, and my learned experiences 
from my previous work on sensitive issues in Pakistan including government 
programmes for land redistribution, enabled me to incorporate research ethics as an 
important factor in my fieldwork. Research ethics was incorporated into data collection 
and analysis at key points, these included: permissions for interview and the use of data, 
anonymity, the use of photography, the use of maps, the respect of cultural norms, and in 
security considerations. A further ethical consideration taken into account was the need 
to ‘give back’ in exchange for participants giving up their time (Banks and Scheyvens 
2014). 
1.6.1 Security	
The Interior Ministry was also informed of my research areas and topic during my visa 
application with detailed interviews conducted at the Pakistan Embassy in London. The 
local police were informed in advance of data collection in high security areas in parts of 
northern and southern Punjab. Areas where access was not permitted were avoided, these 
were generally situated close to military bases. 
1.6.2 Permissions	and	anonymity	
The interview questionnaire was sent prior to all interviews with government and 
communities before scheduling was finalised. Verbal permission was taken at the start of 
all interviews for a Dictaphone to be used. Verbal permission was selected due to the fact 
that many focus group participants were illiterate. Dictaphones were placed in a visible 
location at all times during interviews to make it clear when recordings were being made 
and when it was switched off. In the case where permission was not provided, for 
recordings, detailed notes were taken or in some cases the interview did not go ahead. 
Recordings were deemed important for ensuring accurate transcripts were made for 
analysis. Due to the political nature of water management, there were incidences where 
officials requested to discuss information ‘off the record’ or ‘in confidence’. Information 
provided in this manner was not transcribed and instead utilised to inform questioning 
during further key informant interviews and focus group discussions with communities.  
 
Due to the sensitive nature of water management in Pakistan, the decision was made not 
to include the names of officials in the thesis. Only the department is provided. In the 
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case where officials refused interview after reviewing the questionnaire and study 
purpose, interviews were not pursued further. 
1.6.3 Cultural	norms		
Permission was taken from the head of each household to interview women and requests 
made in more conservative areas for a male translator to be present where women 
translators were not available. In a small proportion of areas, household heads insisted on 
having a trusted male observer from the village in discussions with women to ensure 
cultural norms were respected. This request was complied with in all instances. In 
conservative areas, focus group discussions were carried out with women separately from 
men. This was to ensure that women felt able to speak more openly about issues and 
barriers they confronted in water management in the household.  
1.6.4 Photography	
Due to security issues, photography was not taken of strategic infrastructure such as 
minors and large canals. Permission was taken at the start of all interviews for 
photography of offices, surrounding areas, farmland, broken infrastructure, and interview 
subjects. In the cases where photography was refused, this was not pursued. 
1.6.5 Maps	
Although observed, copies of maps were not taken on the extent of direct outlets from 
district level irrigation departments due to the concern of employees that this action 
would be traced back to them. This restriction on data collection was respected due to its 
political implications. 
1.6.6 Sensitive	data	
Due to the sensitivity of data on water stealing and arrests for such actions, data on this 
was not released by provincial and district level authorities. This restriction on data 
collection was respected due to its political implications. 
1.6.7 Giving	back	
The need to give back to interviewees that had given up their time to participate in the 
study was a strong ethical consideration. This decision was made due to members of 
communities having contacted staff from the National Rural Support Organisation that 
supported in this research for the results of previous research reports. On one occasion 
community representatives had travelled long distances in order to obtain documentation. 
This consideration is also in line with the suggested principles for ethical research 
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forwarded by Banks and Scheyvens (2014). The predominant form that communities 
were helped was by raising their queries and issues with local government authorities, in 
this way their causes were advocated by a third party.  
 
The findings of the thesis in relation to the duration of the water crisis, its perceived 
causes, the extent of its impacts, and perceptions of the institutional new setup were 
shared with provincial and district level government offices. The findings were also with 
members of community organisations to help strengthen evidence for advocacy and the 
need for two-way communication on the impacts of the new institutional setup. 
1.7 Key	Informant	Interviews	
14 key informant interviews were conducted with 32 officials working in departments 
related to agriculture and water management within Punjab and Sindh. 2 provincial level 
interviews were conducted in Hyderabad for Sindh and Lahore for Punjab and 14 further 
interviews were conducted within 11 districts (6 in Punjab and 5 in Sindh). Interviews 
were kept as open as possible to gage local priorities with the questionnaire utilised as a 
prompt only. Districts were selected from the upper and lower parts of each province to 
assess the perceived scale and type of problems confronted in head and tail-end canal 
areas. However, convenience sampling was utilised in regards to the fact that the number 
of officials interviewed in each district varied depending upon availability and security. 
Due to the difficulty in contacting officials, no interview was conducted with the 
Irrigation Department in Bahawalpur with an interview instead conducted in the 
neighbouring district of Rajanpur. Further to this, due to parts of northern Punjab 
constituting high security areas, only one interview was conducted with a Patwari 
official in district Attock.  
 
The objective of key informant interviews was explained up to a week in advance to 
officials prior to interview. All interviews were conducted with men reflecting the 
dominance of men in the government apparatus. Photographs were also taken where 
permitted as further evidence of interviews and to show differing office facilities and 
conditions if required. Government departments identified for key informant interviews 
are presented by province and district in table 10: 
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Table 10 Government key informant interviews conducted by province, district, and 
department 
No. of 
districts 
Level Department 
No. of 
Interviews 
No. of officials 
interviewed 
Province: Punjab 
1 
Provincial 
(Lahore 
based) 
Irrigation and Drainage 
Authority (PIDA) 
1 1 
2 
District 
Attock 
Patwari 
(Land Revenue 
Collection) 
1 1 
3 
District 
Bahawalpur 
Agriculture 1 2 
4 
District 
Rahim Yar 
Khan 
Irrigation  
Agriculture  
2 
2 
2 
5 
District 
Rajanpur 
Irrigation 1 2 
6 
District 
Sargodha 
Irrigation  
Agriculture  
2 
2 
2 
Subtotal 8 14 
Province: Sindh 
1 
Provincial 
(Hyderabad 
based) 
Sindh Irrigation and 
Drainage Authority 
(SIDA) 
1 3 
2 
District 
Ghotki 
Irrigation (Ghotki-Sukkur) 
Agriculture 
2 
2 
3 
3 
District 
Sukkur 
(Irrigation covered 
above) 
Agricultural Extension 
1 2 
4 
District 
Mirpurkhas 
Irrigation  
Agriculture 
2 
2 
2 
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5 
District 
Badin 
Irrigation  
Agriculture Extension  
2 
2 
2 
Subtotal 8 18 
Total : 16 
 
Interviews were conducted in a mixture of English, Urdu, Sindhi, Punjabi, and Saraiki, 
with a team of translators present at all times from the Pakistan based NGO National 
Rural Support Programme (NRSP). In northern Sindh (districts Sukkur and Ghotki), 
translators were present from the Sindh Rural Support Organisation (SRSP).  
1.8 Institutional	capacity	assessment	farmers’	organisations	(FOs)	and	
Khaal	Panchayats/	Water	User	Associations17	in	Punjab	
As a major gap in the current literature on the evaluation of IWRM policies in Pakistan, 
an institutional capacity assessment was conducted of AWBs, Farmers’ Organisations, 
and Water User Associations in Punjab. At the time of data collection for this study, 
NRSP had completed a survey of 16 Farmers’ Organisations and 80 Water User 
Associations in Punjab, completed in October 2014. This data formed part of a feasibility 
study for the expansion of the main canal system and institutional structures from the 
Rasul Barrage on the River Jhelum in Punjab (ICARDA 2014 8). Following meetings 
with NRSP management and the head of the MER section, project management provided 
authorisation for the survey data to be shared for quantitative analysis as part of this 
study. For the reason, data is taken from AWB, Farmers’ Organisations, and Water User 
Association areas in the Lower Chenab Canal (LCC) and Lower Bad Doab Canal 
(LBDC) in Punjab.  
 
                                                             
17 GIS maps are provided curtesy of the Government Urban Unit in Lahore 
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Farmers’ Organisation numbers are limited in Pakistan limiting the sampling frame for 
analysis, initially taken from PIDA. This sampling frame consisted of a list of Area 
Water Boards and Farmers’ Organisations registered in the survey area. 16 Farmers’ 
Organisations were then contacted to provide a list of Water User Associations covered 
by their institutions. These lists were used to draw up the map of the sample area shown 
in figure 31. The 
sample size for 
the number of 
Farmers’s 
Organisations 
operating in the 
LCC and LBDC 
was 50%. It 
should be noted 
that Farmers’ 
Organisations 
established under 
Irrigation 
Management Units from 2005 onwards in the same canal areas were also planned for 
sampling, however, they were in the main found to be defunct. Interviews were therefore 
conducted with 8 Farmers’ Organisations in each canal system with a total of 16 
organisations assessed.  
 
Stepped clustered sampling was conducted by canal division, and canal sub-division 
(sampled FOs were located at the head, middle, and tail-end areas). Interviews were 
conducted with 3 AWBs from each distributary system. 1 Farmers’ Organisation was 
also randomly selected at the head reach of each main canal, 3 from the mid-section, and 
4 at the tail-end. These 16 organisations cover 615kms of canals (361kms in LCC and 
254kms in LBDC) and a canal command area of 713,209 acres (413,679 acres in LCC 
and 299,530 acres in LBDC). Under each Farmers’ Organisation command area, 5 Water 
User Associations were randomly selected for assessment (1 at the head of each 
distributary, 2 in the middle, and 2 in the tail-end) (ICARDA 2014 9).  
 
Figure 31 Sample areas (LCC and LBDC) for Farmers’ Organisation and 
Water User Association selection (source: GIS Department, Urban 
Unit Lahore, Punjab 2015) 
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1 interview was conducted with a member from each Farmers’ Organisation’s 
management committee and 2 interviews conducted with farmers belonging to areas 
where this management setup is established (1 farmer from a middle canal area and 1 
farmer from a tail-end canal area). This means a total of 24 interviews were conducted in 
each main canal distributary totalling 48 interviews with members from Farmers’ 
Organisations. (ICARDA 2014 9). 2 further interviews were conducted with each Water 
User Association (1 completed by a member of the management committee and 1 taken 
from a farmer at the tail-end of the watercourse) (ICARDA 2014). This means 80 
interviews were completed with members from Water User Associations in each canal 
distributary and 160 in total.  
 
Table 11 Sampling table 
No. 
Selected 
FOs 
Canal 
Division 
H/
M/
T 
District 
FO Interviews KP interviews 
Exec 
body  
Farmers 
Chair
man 
Farmers 
AWB Lower Chenab Canal (LCC) (East) Circle, Faisalabad    
1 Hafizabad Khanki H Hafizabad 1 2 5 5 
2 Manawala 
Upper 
Gugera 
M 
Sheikhupura- 
Nankana 
1 2 5 5 
3 Sharqpur 
Upper 
Gugera 
M Sheikhupura 1 2 5 5 
4 
Nillian 
Wala 
Upper 
Gugera 
M Nankana 1 2 5 5 
5 Farooq Burala T Faisalabad 1 2 5 5 
6 Manawala Burala T Faisalabad 1 2 5 5 
7 Hamza 
Lower 
Gugera 
T 
Toba Tek 
Singh 
1 2 5 5 
8 Khikhi 
Lower 
Gugera 
T 
Toba Tek 
Singh 
1 2 5 5 
Subtotal 8 16 40 40 
AWB Lower Bad Doab Canal (LBDC) Circle, Sahiwal   
1 Halla Balloki H Kasur 1 2 5 5 
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2 2R Okara M Okara 1 2 5 5 
3 Chuchak Okara M Okara 1 2 5 5 
4 9L Sahiwal M Sahiwal 1 2 5 5 
5 6R Sahiwal T Sahiwal 1 2 5 5 
6 2-L/10R Khanewal T Khanewal 1 2 5 5 
7 15 AL Khanewal T Khanewal 1 2 5 5 
8 
Koranga 
feeder 
Khanewal 
T 
Khanewal 1 2 
5 5 
Subtotal 8 16 40 40 
Total (48 Farmer Organisation interviews, 160 
Water User Association interviews) 
16 32 
80 80 
 
The survey findings were used to assess the effectiveness of Area Water Board, Farmers’ 
Organisation, and Water User Association operations, the financial management of these 
organisations, the role of women, levels of networking between PIDA, and the new 
organisations set up for water management, and whether there is interference in the 
workings of these organisations from government and landlords. 
1.9 Focus	Group	Discussions		
Community level data was collected through 69 focus group discussions, each consisting 
of 10 to 25 participants, depending on the size of communities and availability of 
participants. Focus group discussions were held in 15 districts comprising 9 districts in 
Punjab and 6 in Sindh, these included all districts where government officials were 
interviewed. More districts were covered in Punjab due to the size of this province and to 
ensure a representative view of the impacts of water mismanagement across the province 
were obtained. 34 or 49% of villages in each district were randomly selected from areas 
within a 2km radius of the head reach and mid areas of canals. The remaining 51% were 
selected from areas at the tail-end of canals, reliant on a mixture of canal water, 
groundwater, and rainwater. This is due to the greater impacts of water mismanagement 
on tail-end areas. The sampling frame consisted of a list of settlements obtained from the 
respective Land Revenue Departments. 
 
The participant criteria for selection was that they are from farming families residing in 
the selected agricultural communities. This means that participants include men and 
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women from the ages of 18 and above, from both landowning and tenant families, and 
from varying income groups, and with varying levels of education. A total of 20 focus 
group discussions were conducted with women only groups to ensure women’s views 
were represented, a further 10 focus group discussions were conducted with a mixture of 
both men and women, the remainder were conducted with men only as the primary actors 
involved in irrigation management. The majority of discussions were held with men and 
women separately to abide by cultural norms.  
 
Focus group discussions were predominantly held in the early evening from 4pm to 
avoid conflicting with farm work and to enable as many participants as possible. All 
communities selected for focus group discussions were contacted beforehand by field 
staff from the National Rural Support Organisation to arrange a neutral place for 
discussions to take place and ensure voluntary and informed participation. Key contacts 
within communities were informed of the broad discussion areas prior to the focus 
groups taking place.  
 
Table 12 FGDs conducted with communities 
No. District Tehsil 
Location M/F/
Mix 
Gender Total 
Province: Punjab FGDs: 37 
1 Attock Hazro Groundwater 1 M 1 1 
2 Bahawalpur 
Yazman 
Ahmedpur East 
Channi Goth 
Bahawalpur 
Jhangiwala 
 
Head 1 
Middle 2  
Tail 4 
Groundwater 1 
 
M 
F 
Mix 
3 
3 
2 
8 
3 Kasur Pattoki Tail 1 Mix 1 1 
4 Khushab 
Khushab (51MB) 
(Botalah) 
Hadali 
Joharabad 
Middle 3  
Tail 3 
 
M 
Mix 
3 
3 
6 
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5 
Muzaffargar
h 
Jatoi 
Middle 1 Mix 1 1 
6 
Nandkana 
Sahib 
Nankana Middle 4 M 4 4 
7 
Rahim Yar 
Khan 
Khan M. Dadu 
Sadiqabad 
Head 4 
Middle 2 
Tail 2 
M 
F 
4 
4 
8 
8 
Sheikhupur
a 
Sheikhupura Middle 1 
Tail 1 
M 2 2 
9 Sargodha 
Bakhsh 
Bhalwal 
(Lalu Wali) 
Head 2 
Middle 4  
M 
F 
3 
3 
6 
Province: Sindh FGDs: 32 
1 Badin 
Tando Bago 
Badin 
Tail 6 
M 
F 
Mix 
3 
1 
2 
6 
2 Hyderabad 
Chando Katiyar 
Tando Hyder 
Head 1 
Middle 1 
Tail 3 
M 
F 
4 
1 
5 
3 Ghotki 
Ubaro 
Bhetoor 
Bundh 
Qadirpur 
Head 2 
Middle 2 
Groundwater 3 
M 
F 
Mix 
3 
3 
1 
7 
4 Mirpurkhas 
Jhuddo 
Mirpurkhas 
Head 1 
Middle 1 
Tail 2 
M 4 4 
5 Sukkur Rohri 
Middle 2 
Tail 2 
M 
F 
2 
2 
4 
6 Thatta 
Mirpursakro 
Garho 
Tail 4 
Groundwater 2 
M 
F 
3 
3 
6 
Total 69 
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According to the preference of participants, focus group discussions took place in Urdu, 
English, Saraiki, Punjabi, Sindhi, and Balochi. In Sukkur, the interviews were transcribed 
in Sindhi script by Sindh Rural Support Organisation and then into English. The team of 
translators received a 2-3-hour training on the purpose of the study, how the collected 
information would be used, and the funding institution to prevent any misconceptions. 
They were also trained on the semi-structured questionnaire, the type of topics to be 
covered, the open style of questioning to be following being predominantly community 
led, on respecting cultural norms and interview ethics. For security reasons, the local 
administration was informed prior to all visits and permission obtained for entrance into 
more high security areas such as Attock. All discussions were recorded and participant 
lists taken.  
 
As outlined, focus group discussions were utilised to collect data on the type and extent 
of problems confronted by communities in relation to water, priorities for water use, the 
role of women in irrigation management, the extent of competition over water resources 
and whether this prevents cooperation over resource management and the sharing of 
information, the impacts of water shortages on livelihood decisions, tensions between 
upstream-downstream users, perceptions of how government manage water resources 
and how this could be improved, relationships with government and local authorities, and 
whether elements of IWRM such as the creation of Farmers’ Organisations and PIDA 
has changed the management of water resources. 
1.9.1 Software	for	analysis	
Transcripts were translated into English for coding and analysis on NVivo. NVivo was 
selected for the analysis of qualitative data as It enables more types of analysis to be 
undertaken. It also enables the illustrations of the connections between themes to be 
highlighted. Further analysis that was undertaken on NVivo was the use of word trees to 
show highlighted themes in context. SPSS was used for the analysis of quantitative data 
due to the ease of transferring excel files onto SPSS after data cleaning. It was also 
deemed to have adequate illustrative options for the types of analysis undertaken. 
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2 Chapter	two:	Key informant interview	analysis		
2.1 Interviews	with	government	in	Punjab	and	Sindh	
Several key thematic areas were drawn out in the key informant interviews conducted with 
provincial and district level government officials in Punjab and Sindh. These issues included:  
i. Underinvestment: this was identified as a major constraint being linked to a number 
of subcategories of problems as listed. 
a. Poor canal maintenance in the form of repairs and a failure to line canals. This 
was identified as the major cause seepages contributing to waterlogging, 
salinity, and water shortages.  
b. Poor maintenance of tubewells reduce capacity for drainage. 
c. Insufficient HR to monitor the use of canal infrastructure. 
d. Insufficient HR to monitor the growth of illegal crops such as rice.  
e. Insufficient HR to enforce policies related to managing illegal paddy fields. 
This factor was also associated with the failure to take wider measures against 
water stealing in the form of direct outlets into canals, enlarged outlets, raising 
water gages, breaking canal infrastructure, and using wooden panels to raise 
water levels to reach watercourses.  
 
ii. Political influence was associated with a number of subcategories as listed. 
a. Legislative and regulatory gaps leading to the overuse of tubewells lowering 
groundwater levels. Lower water tables were recognised as a cause of salinity 
and water contamination. Despite this, in some areas, officials stated that 
farmers should be utilising only groundwater for agricultural purposes where it 
was relatively better in quality. Although recommended for agricultural use, 
the contamination of groundwater was acknowledged as a source of diseases 
such as hepatitis and rashes on the skin. 
b. A major subcategory identified under political influence was the predatory 
institutional culture within institutions associated with water management. 
This was associated with further themes as listed.  
i. The culture of individualism was identified where officials were noted 
to work for their own interests only. In this subcategory, there were 
cases of collusion between officials and further cases where work 
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undertaken for higher level officials was perceived to be unrelated to 
water management.   
ii. The lack of coordination between departments was also associated 
with the culture of individualism. This was exacerbated by the use of 
heavy bureaucracy with letters of notification required for submitting 
requests or appointments. 
iii. The frequency of officials accepting bribery was identified as a major 
factor hindering action on water stealing and the ability of FOs to 
function. 
iv. In some cases, there was a clear resistance to change in the form of 
institutional, management, or system changes. This was apparent in the 
denial of problems confronted in the sector or continued focus on 
supply-side solutions in the form of dams. This tendency was 
associated with a focus on defending official positions, capacity, and 
status, at times resulting in the provision of conflicting information. 
There was a further tendency to blame farmers for water problems with 
references to ‘backbiting’, a lack of ‘progressive farmers’ who would 
make use of new technologies and practices, and unrealistic demands 
for water. 
 
iii. IWRM imposed by the World Bank: The policy of IWRM was rarely discussed unless 
prompted and in many cases irrigation officials refused to discuss implications 
brought by the introduction of SIDA/PIDA. Hostility towards SIDA/PIDA was noted 
to result in a number of issues as listed.  
a. Increased competition over institutional resources was noted to prevent 
efficiency and information sharing. 
b. Weak coordination between PIDA/SIDA, the Irrigation Department, and 
Agricultural Extension Department was stated to result in information gaps. 
The lack of coordination further resulted in the mismanagement of water and 
unapproved changes to water infrastructure with officials in the Irrigation 
Department blaming PIDA/SIDA and vice-versa. 
c. Problems in the formation of FOs by the Agricultural Extension Department 
with water institutions being set up to meet targets only. Due to this, there was 
perceived to be a lack of understanding, motivation, or capacity among FOs in 
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regards to their role and responsibilities. There were also cases identified 
where FOs were formed on paper only with one case where the FO leader had 
died 30 years prior to its formation. 
i. A small number of more positive cases were reported leading to 
improvements in water infrastructure and within communities with 
SIDA reported to work more in the capacity of an NGO. 
ii. The formation of FOs raised questions over the realistic role of women 
in water management institutions. This is at present unclear given the 
conservative culture in many rural areas that hinders the ability of 
women to attend mixed meetings and play an active role in decision-
making.  
d. There appeared to be confusion over the roles of PIDA/SIDA and the 
Irrigation Department in the longer term. 
 
iv. External factors: Population growth was the most frequent external factor mentioned 
being associated with a higher demand for water. A further factor mentioned by 
officials in Sindh was climate change. This was referred to in the form of the late 
receipt of water increasing the frequency of water stealing.  
A map of government perceptions of the issues associated with water resources management 
is summarised in figure 32. 
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Figure 32 Map of government perceptions of issues related to the management of water resources 
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Following the identification of key issues, they were then coded and prioritised. The 
prioritisation of thematic areas was based on how many times each area was referenced 
during key informant interviews. These were then analysed in the hierarchy chart, seen in 
figure 33. 
Figure 33 Hierarchy chart of priority areas discussed in government key informant interviews 
 
2.2 Critical	of	government	
As seen from the hierarchy chart the most discussed areas fell within the overall code ‘critical 
of government’ with 224 aggregated references to this area. Within this category, the most 
referenced areas for criticisms was the water management framework comprising 
‘regulations, monitoring, enforcement, and policy’ with 57 aggregated references. Further 
frequently discussed areas for criticism were: the role of SIDA/PIDA referenced 43 times, 
‘underinvestment’ references 45 times being linked to the failure to line canals and a lack of 
HR, and ‘no coordination’ between government departments referenced 24 times. Officials 
stated that they were unfamiliar with the 2025 Water Policy and it was rarely referenced. A 
more frequently referenced legislative document was the 1991 Water Accord. A higher 
number of officials in Punjab were critical of the 1991 Water Accord than in Sindh viewing it 
as a reason for water shortages, in the main linked to the failure to construct the Kalabagh 
Dam. This indicates a continued focus on increasing supply in parts of Punjab rather than on 
improving demand management. 
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The dismissive attitude towards work undertaken by SIDA/PIDA, was expressed by officials 
in both Irrigation and Agriculture Departments. This was most frequently expressed by 
officials operating in Sindh, irrigation officials in the southern district of Mirpurkhas felt so 
strongly about perceived interference by SIDA that they refused to discuss any issues related 
to the institution. Officials from other districts such as Badin and agricultural professors 
interviewed in Hyderabad, stated the formation of FOs in Sindh to have made no change to 
water management. In some cases, both officials and academics stated that the setup of FOs 
had made the situation worse with avenues for political influence in water management 
opened by bringing in more entities. Officials in PIDA further stated FOs to have been 
largely infiltrated by large landlords being viewed as political entities enforcing biased 
decision making over water allocations. 
There was further hostility in regards to the large amount of funding SIDA/PIDA are 
perceived to receive in comparison to other government departments. This may be in part due 
to the fact that SIDA and PIDA are situated prominent new offices in the cities of Hyderabad 
and Lahore. In comparison, offices belonging to the Irrigation Department were noted to be 
very simple consisting of 1 to 4 rooms on one floor, and generally in poor condition. Salaries 
of officials working in SIDA/PIDA were also reported to be higher than for HR in the 
Irrigation Department being in part funded by the World Bank. 
2.3 Landlords	and	political	influence	
The second most referenced area in connection to water issues was the influence of large 
landlords referenced 94 times in interviews with government. Levels of influence were stated 
by officials to be strongest in northern Sindh in head canal areas such as Sukkur and Ghotki, 
followed by southern Sindh and southern Punjab with landlords protected by armed guards. 
The influence and link between feudal landlords in fertile agricultural areas and government 
can also be seen in the continuing power of the Bhutto family, situated in the northern district 
of Larkana. This is somewhat evident from the greater number of references to landlord 
influence by government officials in Sindh than in Punjab, as shown in figure 34. The left 
side of the diagram shows the number of officials interviewed in Sindh who made references 
to landlord influence and the right side shows the same for Punjab.   
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However, in Punjab, references to 
landlord influence tended to be 
more extreme, either in the form of 
complete denial or statements 
referring to threats by armed mafia. 
These latter statements were made 
by officials in Rajanpur and Rahim 
Yar Khan, both profitable sugarcane 
areas. These findings are in 
accordance with research showing 
the greater power of large landlords 
in more successful agricultural areas 
such as northern Sindh and Southern 
Punjab.  
 
Due to the importance of political influence linked to landlord monopoly over water 
resources, a word tree was completed for the word ‘political’ to show context, as seen in 
figure 35. The words on the right show the information provided by officials immediately 
before the use of the word political and the words on the left show sentences completed after 
the word political. As seen, from the right side, political comes after sentences relating to: 
large scale problems, large landlords, the payment of abiana, unequal power, difficulties in 
resistance, the distribution of canal water, the functioning of Farmers’ Organisations, poor 
canal maintenance, and the construction of large scale canal infrastructure.  
The left side of the word tree shows the results of this influence as: the creation of an 
environment that facilitates interference and biases in resource distribution, politicians being 
able to own lands and fish ponds, interfere in the elections and the functioning of Farmers’ 
Organisations, the maintenance of monopolies, politicians hindering the activities of 
SIDA/PIDA, a lack of cooperation and culture of individualism. The greatest number of 
references to the word political were made by officials in the Rajanpur Irrigation Department, 
followed by SIDA, and officials in Mirpurkhas, all based in agricultural hubs. 
Figure 34 Comparison of perceived landlord influence in 
Sindh and Punjab 
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Figure 35 Word tree for 'political' 
 
Further references outside of the word tree are made to officials having ‘to work alone’ being 
associated with a lack of safety. This analysis strongly indicates the perceived ongoing 
influence, intimidation, and power of large landlords, often backed by government 
bureaucracy or by the lack of action taken to curtail illegal activities.  
2.4 Water	theft	
The influence of large landlords was closely associated with water theft referenced 47 times. 
In some cases, this problem was linked to violence against irrigation officials. In Punjab’s 
southern districts of Rahim Yar Khan and Rajanpur, provinces where the sugarcane industry 
is dominant, it was stated that several irrigation officials in the former district had been 
murdered by gunmen protecting landlord’s access to water, and in the latter district officials 
also made references to threats of violence linked to large landlords and water stealing. In 
other large agricultural areas such as district Sargodha, in northern Punjab, Irrigation officials 
denied any knowledge of water theft, despite being able to observe direct canal outlets from 
the office window. Although this was assumed to be due to landlord influence, it was placed 
under the category of denial (within ‘resistance to change’) since no clear reference was made 
to large farmers. 
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Due to the number of references to water theft, a further analysis was completed to show the 
percentage of all interview time 
that this concern was discussed. 
The results, shown in figure 36, 
show that officials in the 
southern districts of Mirpurkhas 
and Badin in Sindh spoke in 
more detail about the problem of 
water theft. Parts of Mirpurkhas 
suffer from repeated water 
problems whilst orchards are 
grown in other areas of the 
district indicating disparities in 
distribution. Badin is on the 
extreme tail-end of Sindh and 
has witnessed repeated protests 
against perceived unfair water 
management practices including 
water theft in recent years. The 
extent of this problem and increasing organisation of farmers to tackle it was seen in the 
hunger strikes conducted outside government offices in Islamabad in 2014.  
2.5 Industry	influence	
Industry influence was discussed extensively in relation to water theft by officials in southern 
Punjab being referenced 20 times. This was noted in interviews with officials from both the 
Irrigation and Agriculture Department in the southern districts of Rahim Yar Khan and 
Rajanpur; as outlined, these areas are dominated by large landlords operating in the sugarcane 
industry. As such, both districts have problems with water theft, water shortages, and air and 
water pollution linked to the activities of large sugar mills. Due to political influence, there is 
no restriction on the number of sugar mills or amount of sugarcane grown in the district. 
Further industries based in these areas include fertiliser companies further contributing to 
groundwater pollution. To encourage support for industries in Rahim Yar Khan, sugar mills 
fund schools, hospitals, roads, provide employment, and have set up their own NGOs. 
References to the dominance of landlords in industries including sugarcane, rice, and brick 
Figure 36 Percentage-wise coverage of water theft in key 
informant interviews 
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factories and their impacts on local areas in the way of pollution and health, were also made 
by officials in Southern Sindh.  
The least references made by irrigation authorities to large landlords and water theft were 
made by PIDA and SIDA. This may indicate landlord and political influence on the 
organisations, the SIDA office is also situated at a head canal area in Hyderabad so less likely 
to see the direct impacts of water theft in their immediate area.  
2.6 Positive	action	
More positive perceptions of actions taken by government were referenced in the interviews 
with officials from the Agricultural Department in Sargodha, although it should be noted that 
this department was stated to only work with what was referred to as larger ‘progressive 
farmers’. Further references to positive government initiatives were made by the Agriculture 
Department in Rahim Yar Khan in relation to improving soil research and the use of 
perennial canal irrigation to control waterlogging. References were also made to campaigns 
for awareness raising by the Agriculture Department in Badin although this was disputed by 
local NGO workers. The Irrigation Department in Badin further claimed to be taking strong 
action again the installation of illegal outlets claiming they had been closed, this was not 
evident from a brief visual inspection of the main canals.  
 
SIDA and the Irrigation Department in Ghotki, that also overlooks irrigation management in 
Sukkur, made references to the setup and functioning of Farmers’ Organisations. SIDA in 
particular, referenced the positive impact of Farmers’ Organisations on canal maintenance 
and the cost effectiveness of these activities given the cheap labour provided by farmers. 
Despite this, both departments complained of landlord influence hindering the better 
functioning of these organisations and interfering in decision-making over water allocations.  
2.7 Analysis	of	SIDA	and	PIDA	interviews		
Due to the importance and detail provided in the interviews with SIDA and PIDA officials, 
where they were asked to respond to issues raised by irrigation officials on the new 
institutional setup, they have been separately coded in figure 37. The number of issues raised 
in these interviews is shown by the high number of nodes coded against each, 22 nodes 
against the SIDA interview and 24 against the PIDA interview. 
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Figure 37 Thematic coding of interviews with officials from SIDA and PIDA 
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Both SIDA and PIDA officials demonstrated a lot of knowledge of water issues in Pakistan 
being able to articulate how the wider framework for water management is perceived within 
international literature. Officials from both organisations further drew comparisons from 
countries with ongoing problems in participatory irrigation management and discussed 
possible solutions to improving the management of Farmers’ Organisations. Despite this, 
neither officials in SIDA nor PIDA were familiar with the 2025 draft water policy, PIDA 
officials only referenced the 1991 Water Accord in terms of supply problems and the unfair 
levels of water being allocated to lower riparian Sindh. This was also discussed in reference 
to provincial tensions indicative of the political stagnation around the construction of the 
Kalabagh Dam.  
Key areas discussed by SIDA focused on the short tenure of Farmers’ Organisations, landlord 
influence , underinvestment and its link to pollution, poor enforcement and water theft, the 
failure of the World Bank to alter funding to strengthen the involvement of women in 
Farmers’ Organisations, and problems in coordination with other government agencies. More 
interesting in the SIDA interview were the areas that were absent with no acknowledgement 
of the effect of the sugarcane and rice industry on water shortages or the involvement of large 
landlords in water theft. SIDA stated their central areas of work at present are in water 
conservation and the cleaning of canals. Despite the problems outlined in the establishment 
and functioning of Farmers’ Organisations SIDA officials remained positive about the impact 
of their work. 
Officials within SIDA were critical of the World Bank for the lack of guidance on how to 
involve women in Farmers’ Organisations and Water User Associations. Officials stated that 
little progress had been made in this area due to the culture of women not attending meetings 
or traveling. Further criticism focused on the short tenure of Farmers’ Organisations, an 
aspect also noted by IWMI (2015). It was stated that due to this aspect, all members of 
Farmers’ Organisations had to be replaced every 2 years greatly hindering capacity building 
and leading to empty positions to be held for extended periods of time.  
The influence of large landlords was stressed more by officials in PIDA in terms of their 
impact on maintaining low levels of abiana. Despite acknowledging problems with financial 
irregularities in some Farmers’ Organisations with no transparent system of collection and 
deposits, overall PIDA officials were positive about the effectiveness of organisations. They 
further rejected that there were any problems in the short tenure of Farmers’ Organisations 
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stating that longer tenures would encourage corruption. PIDA officials denied accusations of 
landlord and PIDA involvement in politicising Farmers’ Organisations or in water theft. 
Instead officials stated that shortages and increases in water levels could predominantly be 
due to the build-up of silt in canals. PIDA officials highlighted the positive role of Farmers’ 
Organisations in cleaning canals and reducing incidences of illegal outlets. Further issues 
discussed related to underinvestment was linked to the failure to line canals and the failure of 
institutional mentalities to move on from the colonial era, linked into the improper use of 
canals and the need to update their design.  
The responsibilities of SIDA and PIDA at present appear to be limited due to the parallel 
institutional setup referenced by both authorities and government departments being 
uncooperative weakening their field presence. According to officials from the Irrigation and 
Agriculture Department, and academics interviewed at the Agriculture University in 
Hyderabad, the setup of SIDA has not hindered the influence of landlords but instead 
provided them with legitimate avenues to influence water allocations. Officials within SIDA 
rejected these assertions, claiming farmers from Sindh are still able to genuinely participate in 
the new irrigation setup. This stated impact of SIDA’s work in water conservation is also 
questionable given that SIDA does not have authority to line canals despite seepages being 
one of the highest priority areas linked to wastage. In this respect, the activities undertaken by 
SIDA appeared to be more those of a NGO, working more on community level infrastructural 
projects than as a water management institution.  
The denial of officials at SIDA and PIDA over the extent of landlord influence when 
compared to officials in the Irrigation Department, may be indicative of the level of political 
influence within the new institutional setup. As new entities that require political support to 
function and push through their institutional mandates, SIDA officials overtly stated that 
political alliances were necessary in the form of building relationships with influential 
persons. This may result in a repetition of the old system and in fact may exacerbate levels of 
corruption as indicated by officials in other departments. Since there has been little transfer of 
responsibilities from PIDs, the role of SIDA/PIDA remains unclear. However, at present, 
these institutions appear to have embedded themselves within the old institutional setup. With 
no addressal of landlord power, SIDA/PIDA have also come to rely on supporting the very 
actors they should be penalising in order to maintain political support for their operations. 
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3 Chapter	three:	Institutional	capacity	assessment		
3.1 Institutional	Assessment	of	Area	Water	Boards,	Farmers’ Organisations	
and	Water	User	Associations	in	LCC	and	LBCD,	Punjab	
6 Area Water Boards (AWBs), 48 members of 16 Farmers’ Organisations, and 180 members 
of 80 Khal Panchayats (also referred to as Water User Associations (WUAs) in chapter 2 of 
this study), were analysed as part of this institutional assessment. Given the scale of the 
command areas covered under each AWB and Farmers’ Organisations, the views and 
operations of these water institutions can have a significant impact in the districts in which 
they operate. As stated, the analysis focuses on key areas where there are gaps in the 
literature, these are: the potential role of women, HR management and administration of 
AWBs, Farmers’ Organisations, and Water User Associations, their capacity for financial 
management, the extent to which Farmers’ Organisations and Water User Associations are 
improving canal and watercourse maintenance, Farmers’ Organisations and Water User 
Associations impact on dispute resolution, whether the use of more participatory 
organisations are improving water allocations to tail-end areas, levels of institutional 
transparency, and cooperation between administrative levels in the new institutional setup. 
3.2 Institutional	profiles	
All institutional members interviewed were from 2 central canal systems in central Punjab, 
the Lower Bad Doab Canal (LBDC) Circle, Sahiwal and the Lower Chenab Canal Circle 
(LCC), Faislabad. 8 Farmers’ Organisations and 40 Water User Associations were sampled 
from the LBDC system and 8 Farmers’ Organisations and 40 Water User Associations from 
the LCC system. Area Water Boards and Farmers’ Organisations analysed were set up 
between 2005 and 2012 and sampled Water User Associations were set up between 2004 and 
2012. This means the sampled institutions were formed from the initial years that the 1997 
Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority Act was implemented at the grassroots level in 
Punjab.  
As seen from figure 38, the length of distributary canals and corresponding cultivatable 
command area covered by each Farmers’ Organisation distributary greatly varied with an sd. 
of 54,468 acres. The length of distributaries ranged from 1km to 108kms per Farmers’ 
Organisation and canal command area from 6,670 acres to 204,706 acres. Accordingly the 
number of landowners covered by each Farmers’ Organisation ranged from between 4,000 
and 48,000.  
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Working at the more local level of the watercourse, interviewed members from Water User 
Associations monitored watercourses ranging from between 331 metres to 8,000 metres. 
Correspondingly, Water User Associations oversaw cultivable command areas ranging 
between 30 acres to 3,500 acres with those interviewed overseeing a total of 23,342 
landowners. Despite wide variations in canal command area per Water User Association, the 
numbers of members were fixed at 4 for each institution.  
3.3 Inclusion		
3.3.1 The	role	of	women	in	water	institutions	
Despite Farmers’ Organisation membership bodies reporting to cover 16,637 female 
landowners and Water User Associations interviewed covering 1,054 female landowners, no 
organisation reported having any female members in their Management Bodies or General 
Bodies. Area Water Boards also reported having no female members. Despite this, all 
organisations interviewed reported local water institutions to have no overt selection criteria 
for membership other than elections, 16.66% of Water User Association members further 
claimed female landowners to vote in elections.  
Members from Area Water Boards stated that no women had applied for or been nominated 
for positions in any institution. The absence of women’s participation in the new institutional 
Figure 38 Estimated cultivatable command area covered by each Farmers’ Organisation (acres) 
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setup was an area recognised by all Farmers’ Organisation members interviewed. 98.9% of 
members from Water User Associations also acknowledged that no issues of concern to 
women were addressed by local water institutions. All 48 Farmers’ Organisation members 
interviewed stated the reason for the absence of women’s representation to be ‘culture’, this 
was also the primary reason provided by Area Water Boards and members from Water User 
Associations. 83.3% of AWB members and members from 37.5% of Farmers’ Organisations 
further felt that providing a role for women was not a priority and 37.7% of members from 
Water User Associations stated that there is no recognised role for women in irrigation 
management. Members from just 19% of Farmers’ Organisations felt that women could 
potentially have a role in irrigation management but were unclear on what this role would 
entail, indicating the perceived dominance of men in irrigation management. 
 
Despite the generally conservative 
views expressed, members from 
31.25% of Farmers’ Organisations 
went on to state that women could 
potentially have a role in Water User 
Associations operating at the more 
local level. However, as seen from 
figure 39, among members from Water 
User Associations, the percentage 
reporting to be in favour of women’s 
involvement was only 13.89%, with 
the predominant reason for the 
exclusion of women again being 
‘culture’. Among members that supported the greater involvement of women in water 
institutions, it was felt that women could facilitate coordination with female landowners and 
tenants and aid in the collection of abiana from male household members. Some members 
from Farmers’ Organisation stated that women could be involved in water institutions with 
the condition that they did not undertake fieldwork, working more in the area of 
administration and office management. 
Figure 39 Percentage of KP members that support 
women having a role in KPs 
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3.3.2 Inclusion	of	the	poor	
No Farmers’ Organisations reported having tenants as members in their Management or 
General Bodies. In Water User Associations also, members from groups that effectively 
constitute lower castes (kami braderi) were not identified as leaders with 12.7% reporting 
local influence to be a criteria for election. It was further noted that all Chairmen from Water 
User Association owned land ranging from 1 acre to 225 acres with the average land owned 
being 17.9 acres, above the average for central Punjab, as noted in the ICARDA (2014). 
Despite the lack of poorer groups in leadership positions, 47% of Water User Associations 
reported to have those from poorer backgrounds to participate in meetings. This indicates that 
whilst poorer, less influential farmers/tenants participate in the lower tiers of the new 
institutional setup, they are not recognised as leaders. It also indicates a need for more social 
mobilisation with a view to further increasing the representation and participation of poorer 
groups in Farmers’ Organisations and Water User Associations. 
3.4 Farmers’ Organisation	and	Water	User	Association	capacity	in	HR	and	
administration		
As seen from figure 40, 
membership numbers varied 
widely ranging from 24 to 216 
members per FO with a mean 
of 67.75 and SD of 68.22. 
These membership numbers 
were broadly in line with 
differences in canal command 
areas (CCAs) with Farmers’ 
Organisation 9-L and Sharqpur 
holding the largest command 
areas. The sampled FOs had a 
total of 122 members on their 
management bodies and 962 
general body members meaning that management constitutes 12.68% of FO membership 
among those sampled. Membership numbers were less under the LCC distributary 
(constituting the last 8 Farmers’ Organisations in the bar chart), again corresponding with its 
lower total CCA relative to the LBDC distributary.  
Figure 40 FO member count in the General and Executive Bodies 
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The wide variation in membership in Farmers’ Organisations did not transfer to Water User 
Associations level with each member interviewed reporting to have 4 elected members each, 
regardless of differences in canal command area. There is no guidance on the recommended 
number or range of Farmers’ Organisation or members from Water User Associations 
according to canal command area in the 1997 Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority Act. 
Focusing on the setup of PIDA and Area Water Boards, the Act only specifies that the 
number of staff under the latter should not more than 8 (Government of Punjab 1997). 
Just 66.6% of Area Water Board members reported to be aware of their roles due to a 
reported lack of capacity building, guidance, or forums for discussion. Members did not have 
offices making interviews difficult and indicating a lack of investment at this level. Under the 
1997 Irrigation Transfer Management Act, Area Water Boards are legislated to oversee 4-5 
Farmers’ Organisations with 2 members represented from each, the redundant status of Area 
Water Boards indicates significant problems in the new institutional system. Problems in 
their functioning were linked by all members interviewed to political interference, showing 
resistance to the new institutional setup from other government departments.  
In contrast to the lack of 
clarity among members 
of Area Water Board, 
members from Farmers’ 
Organisation and Water 
User Associations 
reported comparatively 
better levels of 
awareness around their 
roles and 
responsibilities. As seen 
in figure 41, members 
from most Farmers’ 
Organisations recognised their role in dispute resolution, watercourse maintenance, and 
abiana collection, weaker areas were the recognition of their role in abiana assessment and in 
ensuring the fair distribution of water. Water User Associations also had a relatively clear 
idea of their responsibilities with the most discussed area in meetings being the cleaning and 
maintenance of watercourses, following by the resolution of water disputes. Weaker areas 
Figure 41 FO and Water User Associations members’ perceptions of 
roles 
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were water theft only discussed by 26.66% of Water User Associations and abiana 
assessment discussed by just 13%. The low level of prioritisation allocated to the assessment 
and collection of abiana is concerning given that it constitutes a core source of funding for 
organisational funding. 
Only 25% of Farmers’ Organisations in LBDC areas were found to have hired professional 
staff. Farmers’ Organisations in LCC areas were reported to perform better in this area 
employing assistants, revenue assistants, Patwaris and Beldars. In the case of 2 Farmers’ 
Organisations, professionals were predominantly hired directly by PIDA. Staff hired by 
PIDA were notably absent in Farmers’ Organisations situated in LBDC areas. This suggests 
that the responsibilities of PIDA need to be further clarified and monitoring of institutional 
activities by geographical area improved. Improved reporting would also improve the 
awareness of and the transparency of the new institutional setup and its operations.  
Positions Farmers’ Organisations were most likely to fill were Patwari (land tax 
administrators), Beldars (unskilled manual labour), Managers, and Assistant Managers. 
Positions least likely to be filled included more skilled positions such as gauge readers, 
clerks/office administrators, and Revenue Assistants, an aspect that may indicate education 
and skills gaps at the Farmers’ Organisation level. This finding is supported at the Water User 
Association level where only 3% of members stated that the education of Managers was a 
criterion for leadership selection with level of participation in collective activities seen as the 
primary priority. 
  
Figure 42 Number of FOs with professional positions filled by role 
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In terms of the capacity of Farmers’ Organisations for the day-to-day administration of tasks, 
members from 75% of organisations reported having an office compared to no Water User 
Associations. Members from these latter organisations reported to hold meetings in the 
Chairman’s residence or at outlet points. A higher percentage of Farmers’ Organisations 
(87%) also reported having office furniture suggesting that meetings may be conducted in 
homes or outside. Farmers’ Organisations under the LCC distributary in the main reported 
furniture to have been provided by PIDA. 62% of Farmers’ Organisations reported having a 
computer, however, as seen from figure 42, only 2 reported to employ clerks/ office 
administrators, making reliable record keeping challenging. All organisations without a 
computer were situated under the LBDC distributary indicating further investment is required 
in this area. This again highlights the need to monitor PIDA investments by geographical 
area. 
 
Just 18.75% of Farmers’ Organisations reported keeping records in all mandated areas and 
just 20% of Water User Associations reported maintaining records at all. The most cited areas 
for record keeping by Water User Associations were abiana collection maintained by 15% 
and the warabandi register kept by 10.5% of members. 29% of Water User Associations 
reported that record keeping was not required. This indicates both a lack or training and poor 
education levels among members, an aspect also noted in the ICARDA (2014) report. In 
12.5% of cases of poor administration reported by Farmers’ Organisations and 6.7% of those 
reported by Water User Associations, follow-up action was taken by PIDA. This was 
predominantly in the form of a verbal warning with only one Farmer Organisation reporting 
to receive a formal warning letter by PIDA to improve administration and 3 Water User 
Associations fined as a penalty. A significant number of members from Farmers’ 
Organisation and Water User Association reported that PIDA was not aware of its 
responsibilities in ensuring organisations had adequate facilities or fulfilled their mandated 
activities. 
3.5 Capacity	for	communications	and	logistics	
Working over large areas, Farmers’ Organisations require a good level of capacity for 
communications and logistics. 75% of Farmers’ Organisations reported having 
communications equipment in the form of mobile phones, although these are likely to be 
personal phones with all members reporting to have purchased these themselves. Most 
201 
 
Farmers’ Organisations reporting to have no means of communication were in LCC areas, 
indicating higher expectation levels that a work phone will be provided.  
Just 25% of Farmers’ Organisations reported having some form of transportation in order to 
carry out maintenance checks and meet with farmers, Area Water Boards, Water User 
Associations, or PIDA. Among those that did report having transportation, this included 
motorbikes and bicycles.   
3.6 Financial	management	capacity	
All Farmers’ Organisations reported opening a bank account, however accounts were not 
opened for any Water User Associations, again indicating a lack of awareness and education 
among members. Just 50% of Farmers’ Organisations had deposited money in the form of 
reserve funds, again indicating problems with the financial viability of Farmers’ Organisation 
and Water User Associations operations. Despite these gaps, Farmers’ Organisations reported 
good levels of financial record keeping and management with 93.75% reporting to work 
against an annual budget and 75% of organisations preparing quarterly budgets. Levels of 
financial transparency were also good with 68.75% reporting to undergoing an annual audit 
of accounts.  
There was a wide variation between Farmers’ Organisation capacity for financial 
management with just 31.25% fulfilling all financial reporting requirements. Record keeping 
for abiana was found to be weak with just 43.75% maintaining a record of abiana 
assessments and collections compared to 15% of Water User Associations. The majority of 
Farmers’ Organisations keeping records were again situated under the LCC distributary 
which performed higher than those in under the LBDC in almost all areas indicating 
differential levels of investment from PIDA by area. Record keeping for abiana requires 
improvement if transparency is to be strengthened. Many members from Farmers’ 
Organisation recognised that abiana collection and its enforcement needed to be improved 
with a significant number of executive members requesting guidance and training from 
PIDA.  
Members from Area Water Baords stated they had confronted significant problems in the 
collection of abiana with several stating that farmers had appealed for monies to be returned 
due to there being no legal means of enforcement. Further to this, 62.5% of members from 
Farmers’ Organisation believed abiana collection to be a central function compared to 13% 
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of members from Water User Associations, reluctance to work in this area was indicated by 
references to social pressure and influence. Members from Water User Associations also 
reported different people to be responsible for abiana collection including Chairmen, 
Patwari, and Farmers’ Organisations, although most reported that the Chairman was paid 
between 4-6% of collections for this task. Just 50.5% of members from Water User 
Associations were aware of the total amount of abiana assessed for 2012-2013 and 53% of 
members were aware of the total abiana collected over the same period. These knowledge 
gaps were reported by both members and Chairmen indicating major lapses in record keeping 
and training. 
Despite confusion in the area of abiana, collection rates are reported to have significantly 
improved when compared to abiana collected over 2002-04 immediately prior to Farmers’ 
Organisation tenures in LCC areas (PIDA 2014). However, ongoing problems in abiana 
collection, and the low sums requested, are affecting the capacity of organisations at all levels 
to undertake mandated activities. All Farmers’ Organisations in LBDC areas reported that 
collected abiana was insufficient to fund their operations, this was also claimed by 37.5% of 
Farmers’ Organisations operating in LCC areas citing funding shortages of between 10%-
50%. Reasons for problems in abiana collection were cited as political interference, the lack 
of legal enforcement, a lack of resources, and a lack of responsibility taken by members of 
Farmers’ Organisation.  
The total amount of assessed abiana for the Rabi season in Farmers’ Organisation areas over 
2012-2013 was PKR 21,109,444 and the total amount collected was PKR 16,395,802 
showing continuing gaps in abiana collection. These gaps were also seen in the Kharif season 
with the total amount of assessed abiana being PKR 33,972,512 and the amount collected 
being PKR 19,908,220. This amounts to an annual funding gap of PKR 18,777,934 or 
approximately USD 162,29218 which poses a major challenge for the functioning of the new 
organisations.  
  
 
                                                             
18 Calculated using XE Currency Converter as of 30th March 2018 
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As seen in figure 43, the annual funding gap was comparatively smaller in LCC areas at PKR 
7,154,462. Sanctions of 10% charges were also imposed on the majority of Farmers’ 
Organisations in this area for late payment despite reports of police harassment and social 
pressure. This compares to the larger funding gap of PKR 11,623,472 reported in LBDC 
areas where assessed abiana rates were significantly higher and no sanctions enforced for late 
payment. The consistent comparative negligence of PIDA in relation to Farmers’ 
Organisation activities in LBDC areas may indicate higher levels of landlord influence. 
3.7 Capacity	for	monitoring	
Just 18.75% of FOs reported to monitor the depth of water tables and quality of groundwater 
in their areas. Despite this, 43.75% of Farmers’ Organisations stated that the monitoring of 
groundwater use to be a mandated function. 26% of Water User Association members were 
also aware of changes in groundwater quality over the previous 5 to 15 years. All members 
were aware of the paucity of regulations for groundwater use with 40% stating stronger 
regulations were required to prevent further damage. This awareness indicates that many 
members of Water User Associations are farmers with a vested interest in monitoring this 
resource, whether it is perceived to be part of the institutional mandate or otherwise. 
Figure 43 The comparative gap between assessed and collected abiana in LBDC and LCC areas 
(source: field survey 2014 
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3.8 Capacity	for	Operation	and	Maintenance	and	rehabilitation	works	
FOs reported a strong focus on canal maintenance and repairs with 87.5% putting together 
annual maintenance plans for works along the distributary canal. 93.75% of members of 
Farmers’ Organisations also reported carrying out maintenance inspections along the 
distributary canal annually with 56% having carried out work over 2013-2014, the year of the 
survey. This was verified by members of Water User Associations with 97% reporting 
farmers to participate in the cleaning of watercourses and 80% reporting farmers to have 
assisted in de-silting canals for between 1-5 days each. 22.7% of members from Water User 
Associations also stated they had made financial contributions towards the maintenance of 
canals. This further tallied with stated contributions in the way of labour and cash by non-
members. The investment placed in O&M highlighted this as a high priority area. 
Despite O&M being indicated as a priority area, no Farmers’ Organisations reported having 
equipment or machinery for the purpose of basic maintenance works with maintenance 
usually carried out via contractors. In spite of this factor, all FOs in LCC areas reported to 
have carried out necessary works, this compares to 62.5% of Farmers’ Organisations in 
LBDC areas with members stating the reason to be the paucity of funding. The large 
percentage of unlined canals was also cited as a common reason for difficulties in Operations 
and Maintenance with just 56.25% of Farmers’ Organisations stating farmers to be satisfied 
with the condition of canals. This links in with earlier interviews analysed with irrigation 
officials reporting underinvestment in canal lining to be a major cause of seepages, variances 
in distribution, and wastage. 
3.9 Capacity	for	fair	water	distribution	
43.75% of Farmers’ Organisations reported preparing an annual water distribution plan 
although only 25% share these plans with Water User Associations. Despite some of the 
Farmers’ Organisations having been in operation since 2005, only 62.5% reported receiving 
their due share of water with the majority of these situated in LBDC areas. Causes of 
problems related to low flow included the need to clean watercourses, water theft, the use of 
canal water for cattle, poor rates of abiana collection preventing investment in O&M 
activities, and interference from PID demanding bribes. Despite reporting water shortages, 
81.25% of Farmers’ Organisations reported that the available canal water was distributed 
equitably along the distributary canal.   
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Despite low numbers of members of Farmers’ Organisations recognising their role in the fair 
distribution of water, all members situated in LCC areas reported checking head and tail flow 
measurements daily, as illustrated in figure 44. This contrasts with just 37.5% of Farmers’ 
Organisations stating to check flow measurements daily in LBDC areas. Records of gauge 
levels also need to be improved with 75% of members of Farmers’ Organisations and 96% of 
members from Water User Associations stating that these were not maintained. This may be 
linked to the lack of computer facilities available to Farmers’ Organisations, the poor level of 
training on the importance of record keeping for transparency, and literacy levels. 
All Farmers’ 
Organisations reported to 
keep some type of 
records with 75% 
keeping a record of 
gauges at the distributary 
level. 56.25% of 
Farmers’ Organisations 
reported to maintain the 
warabundi register and 
62.5% report to record 
the supply of water to watercourses. However, the majority of Farmers’ Organisations in the 
LBDC stated they had not yet received records for the distributary from PID with some 
stating the department to be uninterested in cooperating with them. 62.5% of Farmers’ 
Organisations reported users to be satisfied with distribution, the majority of these were again 
situated in LCC areas.  
3.10 Capacity	for	dispute	resolution	
93.75% of FOs and 67% of Water User Associations reported the most common cause of 
disputes to be water theft, mostly in the form of illegal outlets and the intentional breaking of 
the canal infrastructure. Members of Farmers’ Organisations stated that disputes over illegal 
outlets and other forms of water theft, meant that Water User Associations had not yet been 
established for all watercourses under 31.25% of their organisations. The length of time these 
disputes have lasted, indicates that conflicts over water allocations continue to dominate the 
functions of these organisations hindering the participatory setup. 
Figure 44 Number of FOs taking flow measurements at the head and 
tail reaches of canals 
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However, 70.5% of members from Water User Associations reported the number of water-
related disputes to have reduced since the establishment of the new institutional setup with 
just 9% stating that Farmers’ Organisations needed to be more active in this area. 81.25% of 
Farmers’ Organisations also reported to have successfully resolved almost all water related 
disputes presented. This is compared to 11% reported by members of Water User 
Associations showing the controversial nature of conflicts. Despite this, there were very few 
cases of political interference reported. In cases where Farmers’ Organisations were unable to 
resolve disputes, they were referred to water courts (reported to be largely ineffective), PID, 
PIDA, Area Water Boards, and the police. 
Farmers’ 
Organisations 
reported resolving 
656 water related 
disputes over 2012 
/2013, 278 in LBDC 
and 378 in LCC 
areas. As seen from 
figure 45, there was 
a wide variation in 
the number of 
disputes reported 
under each Farmer Organisation with a Sd of 50.82. 39% of members of Water User 
Associations reported resolving between 1 and 60 water disputes each over 2013 with 13% of 
these escalated to Farmers’ Organisations before being resolved. 
3.11 Farmers’	Organisation	and	Water	User	Association	trainings	and	
skillsets	
Only 62.5% of Farmers’ Organisations reported that their members had received some type 
of training. All Farmers’ Organisations in LCC areas reported receiving training compared to 
just 2 in the LBDC areas. Trainings were undertaken by PIDA and provided in areas covering 
abiana collection being the most frequent training provided, followed by management skills, 
organisational development, and record keeping. It was noted that no Farmers’ Organisation 
reported to have attended more than 1 training each and 66% of Water User Associations 
reported having received no training at all. This indicates significant knowledge gaps and the 
Figure 45 No. of water disputes dealt with by FOs over 2013 
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neglect of capacity building activities. As stated, there needs to be a clear budget for capacity 
building activities with trainings ideally rolled out on an annual basis. 
As seen from figure 46, the highest number of trainings were received in organisational 
development followed by conflict resolution and flow measurement. Presidents of Farmers’ 
Organisations were the most likely to have received training, followed by other members of 
the management committee. Training in financial management was found to be limited with 
only a small number of Farmers’ Organisation and members from Water User Associations 
trained in this area which was also reported to focus almost solely on abiana collection.  
From those that had 
received trainings 
44.4% of Farmers’ 
Organisations were 
dissatisfied with the 
course content. 50% 
reported that further 
training was required, 
these were requested 
in the areas of 
organisational 
development, rules 
and enforcement 
powers, managing abiana collection, and managing water theft.   
Although capacity building is not mentioned directly in the 1997 Punjab Irrigation and 
Drainage Authority Act under PIDA’s mandate, the institution is directed to ‘implement 
policies’ with a view to that ‘other entities become fully operative as self-sustaining and 
financially self-sustaining entities’ (Government of Punjab 1997). This indicates that the 
activities of PIDA in regards to its role in establishing and overseeing Area Water Board, 
Farmers’ Organisation, and Water User Association activities need to be better monitored. 
3.12 Institutional	transparency	and	accountability:	FOs	and	KPs	
Indicators for levels of institutional transparency yielded mixed results. 81.3% of Farmers’ 
Organisations reported that they were satisfied with levels of transparency in their 
Figure 46 Members of Management Body Trained 
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institutions. However, most members reporting to be satisfied with levels of transparency 
were from LBDC areas that had also reported poor levels of documentation. This shows a 
low level of awareness over the need for record keeping. The primary areas listed by 
members from Farmers’ Organisations for improvements in transparency was in abiana 
collection (81.3%), followed by conflict resolution (25%), and the equitable distribution of 
water (25%). 
21.6% of members from Water User Associations felt that levels of accountability in 
Farmers’ Organisations needed to be improved linking problems in this area to political 
interference, the misuse of power, or weak levels of social mobilisation. These assertions are 
somewhat supported by the fact that 37.5% of Farmers’ Organisations members believed that 
not all office bearers should be held accountable for organisation decisions and actions 
indicating a need for improved levels of professionalism and institutional maturity. It also 
indicates that further training and social mobilisation is required to raise levels of 
accountability, an aspect also noted in the report by ICARDA (2014).  
The majority of members from Farmers’ Organisations in LCC areas believed that higher 
level authorities such as Area Water Boards should instead be held accountable for their 
actions, this is in spite of the majority these organisations found to be defunct. Similarly, in 
LBDC areas, members of Farmers’ Organisations believed that PIDA should be held 
accountable; 87.5% of organisations in LBDC areas further stated that an accountability 
committee was being set up within PIDA. It was not implied that any Farmers’ Organisations 
would be represented on the PIDA accountability committee indicating communication gaps 
between administrative levels. Unless significant efforts are made to increase investment in 
strengthening transparency and accountability at the level of Farmers’ Organisation, levels of 
trust by communities and donors in the new institutional structure may deteriorate. 
3.13 Coordination	within	the	new	institutional	structure	
All members of Area Water Boards interviewed stated that their institutions were unable to 
function due to political interference. This implies that third party monitoring is required to 
ensure that new institutions are able to function. It should also be ensured that any 
recommendations drawn from the results of monitoring are enforced with strong government 
backing required. It further suggests that penalties need to set on government institutions that 
seek to block the activities of new institutions and by doing so blocking policy 
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implementation. It is suggested that penalties are in the way of specific actions against 
management or budget cuts. 
In contrast to the status of Area Water Boards, 100% of Farmers’ Organisations in LCC areas 
and 50% of those in LBDC areas stated they had a ‘good’ level of coordination with 
government institutions indicating that lower level institutions may be more accepted by 
officials. However, others felt that PIDA and Area Water Boards should have a more active 
presence in Farmers’ Organisations’ activities, capacity building on related legislation, 
auditing, and in enforcing the collection of abiana. This suggests that legislation on 
organisations established under the new institutional setup needs to be clarified in terms of 
institutional roles and responsibilities. Financial provisions also need to be made available to 
orientate staff on their additional responsibilities and also those that are no longer required 
under the new setup. The differences in investment levels and the performance of Farmers’ 
Organisations in LCC and LBCD areas also shows varying attitudes of PIDA and PID 
towards Farmers’ Organisations significantly affecting their capacity and performance. This 
again suggests the need to use performance related penalties or rewards as a means of 
enforcing institutional cooperation/ legislative compliance. 
62% of Farmers’ Organisations stated they had good coordination with PID. Remaining 
organisations stated that PID did not accept their presence and actively worked with the 
police to create problems for them. For this reason, 50% of Farmers’ Organisations requested 
PIDA and Farmers’ Organisations to be made more independent. Just 25% of Farmers’ 
Organisations stated PIDA and PID to have a good level of coordination, indicating 
institutional rivalries that were also brought out in the key informant interviews at both the 
provincial and district levels. These actions which ultimately block policy implementation 
again suggest the need for anti-corruption monitoring and to ensure law enforcement is 
utilised as a tool for government and for the personal use of HR. It is further suggested that 
more funding is made available against specific budget lines to achieve more independence 
for new water management authorities/ organisations. Similarly, as activities are adjusted/cut 
from existing institutions, HR, resources, and their responsibilities must be adjusted 
accordingly.  
50% of members from Area Water Boards reported conducting quarterly meetings although 
no meetings were conducted with Farmers’ Organisations signalling significant gaps in 
communications and coordination in the new institutional structure. In contrast, all 
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management members reported to conduct between 5 to 9 meetings per annum. However, 
levels of communication with wider general bodies of Farmers’ Organisations varied more 
with the number of meetings conducted per annum ranging from 1 to 12. Coordination 
between the management of Farmers’ Organisations and general bodies seemed to be limited 
with only 62% of general body members in LBDC areas and 6.25% in the LCC areas, 
reporting to know some information on organisational activities. This included basic 
information on general body membership numbers, the number of general body meetings 
held in 2013, and whether meeting minutes were circulated. More detailed information on the 
frequency of general body meetings, basic record keeping, offices, IT facilities, the 
organisations’ bank account, operation and maintenance equipment, training, flow 
measurements, and common disputes, was only known by members of the general body in 1 
organisation. This suggests that members need to be orientated on the expected day-to-day 
running of Farmers’ Organisations and the link between open communication and 
institutional transparency. It is suggested that basic audits are completed every 1-2 years to 
encourage a culture of transparency. 
Members of Water User Associations reported regular contact with Farmers’ Organisations. 
This evidenced by meetings with an average of 9 conducted per year. However, 22.7% of 
members reported to participate in meetings with Farmers’ Organisations on a biannual or 
annual basis and 18.8% stated meetings to be held rarely or not at all. This again shows the 
importance of maintaining records of meeting minutes enabling third parties to verify 
information. This finding also reinforces the need for managers of Farmers’ Organisations to 
be trained on the importance of communication and institutional coordination. This training 
would aid new organisations to avoid duplicating the mistakes made in the former 
institutional setup. 
It is clear that slow progress has been made in the establishment of the new institutional setup 
with much greater investment required to make new organisations operational. It is suggested 
that 5-year asset purchase and training plans are designed to further build the capacity of new 
institutions. Additional finance also needs to be made available for new organisations to 
function effectively alongside strong monitoring systems. Drivers behind significant 
differences in levels of investment by area also need to be researched. In regards to the 
disruptive actions of PIDs, legislation on the mandate of new and old institutions need to be 
made clearer and properly enforced. In this regard, penalties may be needed in cases where 
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PIDs are found to clearly disrupt the mandated activities of Area Water Boards, Farmers’ 
Organisation, and Water User Associations. 
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4 Chapter	four:	Community	perceptions	of	water	resources	management		
4.1 Community	level	findings	from	Sindh	and	Punjab	
Community perceptions of water resources management and the problems they confront 
centred on 4 key areas: the levels of government corruption, the apathy of officials and 
government towards farmers, mismanagement, and climate change. These themes are linked 
on a mind map in figure 47 and discussed in more detail below: 
i. Corruption: this was in the main perceived to be endemic in all aspects of life and 
perceived to have a strong influence on the management of water resources. It was 
perceived to facilitate key actors in carrying out illegal activities including landlords, 
politicians, and industry. These are analysed as subcategories below: 
a. Landlord influence was primarily referenced in the form of the bribery of 
government officials in exchange for the construction of illegal direct outlets, 
motors, and tubewells installed in or close to canals/minors. This was the 
central reason cited for significant water shortages in middle and tail canal 
areas leading to a reliance on more expensive tubewell water, crop losses, and 
livelihood changes. In many instances this was associated with soil salinity 
affecting crops yields and the increased use of fertiliser and loans. It was also 
linked to drinking water shortages with lower flows in canals affecting the 
quality of groundwater supplied to handpumps. Landlord influence was further 
associated with corruption in PIDA/SIDA with Farmers’ Organisations stated 
to be ineffective or formed on paper only. In this way, government officials 
from both the Irrigation Department and PIDA/SIDA were perceived to be 
corrupt and complicit in water theft. 
b. Political influence was linked to the construction of new canals leading to the 
re-direction of water from other areas due to limited supply. This factor was 
associated with the complete stoppage of water leading to land and livestock 
sales, migration for work, and drinking water shortages. 
c. Industry influence was associated with levels of air and water pollution. 
Industries referenced included fertiliser companies, sugar mills, and 
processing plants. The pollution of groundwater was frequently linked to the 
consumption of canal water, diseases, and travel for alternative water sources.  
Some communities also invested in water tests to ascertain the extent of 
groundwater pollution against depth. 
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ii. Government antipathy: this was generally cited as the reason for low levels of 
investment in canal maintenance, canal lining, poor drainage, and weak enforcement 
of legislation against water theft. These subcategories are discussed in more detail 
below. 
a. Canal maintenance was in the main perceived to be very limited or absent. 
Poor maintenance was linked to the build-up of scrub and silt in canals leading 
to blockages. These blockages were felt to contribute to water shortages. 
Many communities cooperated with one another to clean outlets and 
watercourses themselves however, the cleaning of canals was stated to require 
more financial resources and was only undertaken in rare cases with the 
support of landlords. 
b. Poor canal lining was predominantly linked to water theft and seepages. 
Unlined or kutcha canals were stated to cause waterlogging with stagnant 
water linked to malaria and other waterborne diseases. Kutcha canals were 
strongly associated with water theft since such structures can be easily broken, 
as such many requested canal lining as a means to facilitate the more equal 
distribution of canal water. 
c. Poor drainage was associated with waterlogging and the pollution of drinking 
water. Widespread waterlogging was stated to lead to crop losses and in some 
cases the abandonment of land. The abandonment of land was in turn 
associated with changes in livelihood activities and migration. Waterlogging 
was also strongly associated with the spread of diseases among both people 
and livestock leading to frequent medical and veterinary expenses. 
d. Weak enforcement was second form in which officials were stated to enable 
water theft. In some cases, communities took identified thieves to police 
stations themselves only for them to be later released due to bribery. 
 
iii. Mismanagement: this factor was generally associated with poor forward planning on 
behalf of officials contributing to the late release of water and crop losses. A further 
are associated with mismanagement was the LBOD funded by the World Bank in 
Sindh. Communities stated they were not consulted before the LBOD was 
implemented and that it had led to water shortages and salinity (as discussed in 
chapter 1). 
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iv. Climate change: this was specifically associated with increased flooding, changes in 
patterns of rainfall, and the rising sea level. 
a. Flooding was in many cases associated with anger towards landlords who had 
redirected water onto community lands where it remained for several months. 
This led to crop losses and disease. Government was also stated to provide 
very limited assistance during annual flooding in the way of drainage, 
replacing lost livestock, or subsidies. 
b. Changes in rainfall patterns was linked to uncertainty in connection with 
supplementary irrigation for crops causing crop losses. 
c. The rising sea level was cited by communities in coastal areas of Sindh as 
leading to severe drinking water shortages, the abandonment of land, and 
migration. Some communities cited issues with security due to men working 
in cities leaving women to care for their children and livestock in their 
villages. 
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Figure 47 Community perceptions of water problems and their impacts 
 
Co
mm
un
ity
pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
 of
 w
at
er
pr
ob
lem
s a
nd
 im
pa
ct
Go
ve
rn
me
nt
 C
or
ru
pt
ion
La
nd
lor
d
infl
ue
nc
e/
br
ibe
ry
Po
itic
al
infl
ue
nc
e
Ille
ga
l o
ut
let
s,
mo
to
rs,
tu
be
we
lls
Re
dir
ec
tio
n
of 
wa
ter
- n
ew
inf
ras
tru
ctu
re
W
ate
r
sh
or
tag
es
 at
mi
dd
le/
tai
l
St
op
pa
ge
 of
wa
ter
Cl
im
ate
 ch
an
ge
Ch
an
ge
 in
rai
nfa
ll
Ch
an
ge
 in
 se
a
lev
el
Cr
op
los
se
s/l
es
s
inc
om
e
Sa
lin
e
wa
ter
/la
nd
Ab
an
do
nm
en
t
of 
lan
d
Dr
ink
ing
wa
ter
sh
or
tag
es
He
alt
h
pr
ob
lem
s
Liv
es
to
ck
les
s
mi
lk/
inc
om
e
los
s
Co
st 
of
tre
atm
en
t
PI
DA
/S
ID
A
ine
ﬀe
cti
ve
FO
s n
ot
for
me
d/
fun
cti
on
ing
M
ist
us
t o
f
PI
DA
/S
ID
A
Cr
op
 lo
ss
es
Liv
eli
ho
od
ch
an
ge
s/
mi
gr
ati
on
Liv
eli
ho
od
ch
an
ge
/
mi
gr
ati
on
Dr
ink
ing
wa
ter
sh
or
tag
es
Ind
us
try
infl
ue
nc
e
Po
llu
tio
n
He
ath
pr
ob
lem
s
M
ism
an
ag
em
en
t
Po
or
 p
lan
nin
g
La
te 
wa
ter
Cr
op
 lo
ss
es
/
les
s i
nc
om
e
Liv
eli
ho
od
ch
an
ge
s/m
igr
ati
on
Go
ve
rn
me
nt
 an
tip
ath
y
Po
or
ma
int
en
an
ce
Ca
na
l
blo
ck
ag
es
W
ate
r
sh
or
tag
es
Cr
op
los
se
s/i
nc
om
e
los
s
Po
or
 d
rai
na
ge
Sa
lin
e
lan
d/
wa
ter
Inv
es
tm
en
t in
fer
tili
se
r/t
ec
h
Lo
an
s
Di
str
es
s s
ale
of
lan
d/
liv
es
to
ck
W
ate
rlo
gg
ing
Po
llu
ted
dr
ink
ing
 w
ate
r
Liv
es
to
ck
dis
ea
se
s
Le
ss
mi
lk/
inc
om
e
Di
se
as
es
Re
lia
nc
e o
n
tu
be
we
lls
Hi
gh
er 
co
st 
of
die
sa
l
Sa
lin
e l
an
d
Liv
eli
ho
od
ch
an
ge
s/m
igr
ati
on
Liv
es
to
ck
les
s f
od
de
r
Le
ss
mi
lk/
inc
om
e
Ab
an
do
nm
en
t
of 
lan
d
Co
st 
of
tre
atm
en
t
We
ak
en
for
ce
me
nt
Ille
ga
l o
ut
let
s
W
ate
r
sh
or
tag
es
No
 lin
ing
Ille
ga
l
br
ea
ka
ge
s f
or
wa
ter
 th
eft
Se
co
nd
inc
om
e
Liv
eli
ho
od
ch
an
ge
s/m
igr
ati
on
Lo
we
r
yie
lds
/in
co
me
Inv
es
tm
en
t in
fer
tili
se
r
Lo
an
s
216 
 
Following the identification of key issues, they were coded and prioritised. The prioritisation 
of thematic areas and sub-categories was based on the number of times each theme is 
referenced in the discussions with officials. These were then analysed in the hierarchy chart, 
seen in figure 48. 
Figure 48 Hierarchy chart of community water problems and impacts 
 
4.2 Critical	of	government	
The most discussed theme associated with water problems in Sindh and Punjab was ‘critical 
of government’ with 970 references. Due to the number of references under this node and 
their importance as contributing factors to water shortages, related sub-categories have been 
taken as separate headings. Within this theme, the largest sub-category was endemic and 
institutional corruption with 410 references. These references relate to corruption observed at 
all levels of government administration. The most discussed form of institutional corruption 
was the role of government officials in water theft. This role was in the way of officials 
accepting bribes from landlords and incidences of officials obtaining water for their own 
lands, both referenced on 97 occasions. The involvement of government officials in water 
theft was stated to be the primary cause of water shortages. 
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4.2.1 Corruption	
Due to the time participants allocated to the discussion of corruption, a word frequency 
search was conducted for the word ‘illegal’. This search was used to analyse specific 
activities that were deemed unlawful, the results are shown in the word tree in figure 49.  
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Figure 49 Word tree of the word 'illegal' 
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The word ‘illegal’ was referenced 46 times by focus group discussion participants. As seen 
from the word tree in figure 49, ‘illegal’ activities were most frequently associated with 
‘illegal outlets’ directly installed in head reach canal areas and minors. Illegal activities were 
further referenced in association with the widening of outlets beyond sanctioned limits. The 
illegal installation and tampering of outlets was the primary reason cited by communities for 
water shortages in middle and tail-end command areas.  
Officials were reported to encourage bribery in 
exchange for active involvement in illegal 
activities. Official involvement was in the way of 
implementing and/or condoning illegal outlets. 
Some communities reported that they themselves 
regularly provided bribes to officials in the form 
of produce or money to widen outlets or in order 
to obtain their official water quotas. The 
pervasiveness of illegal outlets was the primary 
reason for communities requesting canal lining. 
Communities reported that canal lining would 
make it more difficult for landlords and officials alter canal infrastructure and install or widen 
illegal outlets. 
Illegal activities were also associated with bribes provided to officials in law enforcement 
resulting in ineffective policing and frequent short term arrests. Such arrests were reported to 
be carried out on a cyclical bases with farmers being detained every six months for illegal 
water outlets provided by the Irrigation Department. Some communities also reported to have 
handed thieves over to the police only for them to be quickly released. Farmers further 
frequently referenced the misuse of law enforcement by landlords and government officials. 
In such cases, local police were utilised to prevent complaints being lodged over water theft 
and/or to secure voting. For this reason, many poorer communities expressed a fear of law 
enforcement. Other communities had been made aware of their rights by NGOs and were less 
fearful of overnight arrests. Communities in the main, viewed government administration as 
working against them in the form of facilitating, taking part in, and protecting illegal activity 
linked to water theft.  
 
Picture 1 Example of water outlet  in 
Rahim Yar Khan repeatedly widened 
and re-filled 
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As seen from figure 50, tail-end 
canal areas were the most impacted 
by cases of water theft with a 
greater portion of discussion time 
being allocated to this issue. The 
majority of water theft was reported 
to occur in head reach followed by 
middle canal areas. As seen from 
figure 50, farmers situated at the 
tail-end of canals allocated 61% of 
discussion time to landlords’ roles 
in water theft and 59% of 
discussion time to the role of 
government in water theft 
indicating the importance given to 
this issue. This may account for the 
lower level of discussion time 
allocated to this issue in these areas. 
However, some communities in 
head reach areas openly discussed 
installing motors on water 
infrastructure to obtain more water. Due to the frequency of this activity, it was not perceived 
to be illegal and was justified by levels of canal water received being lower than in former 
years.  
References to illegal activities were made by 21 communities, 14 of which were based in 
Sindh and 7 in Punjab, indicating a higher frequency of illegal activities in relation to water 
management in Sindh. Communities in Sindh were also found to be more aware of their 
rights in relation to water distribution. They further reported having made more efforts to 
access information, lodge complaints against corrupt practices, and cooperate to facilitate 
protests on a larger scale. It is unclear whether the reasons for communities in Sindh being 
more proactive in protests are due to the more prolonged water crisis in the province, the 
dominance of large landlords, or Sindh’s history of uprisings against perceived injustices. 
Figure 50 Perception of Government and landlord 
role in water theft by water source 
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4.2.2 Political	Influence	
Political influence in the form of water being re-directed to new canals, industry influence, 
the manipulation of water problems to obtain votes was a further category referenced under 
‘corruption’ 58 times. The re-direction of water from established irrigation areas, due to the 
construction of new canals, was found to have an immediate and significant impact on the 
lives of communities. None of the communities interviewed reported being consulted or 
informed prior to canal water being re-directed. Even after the passing of several years, none 
of the focus group discussion participants had as yet been informed of the reason for effective 
water stoppages. The re-direction of canal water was found to have a significant impact on 
economic activity and quality of life within affected communities. These impacts were in the 
form of distress sales of land and livestock, changes in livelihood activities, migration, petty 
crime due to unemployment, and drinking water shortages. Communities further frequently 
complained of politicians using the issue of water shortages to obtain votes from them with 
promises later being unfulfilled.  
4.2.2.1 Industry	Influence	
Industry influence with the support of politicians, stated often to be involved in industry 
activities, was reported as another major reason for water theft. Industry influence was also 
linked to the dumping of pollutants affecting groundwater sources. Groundwater pollution 
was reported to be a major reason for drinking water shortages with handpumps 
predominantly utilised for this purpose. The pollution of groundwater was further linked to 
problems with supplementary irrigation water from tubewells. Resultant drinking water 
shortages were reported to lead to the consumption of canal water, increased travel time for 
the collection of water from alternative sources, and the purchase of water from filtration 
plants. Groundwater pollution was reported to result in the spread of diseases such as 
hepatitis A, diarrhoea, and skin conditions. 
4.2.3 Abiana	Collection	
A further key area linked to corruption was the collection of abiana with almost no FGD 
participants aware of official abiana rates. Many participants reported paying more than 
double or triple official rates of abiana stating that they had no choice and others reported 
that it depending on individual relationships with officials. Officials were reported to be more 
flexible in the negotiation of rates if landowners owned larger land plots. Many communities 
resented having to pay abiana despite land being uncultivable due to water shortages, salinity 
or waterlogging. They further stated that for these same reasons, people were reluctant to buy 
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lands from them meaning they were unable to re-locate to areas closer to alternative sources 
of employment.  
4.2.4 Mismanagement	
The second most referenced areas under ‘critical of government’ was mismanagement being 
cited 161 times. This was predominantly linked to the poor maintenance of canals worsening 
water shortages. In 36 incidences, farmers stated that no maintenance had been undertaken 
since the Musharraf regime in 2000, when the allocated budget was higher for water 
management. Several references were also made to poor maintenance on the LBOD 
exacerbating sea intrusion resulting in the abandonment of land. The lack of investment in 
canal lining, reference on 33 occasions, was also stated to exacerbate water shortages by 
enabling incidences of water theft in the form of canal breakages.  
Further key areas linked to mismanagement were the late receipt of water without notification 
resulting in crop losses and poor drainage leading to prolonged waterlogging and the 
abandonment of land, sewerage entering groundwater, and the spread of diseases including 
malaria and cholera. Poor planning was also referenced in relation to the LBOD. Policies 
perceived to be against the agricultural sector as a whole were criticised as a more recent 
development linked to the Nawaz Sharif government from 2013 onwards and their preference 
for investment in industry. 
4.2.5 Community	voice	in	water	governance	
References to communities having ‘no voice’ were made 138 times, such references were 
predominantly linked to poverty, illiteracy, and government apathy. As seen in figure 52, 
communities reporting to have no say in water governance were from both Sindh (shown on 
the left wide) and Punjab (shown on the right side). A total of 26 communities in Punjab 
(predominantly situated in Southern Punjab) and 18 communities in Sindh reported to have 
no voice when it came to the governance of water resources.  
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Figure 51 Communities reporting to have no say in water governance 
 
Evidence provided for having no say in water governance were: unresponsive officials, 
unanswered complaints, manipulation of water issues in electoral voting, court cases that 
were won with no further action taken, the misuse of law enforcement for intimidation, the 
construction of infrastructure affecting water allocations without community consultation, 
and prolonged periods of water stoppages at times lasting several years. 27 references were to 
formal complaints being lodged. Complaints were reported to be made to officials at 
Irrigation and Agricultural Departments, the police, and to local and provincial level 
politicians.  
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Strength of voice in water 
governance and its strong link with 
income level can be seen in figure 
52. This shows that the majority of 
communities reporting to have no 
voice in water governance were 
situated at the tail-end of canal areas 
and followed by communities in mid-
canal areas.  
The predominant reason for 
complaints over water governance 
was related to the perceived apathy 
of irrigation officials over water theft 
and water stoppages/cuts. A number of agricultural communities found to be using solely 
groundwater sources reported to have formally been classed as tail-end areas and as having 
their canal water cut for many years. A small number of those formally in middle canal areas 
had also been re-allocated to tail-end areas following the construction of further 
watercourses. 
27 references were made to local, provincial, and national protests being held with several 
communities travelling long 
distances to reach provincial and 
national level government offices. 
The majority of those reporting to 
have initiated protests and court 
cases against officials were situated 
in groundwater and tail-end canal 
areas. Participants reported protests 
being undertaken in the form of 
road blocks, hunger strikes, the 
burning of effigies of provincial 
politicians, and marches 
undertaken in Islamabad and 
Lahore, and overnight protests outside the houses of politicians and officials working in water 
Picture 2 Local Support Organisation in Badin, Sindh that 
conducted a hunger strike over water shortages in 
Islamabad in 2014 
Figure 52 Voice in water governance by water source 
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management. 11 further references made to court cases were reported to have been initiated 
against water thieves or the government for unauthorised water cuts.  
As seen from table 13, communities most likely to protest over poor government 
accountability in the management of water resources were from groundwater and tail-end 
areas. This shows the greater impact of water shortages on these communities. Reported 
complaints, protests, and court cases on the part of communities in these areas were 
frequently drawn out lasting several days, weeks, or months, and often to no avail. 
Table 13 Heat map of number and level of complaints made by water source 
 
Court cases awarded in the favour of communities were also reported, in the main, to lead to 
no further action being taken. This meant that despite legal rulings in the favour of 
communities, many remained without access to their official water quotas under the 
warabundi system. For these reasons, the majority of communities reported being unable to 
make officials accountable for their actions and as having no voice in the governance of 
water resources.  
4.2.6 PIDA/SIDA	
The negligible or negative impact of PIDA/SIDA authorities was referenced 101 times. This 
was in the form of PIDA/SIDA officials participating in corrupt activities referenced on 13 
occasions and the fact that many FOs were reported to be formed on paper only also 
referenced 13 times. Further issues raised by communities related to PIDA/SIDA being 
utilised as a means to shift responsibility back and forth with Irrigation Departments, the 
absence of PIDA/SIDA from their offices, the ineffectiveness of Farmers’ Organisations, a 
lack of awareness of PIDA/SIDA, and poor guidance in the construction of watercourses. 17 
references were also made to poor cooperation among communities in irrigation 
management, these included an analysis of cooperation in marked Farmers’ Organisation 
areas. 
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No women reported any knowledge of Farmers’ Organisations or SIDA/PIDA. 40 references 
were made by participants to women having no role in irrigation management. Whilst the 
majority of women reported assisting in agricultural activities, very few cases were found 
where women operated tubewells or were responsible in some way for the management of 
irrigation water. Despite this, women were 
predominantly responsible for the collection 
of clean drinking water, often from 
handpumps or canals.  
As seen from figure 53, communities in 
Punjab reported to take a more conservative 
approach to women’s involvement in water 
management than in Sindh. 33 communities 
in Punjab reporting women to have no role in 
irrigation management compared to 7 in 
Sindh. However, communities reporting 
women to already have an active role in 
irrigation management/abiana were similar 
in number across the provinces. 11 
communities reported women to have some type of role in irrigation activities Sindh 
compared to 7 in Punjab. 
As seen from figure 54, women only 
focus groups were more likely to 
report themselves having no role in 
irrigation management/ abiana 
collection than groups consisting of all 
men. Mixed groups were least likely to 
report women having no role in 
irrigation activities or abiana 
collection. 
  
Figure 53 Women's reported role in 
Irrigation management by province 
Figure 54 Women's perceived role in irrigation 
management by FGD participant group gender 
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4.3 Government	Support	
As seen from figure 55, the level of government works significantly differed by province 
with communities in Sindh reporting to receive approximately 50% of the assistance as 
communities in Punjab. The highest 
levels of investment in the way of 
infrastructural works and support 
for farming communities reported 
in Bahawalpur in Southern Punjab, 
and Khushab, and Sargodha, 
followed by Kasur in northern 
Punjab. Very limited works and 
support from government was 
reported in Southern Sindh and no 
works or any form of support were 
reported by communities in 
northern Sindh. 
As shown in table 14, the main form of government assistance provided for communities was 
canal lining to reduce seepages. This was followed by canal maintenance, water testing, land 
distribution, the 
provision of filtration 
plants, drainage, and the 
provision of advice on 
new seed varieties. This 
support was reported to 
be given almost evenly 
across all categories of 
water source since activities such as canal lining and maintenance affected all water users.  
4.4 Climate	change	
References were made to the impacts of climate change on farming communities on 27 
occasions. Perhaps due to its position close to the sea and as the primary outlet for flood 
waters, problems stemming from the impacts of climate change were reported by more than 
double the number of communities in Sindh than in Punjab. The most referenced climate 
Table 14 Breakdown of government assistance received by type 
and province 
Figure 55 Percentage of time government assistance 
discussed in Punjab and Sindh 
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change impact was flooding damaging housing and crops, followed by changes in rainfall 
patterns leading to drought. The impacts of rising sea levels on salinity were referenced by 
coastal communities in Sindh. The impacts of sea level rise were also stated to have been 
exacerbated by the construction of the Left Bank Outfall Drain in Sindh reported to have 
lowered the freshwater barrier. 
4.5 Coping	strategies	
Nearly double the number of coping strategies in response to water shortages were reported 
to be utilised by communities in Punjab than in Sindh. Coping strategies employed by 
farmers in Sindh and Punjab also tended to differ in type and associated impact. The majority 
farmers in Sindh and a much lower number in Punjab, reported switching to less water 
intensive crops, reducing yield, and reducing planting to one season only. A total of 104 
references were made to this coping strategy. In cases where communities switched to a 
single crop this tended to be either wheat or rice, the latter predominantly due to drainage 
problems and waterlogging. As seen in table 15, those most likely to adopt this coping 
strategy were in areas reliant on groundwater due to its deteriorating quality.  
Coping strategies in the form of changes in crop type and quantity were reported to 
significantly lower income levels. Lower incomes led many farmers in Sindh and to a much 
lesser extent in Punjab to seek supplementary income in the form of wage labour. 
Supplementary forms of income included working on the land of others, domestic labour, and 
unskilled work in construction. 
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Table 15 Heat map of coping strategies 
 
Larger investments in agriculture were also reported as a coping strategy against changes in 
water quantity and quality in 77 instances. No significant differences in the frequency of 
reports of this strategy being employed in Punjab and Sindh. Farmers predominantly opting 
for this type of strategy were from middle canal areas having more income than farmers 
situated at the tail-end, and in groundwater areas where there were no other options. 
Investments were in the form of fertilisers to compensate for land salinity, diesel, and 
technology. These types of investments were predominantly due to the need to use 
supplementary or only tubewell water to compensate for water shortages.  
Larger investments were associated with loans referenced in 25 cases, often carrying high 
interest rates to be paid in cash or kind. Borrowing credit was also associated with distress 
sales in the form of land (referenced on 23 occasions) and sand to brick factories, and 
livestock (again referenced in 23 instances). The sale of sand to brick factories, sold at PKR 
25,000 per metre acre was found to permanently damage land in the removal of topsoil and 
eventual waterlogging as the depth of sand taken became deeper each year. Distress sales 
were reported on 46 occasions with some communities stating they were unable to sell land 
due to its related water issues.  
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The second most referenced coping strategy was in the form of livelihood changes with 
people reporting moving over to wage labour in 42 instances. This again had a similar 
frequency of reporting as a coping strategy in Punjab and Sindh. The most disruptive coping 
strategies were in the form of the migration of men to cities. In some instances, communities 
were found to be almost empty or to have women only leading to security problems and 
higher costs in travel.  
Cases of cooperation at the community, village, and union council level were frequently 
reported as a necessary response to water shortages. This was in the form of cooperation over 
canal maintenance, irrigation water, protests, and less frequently for obtaining drinking water. 
Few communities reported having to purchase water for consumption with neighbours 
providing this without charge. Irrigation water was usually purchase for the price of diesel 
from used to operate tubewells. Cooperation over water issues was found to be most frequent 
in groundwater areas, followed by middle and tail-end canal areas. 
The majority of farmers practising water conservation were situated in areas reliant on 
groundwater due to having few options for clean water other than rainwater. Areas reliant on 
groundwater were also more likely to have a history of practising water conservation in the 
form of ponds and small dams. 
4.6 Impact	
The largest impacts resulting from 
water shortages, waterlogging, and 
salinity, was in the form of crop 
losses and associated reductions in 
income. Significant income losses 
were most frequently reported by 
communities in groundwater, 
middle, and tail-end areas. Further 
impacts were reported on health, this 
was in the form of diseases and 
malnutrition resulting from water 
shortages. In some cases, parents 
reported not providing food for children since salt in foods would require the consumption of 
water.  
Picture 3 Waterlogged land causing the spread of 
waterborne diseases and malaria in Bahawalpur, Punjab 
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As seen in table 16, diseases in areas 
with water shortages and waterlogging 
tended to be hepatitis, diarrhoea and 
rashes on the skin, followed to a lesser 
extent by cholera. Waterlogged areas 
further reported a rise in cases of 
malaria. Tenants in Sindh further 
reported drinking stagnant water in 
fields due to not being able to travel to 
handpumps or carry enough water to 
work through long hours. This again 
resulted in diseases.  
Many communities stated they were unable to boil water due to a lack of time, electricity, and 
fuel. In some cases, worms were reported in drinking water by tenant communities in 
northern Punjab in which case cloths were utilised to filter water prior to consumption. Most 
communities realised the water they were consuming was polluted with chemicals or 
sewerage or saline reporting changes in the colour of water if left for 30 minutes or more. 
However, communities reported that no alternative sources were available to them. 
Table 16 Heat map of diseases by type and water source 
 
  
Picture 4 Common skin condition reported to result 
from insanitary/ polluted water in Sukkur, Sindh 
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Communities in middle and head canal 
areas complained about the cost of 
treatment for waterborne diseases stating 
this to affect household expenses whilst 
many communities in tail-end areas did 
not seek treatment. Travel to hospitals 
further added to these costs. Treatment 
for waterborne diseases was reportedly 
sought once every 1-2 months on a 
cyclical basis. Some reported making 
their own treatments in the form of 
temporary bottled water, oils and in some cases branded sweets. 
A large number of cases involving diseases in livestock were also reported in tail-end and 
middle canal areas. This was frequently due to livestock consuming stagnant water or 
polluted groundwater from handpumps. Such diseases were reported to lower the quantity of 
milk produced. Milk production was further lowered by the inability to grow fodder in areas 
with water shortages. The cost of veterinary doctors was found to vary widely from area to 
area. Government facilities were reported to be significantly cheaper than private sources but 
was of mixed quality and in some areas were mistrusted. 
4.7 Perceived	solutions	
Communities predominantly requested that government officials restore their officials quotas 
for canal water as a perceived solution to water shortages. Farmers, primarily from Sindh and 
from tail-end and groundwater areas, forwarded that this could be achieved via equal 
distribution. It was frequently reported that equal distribution could be achieved by 
strengthening enforcement against water stealing. Farmers in Punjab focused more on the 
need to improve water distribution via canal lining, also requested by many in tail-end areas, 
as seen from table 17. The predominant reason for farmers requesting canal lining was as a 
means to reduce incidences of water stealing and canal breakages. A further area cited to 
improve irrigation supply was technology predominantly requested in groundwater areas as a 
means to reduce salinity, as a means to bore deeper for water, and in the form of solar 
tubewells to reduce fuel costs. Other areas forwarded to alleviate water problems was 
improvements in canal maintenance to reducing blockages and improved drainage and 
Picture 5 Treatment for stomach condition shown 
in the form of branded sweets 
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sanitation facilities to reduce waterlogging in middle and tail-end areas. Drainage facilities 
were predominantly requested by farmers in Punjab. 
Table 17 Perceived solutions forwarded by water source 
 
A further key area where government assistance was requested as a solution to the second 
main theme discussed being the spread of diseases, was the provision of filtration systems 
and small reservoirs. Due to the quality of water, it was observed by many communities that 
filtration plants would also require regular maintenance. It was reported that these were 
required to improve access to drinking water and to cut down expenses in the form of travel 
costs to access clean water supplies in other villages. Drinking water facilities were requested 
by communities across all canal areas. 
4.7.1 Summary	of	findings	
It is clear that there is a disconnect between government and community priorities. The 
introduction of IWRM and its competing institutions for water management appears to place 
government actors on the defensive. Rather than reforming the system of water management, 
the new institutional setup has created a two-tiered system and neither system appears to be 
placing water users first. Instead each institution is putting forward their own priorities in the 
way that a business would do, fighting to justify their place in the system and their own 
financing. Here we can clearly see the conflict between government actors who need to stay 
in employment and earn an income for their families versus the objectives of their institutions 
to raise the productivity of water use.  
Due to the introduction of IWRM in the institutional, policy and legislative context by 
external actors, there is also confusion about what the framework entails and its objectives. 
Due to its dislocation from specific problems, there is also scepticism towards the rationale 
for the new framework leading to the misuse of funds and resistance to policy 
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implementation. This is evidenced in the lack of funding for new water institutions below the 
provincial level. This paucity of funding is leading to capacity gaps and disillusionment 
further leading to the misuse of new institutions. The power of large landlords and their 
coalitions are also such that the new framework is impossible to implement without their 
cooperation. This constitutes a powerful case study of the advocacy coalition framework 
showing the power of long term and shifting landlords-politician coalitions since the time of 
the British administration. If such an analysis of the existing institutional environment as 
advocated under the advocacy coalition framework to establish motivations, if any, and 
potential resistance towards policy change and IWRM, it is hypothesised that an entirely 
different approach would have been taken to its implementation.  
Stagnation and naivety in the implementation of IWRM is having its greatest impact on the 
rural poor in water scarce areas. It has led to further bureaucratic confusion lowering levels of 
institutional and individual accountability. This has served to further distance rural 
communities from government further breaking down levels of trust. The cumulative impacts 
of long-term conditions of water scarcity means that priorities in many areas have shifted 
away from irrigation water to that of drinking water. There is clearly a perception on the part 
of communities that government is not doing enough to resolve these problems. This is 
leading communities to take part in active anti-government protests increasing levels of 
political instability. It is unclear what the long-term political implications of continued 
inaction will be in terms of levels of action communities are willing to take and the long 
terms effects of mass migration into cities. Further effects that need to be assessed in greater 
detail are the impacts stemming from the closure of farms on food security throughout the 
country.  
Due to the way it has been implemented and the rushing of its rollout as a tick-box excersise 
without proper analysis of the institutional environment, IWRM appears to have become little 
more than the presence of physical infrastructure in the form of offices and HR. Further to 
this, these offices remain at the provincial level and are not accessible to the rural poor. The 
introduction of IWRM without accounting for Pakistan’s rigid power structures and the 
complete dominance of landlords in the control of water means that the policy has made little 
difference on the extent of water problems in the country. Evidence from the field work 
suggest this to be the case in both Sindh and Punjab. 
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Section	four:	Conclusion	
1 Conclusion	and	recommendations	
Pakistan has proved a complex case study for the implementation of IWRM as it would be for 
any type of change affecting political power over the country’s natural resources. This is due 
to the grip of the rural elite over Pakistan’s resources and the use of water as a tool to 
maintain this power. Although the power of Pakistan’s elite families and tribes predated the 
time of the British Administration, colonialism only served to expand, entrench, and 
legitimise the control of the rural masses by a handful of families. This power was entrenched 
through the creation and allocation of the canal colonies as evidenced from the case studies of 
Sindh and Punjab. This favouritism in granting access to diverted resources has impacts on 
patterns of economic development that can still be seen today. The fact that this biased 
system continues to form the base of political power in the form of rural vote banks in 
exchange for food security and employment means that resistance to change remains strong.  
The introduction of IWRM, an apolitical framework in this highly politicised environment 
has been at best naïve. The way aspects of the framework have been introduced as a tickbox 
exercise have led to questions over the motivations of international donors and in how they 
analyse policy change and its implementation. There clearly needs to be a change on the part 
of how donors assess the feasibility of introducing new policies and their likely acceptance 
into the political system. Further to this, the introduction of an entirely new layer of water 
management institutions with no attempt to integrate these with the existing institutional 
system or account for existing HR expertise has inevitably led to negative impacts. In this 
way, the new institutional setup has failed to ingender trust in IWRM as a part of a positive 
movement for change. Instead it has been viewed with suspicion or disregarded altogether.  
Problems with IWRM implementation have led to unforeseen changes in the operation of 
new water institutions. These new institutions have changed their mandates to a more NGO 
leaning, with activities more likely to be accepted by political actors in the existing setup. In 
order for new institutions to survive, they have further adopted the ways of the old system 
forming networks with influential landlords and incorporating them into the new system. In 
this way, landlords have simply crossed over into the new institutions and found pathways to 
further legitimise their power over water allocations and institutional monitoring activities. 
As a result, Pakistan’s challenges relating to the scale of wastage, the overexploitation of 
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ground and surface water resources, and infrastructural expansion beyond resource capacity 
resulting in salinity and waterlogging remain unaddressed. Populations living in tail-end 
command areas continue to have with little or no power to bring landlords and officials to 
account. As a result, militancy in rural areas is growing evidenced by the increasing number 
and intensity of protests as problems once limited to irrigation shortages become drinking 
water shortages. 
Underinvestment in HR, prolonged conditions of water scarcity, and the strong link between 
political power, land, and water, have enabled corruption to pervade every level of water 
resource management. The extent of institutional capture is exacerbating biases in water 
distribution with landlords situated in head reach areas able to effectively bribe their way into 
having complete control over the entire canal. The complicity of officials in corrupt activities 
is justified by claims that the IBIS continues to operate in isolation from human agency (I. 
Ali 1988). Such justifications, and the weak voice of the rural poor in irrigation management, 
have served to almost entirely remove any sense of accountability from the government 
administration. The reliance of the IBIS on fixed calculations has further been used to justify 
the refusal to adjust water allocations to upper riparian Punjab under the 1991 Provincial 
Water Accord, and at the more local level to head canal areas. This is in spite of extensions to 
the canal system being made since the signing of the 1991 Accord, the mounting impacts of 
climate change on water shortages, and higher demand for water pushed by population 
growth and the use of HYV cash crops. This predatory culture over water resources is 
exacerbating water shortages in lower riparian Sindh and tail-end areas.  
Distributional biases, implemented within conditions of water scarcity, are increasing 
disparities in levels of economic development by province, district, and village. At the lower 
level, disparities in household income are also increasing shown in Pakistan’s higher gini 
ratio in recent years (Talpur 2017). The extent to which mismanagement, funding gaps, and 
resource monopolies have been permitted to escalate, may be classified as breaches in 
international water law and human rights. These breaches are in the form of the denial of 
water resources to significant portions of the country’s population. This has resulted in both 
environment and development impacts in rural areas. Environmental impacts are in the form 
of the inundation of seawater onto fertile lands, the pollution of ground and surface water 
resources, and land degradation. Development impacts are shown in persistent high levels of 
poverty in agricultural communities despite rising prosperity in more urban areas. They are 
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further evidenced in high levels of food insecurity and malnourishment in rural areas (WFP 
2018). 
The increasing challenges confronted by farmers in middle and tail-end areas have without 
doubt contributed to accelerated rates in the sale of sand for bricks, land sales, and land 
abandonment. This is shown in the reverse of the earlier trend in reductions in large farms of 
over 50 acres from the 1980s onwards (Khan, et al. 2011). Due to this factor, analysis now 
indicates that the number of large farms appears to have remained constant since 
independence in spite of repeated government programmes of land reform. The mean area of 
the largest land class being above 150 acres has also increased over time, initially by 8 acres 
between 1972 and 1980, increasing to a 27 acres gain between 1980 and 2000 (Khan, et al. 
2011, 53). Distress sales by smaller farmers are further evidenced in the long-term trend in 
the rising number of brick factories seen across the landscape of rural Pakistan (ILO 2004). 
The increasing fragility of agricultural livelihoods is also seen in mounting levels of 
unemployment and unrest in rural areas. This is evidenced in the increasing number of anti-
government protests and rises in extremism as people turn away from formal systems of 
justice. Further impacts are in the form of livelihood changes and mass migration to urban 
areas.  
In their introduction of IWRM in Pakistan, international donors have failed to address the 
systematic problems with Pakistan’s systems and structure of water resources management.  
No large-scale endeavours have been made to assess or improve the productivity of water, its 
distribution, or to reduce the pollution of groundwater resources. Legal loopholes in relation 
to the management of groundwater and ambiguous water agreements such as the 1991 Water 
Accord have also been ignored. Perhaps most critically, the deep-seated monopolies that 
impede the current system of water management have been overlooked in the bid to push 
through IWRM priority areas.  
There has further been a failure to question political motivations for supporting participatory 
irrigation management. This is despite research indicating that similar donor policies in the 
past, were predominantly utilized to side-step provincial government administration and to 
control resources via local government (Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010). Funding for 
participatory irrigation management has been pushed through, despite overwhelming 
evidence that political actors in Pakistan remain reliant on the support of landlords to achieve 
and maintain power. The lack of any combined political and economic analysis of the 
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problems endemic to Pakistan’s systems of water management and their links to the political 
establishment, is a fundamental failing on the part of international donors. 
In turn, even the artificial adoption of an externally conceived policy for water management 
has led to a bureaucratic and administrative quagmire for Pakistan’s water management 
institutions. This is in the form of the IWRM institutional framework being operated in 
tandem to the existing institutional framework for irrigation management. This has resulted in 
responsibilities and accountability being continually shifted between departments. It has 
further contributed to the competitive and hostile environment that pervades water 
management and its associated powers. Officials appear to currently operate in an 
environment that effectively constitutes a ‘Chinese wall’ in terms of communications and 
information sharing. The field research conducted under this study concludes that this 
uncooperative institutional environment has served to further distance water users from its 
management. It has further served to exacerbate the culture of apathy among irrigation 
officials, resentful of the higher salaries and new offices provided to those working under the 
new system. Meanwhile officials working within the new system have limited powers, 
community contacts, or administrative freedoms to impose their new mandate. These officials 
were found to have over time joined the old system recognizing that influential contacts are 
required if their departments are to continue in operation. 
Weak levels of government ownership over IWRM policy not only evidenced in the failure to 
support the transfer of institutional powers but is seen in the now decade long delay in the 
passing of the updated water policy. Based on Water Vision 2025, this document continues to 
experience repeated revisions and setbacks. Meanwhile, the country remains reliant on its 
essentially colonial legislation for water management. Weak government ownership is also 
seen in the failure to transfer powers to donor funded IWRM institutions such as 
SIDA/PIDA, AWBs, Farmers’ Organisations, and WUAs. Many of these institutions appear 
to operate on paper only, further illustrating the hollow nature of IWRM implementation in 
Pakistan. This attitude is again reminiscent of previous donor driven policies in the sector of 
water management implemented under Musharraf and before him under Ayub Khan 
(Mezzera, Aftab and Yusuf 2010).  
In this respect, there appears to have been a tendency on the part of international donors to 
fund and implement programmes in isolation from the realities on the ground. In this way 
they have taken no account of individual motivations and institutional processes in decision 
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making, as highlighted under the Advocacy Coalition Framework referred to throughout this 
study. IWRM has therefore been implemented in an apolitical and highly idealistic manner 
that overly focuses on outputs and goals rather than looking into the drivers and processes 
utilised to achieve these. Given that IWRM is based on participatory principles, this study 
forwards that the form in which it should been implemented, if any, should have only been 
decided following open consultation with government, landlords, and communities.  
This study concludes by assessing the specific principles of IWRM that may be adapted to 
improve their feasibility within Pakistan. These have been selected primarily based on the 
political feasibility of their implementation. The forwarded recommendations/ amendments 
have further attached conditions in accordance the level of likely acceptance of these 
principles by agricultural communities, based on the fieldwork findings. 
i. Water as a finite resource: Groundwater 
a. It is suggested that the overexploitation of groundwater resources is dealt with as a 
high priority. This is likely to be political feasible if industry is brought in to 
negotiate what is deemed to be ‘sustainable’ use against the likely impact of no 
action being taken on industry activities over the coming years. Given the 
recognised poor condition of groundwater in many agricultural areas, it is already 
increasingly viewed and monitored as a rare resource in parts of the country. It is 
likely that industry will need to be compensated for potential losses with subsidies 
negotiated.  
b. The pollution of groundwater may also draw political support given that the 
majority of households in both rural and urban areas are affected by this issue. It is 
also an issue that affects both the domestic and irrigation sector and therefore 
increasingly affects industry. Due to levels of government corruption and capacity 
issues, the design and construction of processing plants for sewage and other 
effluents will need to be conducted by a third party. A budget will further need to 
be set aside for maintenance. 
 
ii. The participation of women: Water and Sanitation 
a. A separate budget needs to be set aside to encourage the participation of 
women in activities associated with water management. Rather than irrigation, 
it is suggested that women work in a less controversial extension of their 
traditional role in sanitation activities ensuring the health of the family. Such 
240 
 
activities may include regularly sending away water samples for testing to 
allocated government centres and sharing information with the wider 
community.  
b. Women may also oversee and aid in the planning of investment for the 
provision of water filter facilities at the more local level until wider issues of 
sewerage and pollution treatment can be addressed. Given the meagre 
resources in rural households, it is suggested that government filter plants be 
provided alongside a maintenance budget. Biogas may be further considered at 
the community level as a means to enable people to boil water prior to 
consumption.  
c. Women may further work with local government to apply for water tanks for 
household use. Again, a budget needs to be set aside for water and sanitation 
to enable women’s involvement and investment in such activities.  
It is forwarded that women’s role in water and sanitation is a more realistic and 
accepted role than the role forwarded at present in irrigation management. This is 
shown in the weak progress to date in this area and the fact that they report 
traditionally having little involvement in tubewell use, abiana, irrigation under the 
warabundi system, or watercourse maintenance.  
iii. The economic value of water: Paying for reliability 
a. Community level payments may be forwarded to improve the receipt of reliable 
and clean water piped water or to maintain water filtration plants, water tanks, or 
small reservoirs. At present, many communities already pay high amounts for 
drilling bore holes or operate tubewells, only to receive groundwater that is often 
unclean. They further travel long distances at times paying high transport costs to 
receive water from government filtration plants. It is forwarded that community 
payments towards the provision of piped water should be initially voluntary to 
ensure that costs are based on demand and ability to pay. It would also need to be 
ensured via monitoring of use that this water is not re-directed in large quantities 
for irrigation purposes.  
b. In poorer regions such as the coastal areas of Sindh or FATA, it is suggested that 
subsidies are provided whilst in more affluent areas, costs may be recovered. This 
condition is also forwarded in the case study of Huda (2005) in regards to 
Bangladesh. 
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iv. Participatory development: Water harvesting, water recycling, water conservation 
a. It is suggested that the participatory development of water resources focus on 
programmes for water conservation and filtering water for different uses. This will 
also aid in raising community capacity and awareness of technologies in these 
areas. It is suggested that funding is focused on locations where water resources 
are deemed to be at risk and therefore where there is strong motivation on the part 
of communities to develop alternative means of water collection and water saving. 
It is further suggested that such schemes are carried out in areas where rainwater 
harvesting is feasible, or where groundwater resources are present but polluted/ 
contaminated. 
b. Participation in surface water management will heavily depend on the strength of 
landlord influence and needs to be assessed from area to area.  
c. It is suggested that further steps are taken to lay the groundwork for future 
participation between irrigation officials and communities. This could be in the 
way of information provision, providing a first-point-of-contact, and improving 
transparency. Information provision may include notice of expected variations in 
irrigation timetabling as soon as this becomes available. Community relations and 
subsequent levels of participation may also be improved by having clear lines of 
accountability between officials and via the provision of a first-point-of contact. 
Information on abiana rates should also be widely published outside government 
buildings and community centres. This would improve the negotiating power of 
farmers and also reduce levels of distrust within communities over the sharing of 
information in this regard. 
 
Despite the ongoing water crisis, changes in the mindsets that drive Pakistan’s water 
management institutions may take more than a decade to achieve. Such changes are likely to 
correlate with the relative growth of industry and urban areas as a new foundation for 
government power. Changes may also require reforms to the current electoral system to 
enforce the notion of individual voting and the secret ballot rather than outdated practices 
such as block voting or family voting blocks. This has significant implications for the 
feasibility of implementing IWRM. It must further be recognised that change needs to be 
driven from within the country rather than by external funding for inflexibly applied 
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frameworks that have to date yielded very shallow and even negative results for Pakistan’s 
farmers.  
In light of these findings, it is recommended that the programme of IWRM be restructured in 
Pakistan. The new institutions need to be merged with the old institutions and the focus 
shifted from replacement to capacity building. In this regard, salaries also need to be 
reviewed to limit motivation for corruption at all levels. New limitations on land ownership 
by members and immediate family members of high-ranking professionals working in water 
and agricultural institutions could also be considered to curtail conflicts of interest. Actors 
from the new and old system further need to be brought together to improve institutional 
accountability and cooperation. The old system needs to evolve over time with guidance and 
support rather than being blamed as part of the problem and expected to support its own 
replacement. Much capacity building needs to focus on improving financial transparency and 
the introduction of technology such as realtime software for the better scrutiny of water 
allocations. Such softwares can also be utilised to improve transparency and and cost 
efficiency. It is clear that many pathways can be taken to improve the current application of 
IWRM in the country. The policy’s future success will depend on donor flexibility and the 
ability to win over political support at all levels. It is hoped that this study will contribute to 
the development of a more realistic and informed approach in respect to Pakistan’s ongoing 
battle with the politics of water management. 
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Annex	I:	Key informant interview	questionnaire/	prompt	sheet	
Irrigation	Department	
1. What is the scale and type of water problems you are facing? 
 
2. Why do you have these problems? Are they related to underfunding or the small price of 
abiana? Water stealing and landlord influence? Weak monitoring and enforcement e.g. of 
groundwater use? Poor management by farmers or departments? A failure to change ways of 
working post-colonial era? 
 
3. What benefits you may get if there is good coordination between irrigation department and 
PIDA? Do you share information? Are you involved in FO formation? Do you provide 
technical advice? Is PIDA helping your job or making it more challenging? 
 
 
4. If there are organized and active farmers associations/organizations at local level do they help 
to solve water problems or make them worse? How? 
 
 
5. What are the challenges in the functionality of FOs? E.g. avenue for landlord influence? Short 
tenure of FO leaders meaning they lack capacity? 
 
6. Do you feel that the FO system has been imposed on Pakistan from external donors? Do you 
think they fully understand how the specific challenges confronted in Pakistan? 
 
 
7. Do you think there is any realistic role for women in water institutions and irrigation 
management?  
 
 
8. What are Pakistan’s options are for future water policy, is the situation getting worst or 
better? 
 
9. Why you think that 2025 national water policy is delayed? Why is it so controversial here in 
Pakistan? (it was first developed in 2002) 
 
 
10. Do you think that 1991 water accord needs renegotiating, is it being properly applied? Do you 
think the accord is valid given Pakistan’s water problems? 
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11. Do you agree that Pakistan had one of the lowest water productivity in the world? Why do 
you think this is? No culture of water conservation? Wastage? Overwatering? Seepages? Is 
our open irrigation system not suited to our hot environment? 
 
 
12. How you are managing the massive budget gaps and are they increasing? Are you able to 
carry out the same level of maintenance works are previously e.g. in canal lining? 
 
13. What do you think about integrated water resource management as a policy? Do you think it 
is realistic that all departments will work together with communities for water management? 
 
 
14. Pakistan is now one of the most water scarce countries in the world. How is your department 
tackling the water scarcity problem? Any projects? Specific measures? News ways of 
working in light of how serious the problem is becoming? 
 
15. How your department tackling water salinity and waterlogging? Are these getting worse of 
better due to flooding and maintenance situation? 
 
Agriculture	Department		
1. What percentage of areas in your district have problems with waterlogging/ salt water 
intrusion 
 
2. Is it illegal to grow certain types of crops within areas of the district e.g. rice due to 
the high water usage and damage to soil, if it is how is this monitored 
 
3. Are there significant problems with water shortages? 
 
a. In your view, have these problems got worse or better over the past 10 years? 
Please describe the reasons 
 
4. What percentage of the district which is affected by salinity? 
 
5. Do you believe this problem is getting worse? 
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6. What do you think is causing this problem? 
 
7. Do you believe that your department has enough resources to adequately support 
farmers with the problems they are facing?  
 
a. What further actions could be taken? E.g. training on most suitable crop types 
for changing water levels and salinity, subsidies, rental of gypsoms 
 
8. Have there been petitions or protests in your area due to water problems or perceived 
problems with the management of water?  
 
a. Mention in Thatta the hunger strikes by farmers in Badin, what do officials 
think about the perceived injustices in water distribution? 
 
9. Have you noticed changes in the types of crops grown in the district due to water 
problems?   
 
a. Have people altered their livelihood activities e.g. more in wage labour, more 
communities/families migrating, more fisheries, or small businesses 
 
 
10. We understand that significant financial resources have been placed into SIDA in 
recent years to improve cooperation in water management. Do you think the existence 
of SIDA has improved lessened, or made no change in water management in your 
area? Reasons 
 
11. Are you actively working with SIDA to combine resources to combat problems in the 
management of water or do you work better with the Irrigation Department? 
 
12. Do you believe that SIDA encourages or reduces corruption through the formation of 
farmer organisations?  How? 
 
13. Do you believe that farmer organisations formed under SIDA are effective? How? 
 
14. Do you believe that you work more or less closely with Departments for Water 
management now than 10 years ago? How? Why? 
 
15. Were you involved in the programme of integrated water resource management 
implemented in Sindh and Punjab in 2002 to improve cooperation between the 
Agriculture and Irrigation Department?  
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a. (if yes, please obtain any documentation) 
 
16. How do you think that water management for agriculture in your district could be 
further improved? 
 
17. Please let us know if you have any further comments, documentation in the way of 
maps or articles they can provide which they believe will be helpful 
 
 
FGD	questionnaire/	Prompt	sheet	
Rapport Building 
We are here to ask you about the water management issues and how irrigation systems have 
been changed and what are the effects on the production by these changes. How have you 
adopted and what are your initiatives. 
Would you like to talk in Urdu or Punjabi/ Saraiki/ Sindhi? 
Permission to record interview for analysis 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------- 
Have you all been residing in your area all your life? (Far How long have you been residing 
here?) 
 
How have forms of irrigation changed since they have been living here? (How irrigation has 
changed with the passage of time, means how it was before and how is it now? You would have 
heard from your ancestors or would have seen by yourself. It seems that now canal is a source 
for irrigation, what was before? What was the situation since beginning? 
 
What type of water resources are you using?  
 
What type of crop they are you growing in this area? Any changes in crop type? Yield? 
 
How are you transporting the water?  
And who collects the water for household?  
Who is opening and closing water outlets if they are getting it from canals? Who is responsible 
for cleaning and who is responsible for operating tubewells in household? (men or women) 
 
Has your land been affected by waterlogging/salinity/water shortages?  
How long water remains on land?  
What is causing the these problems? (water stealing, poor maintenance etc) 
 
Are there any chemicals in groundwater?  
What about the soil quality? Is it same?  
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Are you practicing the soil conservation practices?  
 
Have you been informed of this by the irrigation department? 
 
Any problems with the payment of abiana? 
 
Who is responsible for maintaining the canal infrastructure?  
Are they maintaining it well?  
Who collects the water tax for maintaining the water canal?  
Is it the transparent system? Do they have problems with it?  
 
What are your priorities in term of water usage? Is it irrigation, or livestock or household?  
Are you facing increase cost for obtaining clean water?  
 
Can you prioritize the threats you face to water supply?  
 
Is there high competition for water or increasing competition?  
 
Are people turning into other livelihood strategies?  
What is the condition of groundwater?  
 
Are there any adaptation activities in the way of water conservation, technology, or greater 
community cooperation over water resources. 
 
Do you receive support from government or any other NGO? (Have Government  
 
Have you changed your income source as a result? Any trend has been noticed in this area? 
Are livelihoods getting more difficult?  
 
What actions do you ideally want the government take to resolve water problems?  
Are you cooperating with each other due to these problems?  
In what way?  
 
Do you wish to include any other issue that they think we have missed?  
 
Words of thanks 
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Annex	II:	Institutional	questionnaires	
 
Institutional Assessment of Farmer Organizations 
Name of Canal System: ___________________________________________ 
Name of Distributary Canal: _______________________________________ 
Date of Survey: _________________ Name of Surveyor: _______________________ 
Name of Interviewees: ____________, Place of Interview ______________________ 
Basic Information on Distributary Canal 
What is the estimated length of the 
distributary canal? 
 
__________ km 
What is the number of villages within 
the command area of the distributary 
canal? 
 
Number of villages: _____________ 
What is the size of the Cultivable 
Command Area? 
 
__________ acres 
What is the number of Gross command 
area 
_____________acres 
What is the number of minor canals? Number of minor canals: ________ 
What is the total number of 
mogha/outlets 
 
Number of mogha/outlets: ________ 
What is the estimated number of 
landowners within the command area of 
the distributary? 
Number of landowners: ________, Number of 
female land owner:___________Number of 
Tenant/land less:__________ 
What is the estimated number of 
tubewells (Public /Private) installed 
within the command area of the 
distributary? 
 
 
 
Number of installed tubewells: ________ 
Have rehabilitation works carried out 
on the distributary canal? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, in which year(s) Year(s): ___________ 
q If YES, did farmers contribute 
to the costs of the rehabilitation works? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, how: 
_____________________________ 
Khal Panchayats 
Have Khal Panchayats been formed at 
watercourse level? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes (continue with subsequent 
questions) 
In which year(s) were the Khal 
Panchayats formed? 
 
Year(s) ________________ 
Have the Khal Panchayats been formed 
on all watercourses? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, why not? ¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no tell the reason 
q Are the female members of the 
Khal Punchyat? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
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q Do you think woman can play 
role in the Khal Punchyat? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
¨ Cultural barrier 
¨ Lack of education 
¨ No recognized role of woman in irrigation 
¨ Man dominant society 
¨ No legal protection 
¨ Other 
 
If yes, what will be the role 
 
¨ Convince their men on payment of Abiana 
¨ Conflict resolution (through men) 
¨ Control in water theft (through men) 
¨ Accountability of KP 
¨ Other 
 
For how many years are the members of 
the Khal Panchayats elected? 
 
Number of years: _________ 
Do Khal Panchayats organise meetings 
with the farmers? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how many meetings 
each year? 
 
Number of meetings: __________ 
q If YES, what are the topics 
discussed during the meetings? 
 
q Khal Punchyat keep the record 
of the meeting 
If no, then how communicate the decision and people 
accept the decision? 
What are the main functions of the Khal 
Panchayats? 
¨ Distribution of canal water among farmers 
¨ Maintenance of the watercourse 
¨ Resolution of water-related disputes 
¨ Assisting in assessment of Abiana 
¨  Assisting in Abiana Collection 
¨ Other(s), specify: ____________________ 
General farmers are aware of the Khal 
Punchyat 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, satisfaction level 
Farmers’ Organizations 
In which year was the FO established? Year: ___________ 
In which year was the FO registered? Year: ___________ 
Do farmers have to pay a membership 
fee in order to become FO member? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, amount: Rs 
_______________________ 
Has the FO signed an IMT Agreement 
with the AWB/PIDA? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, in which year was the 
IMT Agreement signed? 
 
Year: ___________ 
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General Body 
Who are the members of the FO 
General Body? 
¨ All landowners    ¨ Khal Panchayat Chairmen 
¨ Other(s), specify: _____________________ 
How many male and female members 
does the FO General Body have? 
Number of male members: _______ 
 
Number of female members: _______, if no the 
reasons:___________ 
Do you think woman can play role in 
the FO? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
¨ Cultural barrier 
¨ Lack of education 
¨ No recognized role of woman in irrigation 
¨ Man dominant society 
¨ No legal protection 
¨ Other 
 
If yes, what will be the role 
 
¨ Convince their men on payment of Abiana 
¨ Conflict resolution (through men) 
¨ Control in water theft (through men) 
¨ Accountability of FO 
¨ Other 
 
 
Any representation from the tenant ¨ No         ¨ Yes, reason in case of no: 
How many meetings did the FO 
General Body have in 2013? 
 
Number of meetings: _______ 
How are the members of the FO 
General Body informed about the date, 
time and venue of the next meeting? 
¨ Written invitation    ¨ Verbally 
¨ Other(s), specify: 
_________________________________ 
Who is responsible to inform the 
members of the FO General Body about 
the next meeting? 
¨ President    ¨ Management Committee members 
¨ Manager    ¨ FO Assistant    ¨ AWB/PIDA 
¨ Other(s), specify:___________________ 
Are minutes prepared of each FO 
General Body meeting? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, who is responsible for 
preparing the minutes of meeting? 
 
Management Committee 
How many male and female members 
does the FO Management Committee 
have? 
Number of members: _______ 
 
Number of female members: _______ 
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How frequently does the FO 
Management Committee have a 
meeting? 
¨ Weekly    ¨ Two-weekly    ¨ Monthly    ¨ 
Quarterly 
¨ Annually 
How many meetings did the 
Management Committee have in 2013? 
 
Number of meetings: _______ 
How are the members of the 
Management Committee informed 
about the date, time and venue of the 
next meeting? 
¨ Written invitation    ¨ Verbally 
¨ Other(s), specify: _______________________ 
Who is responsible to inform the 
members of the Management 
Committee about the next meeting? 
¨ President    ¨ Management Committee members 
¨ Manager    ¨ FO Assistant    ¨ AWB/PIDA 
¨ Other(s), specify: _____________________ 
Are minutes prepared of each 
Management Committee meeting? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, who is responsible for 
preparing the minutes of meeting? 
 
Executive Staff 
Has the FO employed any executive 
staff? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes (continue with next questions) 
Which executive staff are employed by 
the FO? 
¨ Manager    ¨ FO Assistant    ¨ Revenue 
Assistant 
¨ Patwari, number: _______  ¨ Beldar, number: 
_________ 
¨ Gauge reader, number: _______ 
¨ Office clerk/computer operator    ¨ Chowkidar 
¨ Other(s), specify: _____________________ 
Which staff have been provided by 
PIDA/IPD on deputation? 
¨ Manager    ¨ FO Assistant    ¨ Revenue 
Assistant 
¨ Patwari(s)    ¨ Beldar(s)    ¨ Gauge reader(s) 
¨ Other(s), specify: _____________________ 
FO Office and Equipment 
Does the FO have an office? ¨ No         ¨ Yes (continue with next questions) 
How has the FO obtained the office 
building? 
¨ Purchased    ¨ Rented    ¨ Provided by 
AWB/PIDA/IPD 
¨ Other, specify: _______________________ 
Does the FO have any office furniture? ¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how has the FO 
obtained the office furniture? 
¨ Purchased    ¨ Rented    ¨ Provided by 
AWB/PIDA/IPD 
¨ Other, specify: _______________________ 
Does the FO have a computer with 
printer? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how has the FO 
obtained the computer? 
¨ Purchased    ¨ Provided by AWB/PIDA/IPD 
¨ Other, specify: _______________________ 
267 
 
Does the FO own any means of 
transport? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, which means of 
transport? 
¨ Bicycle, number: _____    ¨ Motorcycle, number: 
______ 
¨ Car, number: ______ 
¨ Other(s), specify: ____________________ 
q If YES, how has the FO 
obtained their means of transport? 
¨ Purchased    ¨ Provided by AWB/PIDA/IPD 
¨ Other, specify: _______________________ 
Does the FO own any equipment and/or 
machinery for the O&M of the 
distributary? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, which type of 
equipment and/or machinery? 
 
q If YES, how has the FO 
obtained the O&M equipment and/or 
machinery? 
¨ Purchased    ¨ Provided by AWB/PIDA/IPD 
¨ Other, specify: ______________________ 
Does the FO have any means of 
communication? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, which means of 
communication? 
¨ Mobile phones    ¨ Radio Telegram 
¨ Other(s), specify: ___________________ 
q If YES, how has the FO 
obtained their means of 
communication? 
¨ Purchased    ¨ Provided by AWB/PIDA/IPD 
¨ Other, specify: 
___________________________________ 
Record Keeping: 
Does the FO maintain records? ¨ No         ¨ Yes if no why 
¨ Lack of capacity 
¨ Lack of staff strength 
¨ Record was not given by PIDA/AWB 
¨ Not aware of its roles and responsibilities 
¨ No check and balance on FO 
¨ Other 
Please specify which particular record 
is not maintained by FOs 
 
¨ Minutes of the meeting 
¨ Daily gauges of the distributary 
¨ Crop assessment 
¨ Abiana collection 
¨ Other 
Action taken by PIDA/AWB for lack of 
record keeping  
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
 
¨  No legal power to take action 
¨  FOs has political support 
¨  Does not aware of it responsibility 
¨ Other 
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In case of yes, what action took place? 
 
¨ Issuance of warning letter 
¨ Imposed penalty/fine 
¨ Temporary suspension of water supply 
¨ Other 
FO received all the record of the 
distributary?  
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
 
q If YES, which records are 
maintained? 
¨ Warabandi register    ¨ Farmers/Voters list 
¨ Landownership record    ¨ Minutes of meeting 
¨ Abiana assessed    ¨ Abiana collected 
¨ List of defaulters ¨ Account of late payment 
fine(s) 
¨ Dispatch – Receipt record    ¨ FO decisions 
¨ Follow up of the 268decision 
¨ Other record(s), specify: ________________ 
Financial Management 
Has the FO opened a bank account? ¨ No         ¨ Yes 
Is an Annual Budget prepared? ¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, who is responsible for 
the preparation of the Annual Budget? 
¨ Manager   ¨ FO Assistant   ¨ President  ¨ 
Treasurer 
¨ Other(s), specify: ____________________ 
Are (quarterly and/or annual) financial 
statements prepared? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, who is responsible for 
the preparation of the financial 
statements? 
¨ Manager   ¨ FO Assistant   ¨ President  ¨ 
Treasurer 
¨ Other(s), specify:______________________ 
Are the financial records and accounts 
audited annually? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
Does the FO have a Reserve Fund? ¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how much money has 
been deposited in the Reserve Fund? 
 
Rs ________________ 
Operation of Distributary Canal 
Design discharge of the 
distributary:__________cusec 
FO getting its due share; ¨ No         ¨ Yes, reasons 
in case of no:____________________and informed 
AWB:________ 
Is the water flow at the head of the 
distributary/ canal measured? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
If no why 
¨ Gauges are not installed 
¨ Lack of competency 
¨ No check and balance on FOs to monitor their 
activities 
¨ Not aware of it roles and responsibilities 
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¨ Other  
q If YES, what is the frequency? ¨ Daily  ¨ Every 2 or 3 days   ¨ Weekly   ¨ Two-
weekly 
¨ Other, specify: ______________________ 
q If YES, who is responsible for 
flow measurement? 
¨ AWB/PIDA    ¨ FO    ¨ IMU 
¨ Other(s), specify: ____________________ 
Is the water flow in the distributary 
canal measured at other places? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, at how many places and 
where? 
Number: ______    Location: 
____________________________ 
Is an annual water distribution plan 
prepared for the distributary canal? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, who is responsible for 
the preparation of the annual 
rotational/water distribution plan? 
¨ IPD    ¨ PIDA    ¨ AWB    ¨ FO    ¨ IMU 
¨ Other(s), specify: ___________________ 
q Do the WUAs received the 
rotation plan? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
Who is responsible for the operation of 
the distributary canal? 
¨ IPD    ¨ PIDA    ¨ AWB    ¨ FO    ¨ IMU 
¨ Other(s), specify: ___________________ 
q If the FO is not responsible for 
the operation of the distributary canal, 
is the FO satisfied with the performance 
of the canal operator? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, why not?  
Is the actual supply of canal water to the 
watercourses recorded? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
Is available canal water equitably 
distributed along the distributary canal? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, why not? ¨ Design discharge of outlet is not available 
¨ FOs leaderships involve in water theft 
¨ No check and balance on FOs 
¨ Not aware of it roles and responsibilities 
¨ Lack of technical skill to achieve the equity 
¨ Political interference 
¨ Other  
What are the main problems regarding 
the operation of the distributary canal? 
 
Are the water users are satisfied on the 
equitable water distribution of water? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
Maintenance of Distributary Canal 
Is a maintenance inspection carried out 
along the distributary canal each year? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
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q If YES, who is responsible for 
executing the (annual) maintenance 
inspection(s)? 
¨ IPD    ¨ PIDA    ¨ AWB    ¨ FO    ¨ IMU 
¨ Other(s), specify: _______________________ 
Is an Annual Maintenance Plan 
prepared for the distributary canal? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, who is responsible for 
the preparation of the Annual 
Maintenance Plan? 
¨ IPD    ¨ PIDA    ¨ AWB    ¨ FO    ¨ IMU 
¨ Other(s), specify: 
_________________________________ 
Who is responsible for the execution of 
the maintenance and repair works along 
the distributary canal? 
¨ IPD    ¨ PIDA    ¨ AWB    ¨ FO    ¨ IMU 
¨ Other(s), specify: _______________________ 
q If FO is responsible for the 
execution of the maintenance and repair 
works, what are the implementation 
modalities? 
¨ Employed executive staff (i.e. beldars) 
¨ Hired daily laborers    ¨ Farmers (providing free 
labour) 
¨ Contractor(s) 
¨ Other(s), specify: _____________________ 
q If FO is responsible for the 
execution of the maintenance and repair 
works, has it been able to carry out all 
necessary maintenance and repair 
works? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
- If NO, why not? ¨ Design record (bed width & slope etc) is not 
available 
¨ Do not feel the need of maintenance work 
¨ Lack of funds 
¨ Lack of technical skill 
¨ No check and balance on FOs 
¨ Other 
q If FO is not responsible for the 
execution of the maintenance and repair 
works, is the FO satisfied with the 
quality of the maintenance and repair 
works carried out? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
- If NO, why not?  
What are the main problems regarding 
the maintenance of the distributary 
canal? 
 
What is the overall physical condition 
of the distributary canal? 
¨ Good    ¨ Moderate    ¨ Poor 
q If POOR, what are the main 
reason(s)? 
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q Are the KP/Common farmers 
are satisfied with the physical condition 
of the canal?  
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
Groundwater Monitoring 
Is the groundwater monitored in FO 
area? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, is the groundwater 
depth monitored? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, is the quality of 
groundwater monitored? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, who is responsible for 
monitoring the groundwater? 
¨ IPD    ¨ PIDA    ¨ AWB    ¨ FO    ¨ IMU 
¨ Other(s), specify: _______________________ 
q Groundwater monitoring is in 
the scope of FO? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes if no 
Will the FO monitor the groundwater? If yes, how; 
specify:_________________________________ 
 
Assessment and Collection of Abiana 
What was the Abiana rate for Rabi and 
Kharif crops respectively in 2013? 
Rs __________ for Rabi crops 
 
Rs __________ for Kharif crops 
Who is responsible for the assessment 
of the Abiana to be paid by individual 
farmers? 
¨ IPD    ¨ PIDA    ¨ AWB    ¨ FO    ¨ IMU 
¨ Other(s), specify: 
_________________________________ 
Who is responsible for the collection of 
the Abiana among the farmers? 
¨ IPD    ¨ PIDA    ¨ AWB    ¨ FO    ¨ IMU 
¨ Other(s), specify: _____________________ 
What was the total amount of the 
assessed Abiana for Rabi 2012-13? 
 
Rs __________________ 
What was the total amount of the 
collected Abiana for Rabi 2012-13? 
 
Rs __________________ 
What was the total amount of the 
assessed Abiana for Kharif 2013? 
 
Rs __________________ 
What was the total amount of the 
collected Abiana for Kharif 2013? 
 
Rs __________________ 
What are the sanctions for late payment 
of Abiana? 
¨ Fine, specify: ______________________ 
¨ Cessation of water supply 
¨ Other(s), specify: _____________________ 
What are the sanctions for non-payment 
of Abiana? 
¨ Fine, specify: _______________________ 
¨ Cessation of water supply 
¨ Other(s), specify:____________________ 
Is the 50% share of the (collected) 
Abiana sufficient to finance all 
necessary operational and maintenance 
costs? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
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q If NO, what is the estimated 
shortage in %? 
 
% shortage: _____________ 
q Who are the main defaulters? Office bearer__________ 
Common farmers__________, other:__________ 
What are the main problems regarding 
the assessment and collection of 
Abiana? 
¨ No penalty on defaulters 
¨ FOs leadership make the personal use of Abiana 
amount  
¨ Lack of technical staff 
¨ Political interference 
¨  No check and balance 
¨ FO does not realize it responsibility 
¨ Lack of awareness regarding the reform process 
¨ Poor integration of FOs at grass-root level 
¨ Other 
Conflict Resolution 
What are the most common water-
related disputes within the command of 
the distributary canal? 
¨ Water theft    ¨ Tampering of outlets    ¨ Illegal 
outlets 
¨ Causing damage to canal bank and/or structures 
¨ Other(s), specify: ___________________ 
How many disputes the FO had to 
resolve in 2013? 
 
Who is responsible to resolve water-
related conflicts reported to the FO? 
¨ President    ¨ Management Committee members 
¨ Manager    ¨ FO Assistant 
¨ Other(s), specify: ______________________ 
Are all water-related disputes recorded 
by the FO? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
Has the FO been able to resolve all 
water-related disputes satisfactory? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, why not? ¨ Political interference 
¨ Lack of awareness 
¨ Lack of record keeping 
¨ No integration at grass root level 
¨ No check and balance on FO 
¨ Other 
If FO is unable to resolve a water-
related dispute, to whom the case shall 
be referred? 
¨ AWB    ¨ PIDA    ¨ IPD    ¨ Police    ¨ Court 
¨ Other(s), specify: ____________________ 
Any water court working?   
Level of satisfaction of common 
farmers about the water disputes? 
Satisfied:_____, Unsatisfied:_______ 
Training 
Have the members of the FO General 
Body received any training? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
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q If YES, in which topics and for 
how many days? 
 
q If YES, who has provided 
training for members of the FO General 
Body? 
¨ AWB    ¨ PIDA    ¨ IPD 
¨ Other(s), specify: ______________________ 
Have the members of the FO 
Management Committee received any 
training? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, which members of the 
FO Management Committee have 
received training in which topics and 
for how many days? 
¨ President:______________________________ 
¨ Vice President: _________________________ 
¨ Secretary: ____________________________ 
¨ Treasurer: ____________________________ 
¨ Executive Members: ____________________ 
q If YES, who has provided 
training for members of the FO 
Management Committee? 
¨ AWB    ¨ PIDA    ¨ IPD 
¨ Other(s), specify: ______________________ 
Have executive staff members received 
any training? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, which executive staff 
members have received training in 
which topics and for how many days? 
 
 
¨ Manager: ___________________________ 
¨ FO Assistant: ________________________ 
¨ Revenue Assistant: ___________________ 
¨ Patwari: ___________________________ 
¨ Beldar(s): __________________________ 
¨ Gauge Reader(s): ___________________ 
¨ Other(s): __________________________ 
q If YES, who has provided 
training for the executive staff of the 
FO? 
¨ AWB    ¨ PIDA    ¨ IPD 
¨ Other(s), specify: ____________________ 
Is the FO satisfied with the quality of 
the training provided? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, why not?  
Does the FO need more training? ¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, in which subjects?  
q If YES, who will the FO request 
to provide training? 
¨ AWB    ¨ PIDA    ¨ IPD 
¨ Other(s), specify: ___________________ 
q If YES, who will pay for the 
provision of training? 
¨ AWB    ¨ PIDA    ¨ IPD    ¨ FO 
¨ Other(s), specify: ___________________ 
 Transparency and Accountability in the System 
Is there any need to make the FO more 
transparent and accountable?  
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if yes why 
 
¨ More user’s satisfaction 
¨ Client’s satisfaction 
¨ Achieve the objectives of reform 
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¨ Replication of results at large scale 
¨ Other 
 
¨ Do you think there is transparency 
and accountability within the FO 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
¨ Lack of legal protection 
¨ No one take the responsibility 
¨ Political interference 
¨ Lack of awareness among the FO’s leadership 
¨ No check from AWB/PIDA 
¨ Other 
q Is there any specific areas that 
required  transparency 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if yes specify the area and why 
 
¨ Equitable water distribution 
¨ Abiana collection 
¨ Conflict resolution 
¨ Maintenance work of the distributary 
¨ Other 
q Do think all office –bearers 
should be accountable? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes if no, who is more accountable 
and why 
¨ President 
¨ Vice President 
¨ Secretary 
¨ Treasury 
¨ Other 
q Who should be responsible for 
the accountability of FOs 
¨ Common farmers 
¨ KP’s office bearers 
¨ AWB 
¨ PIDA 
¨ PID 
¨ Other 
q How the accountability process 
can be initiated? 
¨ Make amendments in the existing rules and 
regulations 
¨ Formulation of accountability committee at FOs 
level 
¨ Formulation of accountability committee at AWB 
¨ Formulation of accountability committee at PIDA 
¨ Other 
 
 
Miscellaneous 
FO knows about their roles and 
responsibility? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
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q Coordination Level between FO 
and Nehri Punchyat? 
¨ Good, ¨ Poor, Reason for Poor 
q Coordination Level between FO 
and IMU? 
¨ Good, ¨ Poor, Reason for Poor 
q Coordination Level between FO 
and Khal Punchyat 
¨ Good, ¨ Poor, Reason for Poor 
q Coordination Level between FO 
and PIDA 
¨ Good, ¨ Poor, Reason for Poor 
q Coordination Level between FO 
and PID 
¨ Good, ¨ Poor, Reason for Poor 
q Coordination Level between 
PIDA and PID 
¨ Good, ¨ Poor, Reason for Poor 
q Female participation in the 
meeting 
¨Yes, ¨ No if no why 
 
¨ Do not give importance to woman role 
¨ Poor social mobilization in the area 
¨ Cultural barrier 
¨ Lack of legal protection 
¨ Others 
q Females concerns are addressed ¨ Yes, ¨ No if no why 
 
¨ Lack of woman representation 
¨ Less importance to women issues 
¨ Lack of awareness 
¨ No one is responsible 
¨ Other 
 
q Sufficiency of the legal 
framework for the functioning of the 
FOs 
¨ Yes, ¨ No, 
 
Suggestion for Improvement:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------- 
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Institutional Assessment of Khal Panchayat 
Name of Main Canal System: __________  Name of Distributary System: _________ 
Name of FO: ______________ Name/Number  of Khal Panchayat: ________________ 
Date of Survey: _________________ Name of Surveyor: ____________________ 
Location: (Head/Middle/Tail)_____________________________ 
Names of Participants with designation: ____________________________ 
Basic Information on Watercourse 
What is the estimated length of 
watercourse? 
 
Length: ______________ metres 
How many villages have land in 
command area of watercourse? 
 
Number: ___________ 
What is the size of Cultivable 
Command Area of the watercourse? 
 
______________ acres. 
What is the total number of farmers on 
watercourse? 
 
Number: ___________ 
What is the number of female 
landowners? 
 
Number: ___________ 
Has the watercourse been lined under 
OFWM Project? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, in which year?  
Formation of Khal Panchayat (KP) 
When was the KP formed? Year: ___________ 
What is the number of elected male and 
female KP members? 
Number of male members: ___________ 
Number of female members: ___________, if female 
is not selected, specify the reasons 
 
Do you think woman can play role in 
the Khal Punchyat? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
¨ Cultural barrier 
¨ Lack of education 
¨ No recognized role of woman in irrigation 
¨ Man dominant society 
¨ No legal protection 
¨ Other 
 
If yes, what will be the role 
 
If yes, what will be the role 
¨ Convince their men on payment of Abiana 
¨ Conflict resolution (through men) 
¨ Control in water theft (through men) 
¨ Accountability of KP 
¨ Other 
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Women views and concerns are 
captured? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if yes how; 
¨ Individual Meeting with female 
¨ Group Meeting with females 
¨ Joint Meeting with men 
Usually what are the women views ¨ Shortage of water supply 
¨ Job opportunity for women 
¨ Education for the girl 
¨ Lack of health facilities 
¨ Other 
Are there any criteria regarding the 
composition of the KP? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, which criteria? ¨ Each biraderi must represented 
¨ Farmers from tail reach must be represented 
¨ Small farmers must be represented 
¨ Any other, specify: ____________________ 
In which reach of the watercourse does 
the KP Chairman have land? 
¨ Head     ¨ Middle      ¨ Tail 
How much land does the KP Chairman 
own? 
 
_______________ acres 
When was the last election held?  
Year: ___________ 
Do the female landowners cast their 
votes? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
 
How did female landowners cast their 
votes? 
 
 
Who is/are the KP’s representative(s) in 
the General Body of the FO? 
 
Do farmers have to pay membership 
fee? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes Amount Rs 
________________ 
Do farmers have any regular saving 
system? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
Does KP have Bank account? ¨ No         ¨ Yes Deposited Rs: ____________ 
Criterion of leaderships selection ¨ Location of his land (Head, Middle, Tail) 
¨ Big land lord 
¨ Bradri/caste representation 
¨ Influential in the area 
¨ Active in the collective actions 
¨ Educated 
¨ Other 
Meetings 
Does the KP organise regular meetings 
with all farmers? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
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q If YES, how frequently does the 
KP have general meetings? 
¨ Weekly   ¨ Two-Weekly   ¨ Two-weekly  ¨ 
Quarterly 
q If YES, where are the meetings 
held? 
 
 
q If YES, how are farmers 
informed about date, time and venue? 
 
q If YES, who is responsible to 
inform the farmers about the meetings? 
 
q If YES, what are the main topics 
discussed in the meeting? 
¨ Cleaning of watercourse 
¨ Assessment and collection of Abiana 
¨ Water theft 
¨ Water-related disputes 
¨ Other issue(s), specify: __________________ 
q If YES, do female landowners 
attend the meetings? 
¨ No    ¨ Yes 
q If YES, do members of kammi 
braderi (lower social status) attend the 
meetings? 
¨ No    ¨ Yes 
Are minutes of the meetings prepared? ¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, who is responsible to 
record the minutes? 
 
When was the last general meeting 
held? 
 
Record Keeping: 
Does the KP maintain records? ¨ No         ¨ Yes if no why 
¨ Lack of capacity 
¨ Lack of staff strength 
¨ Record is not provided by AWB/PIDA 
¨ Not aware of its roles and responsibilities 
¨ No check and balance  
¨ Other 
q If YES, which records are 
maintained? 
¨ Warabandi register    ¨ Farmers/Voters list 
¨ Landownership record    ¨ Minutes of meeting 
¨ Abiana assessed    ¨ Abiana collected 
¨ List of defaulters ¨ Account of late payment 
fine(s) 
¨ Despatch – Receipt record    ¨ FO decisions 
¨ Other record(s), specify: _________________ 
Please specify which particular record 
is not maintained by KP 
q  
¨ Minutes of the meeting 
¨ Daily gauges of the distributary 
¨ Crop assessment 
¨ Abiana collection 
¨ Other 
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q Action taken by PIDA/AWB/FO 
for lack of record keeping  
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why 
 
¨  No legal power to take action 
¨  Political interference 
¨  Does not aware of it responsibility 
¨ Other 
In case of yes, what action took place? 
 
¨ Issuance of warning letter 
¨ Imposed penalty/fine 
¨ Temporary suspension of water supply 
¨ Other 
Training  Activity  
q Does the KP attended any 
training 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if yes on what aspects 
¨ Record Keeping 
¨ Finance Management 
¨ Conflict Resolution 
¨Organizational Development 
¨Flow Measurement 
¨Other 
Supply of Water: 
Is the watercourse receiving the 
sanctioned amount of canal water? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, why not?  
Has the supply of canal water to the 
watercourses improved following the 
signing of the IMT Agreement by the 
FO? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how?  
q If NO, why not?  
What were the most common water-
related conflicts before the signing of 
IMT Agreement by FO? 
¨ Water theft    ¨ Tampering of moghas 
¨ Breaches/damage of canal bank 
¨ Other(s), specify: _______________________ 
Has the number of water-related 
disputes reduced after the signing of 
IMT Agreement? 
 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, why not? ¨ No check and balance  
¨ Political interference 
¨ Lack of legal protection 
¨ Lack of technical skill 
¨ Not aware of it duties 
¨ Other 
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Assessment and Collection of Abiana: 
What is the current Abiana rate for Rabi 
and Kharif crops respectively? 
Rs_______________ for Rabi crops 
 
Rs_______________ for Kharif crops 
Who is responsible for the assessment 
of the Abiana to be paid by individual 
farmers? 
¨ IPD         ¨ PIDA    ¨AWB         ¨ FO     
¨ Other(s) specify: 
_________________________________ 
Who is responsible for the collection of 
the Abiana among the farmers? 
¨ IPD         ¨ PIDA    ¨ AWB       ¨ FO     
¨ Other(s) specify: ______________________ 
If the KP Chairman is responsible for 
the collection of the Abiana, is he paid 
for providing this service? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how much does the KP 
Chairman receive? 
 
Rs ____________________ 
What was the total amount of the 
assessed Abiana for Rabi 2012-13 along 
watercourse? 
 
Rs ____________________ 
What was the total amount of the 
collected Abiana for Rabi 2012-13 
along watercourse? 
 
Rs ____________________ 
What was the total amount of the 
assessed Abiana for Kharif 2013 along 
watercourse? 
 
Rs ____________________ 
What was the total amount of the 
collected Abiana for Kharif 2013 along 
watercourse? 
 
Rs ____________________ 
What are the sanctions for late payment 
of Abiana? 
¨ Fine, specify: _________________________ 
¨ Cessation of water supply 
¨ Other(s) specify: _____________________ 
What are the sanctions for non payment 
of Abiana? 
¨ Fine specify: _________________________ 
¨ Cessation of water supply 
¨ Other(s) specify: ______________________ 
Does the KP receive a bonus if the 
Abiana recovery is at least 90% on due 
date? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, what is the bonus?  
Is there any relief in Abiana in case of 
crop failure? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, what is the relief?  
 
What are the main problems regarding 
the assessment and collection of 
Abiana? 
¨ Lack of accountability 
¨ Political interference 
¨ Lack of interest of FO 
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¨ Lack of social mobilization 
¨ Miss use of power 
¨ Other 
 
Does the KP collect other cash 
contribution from the farmers? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, for which purpose(s)  
Common Action: 
Do farmers participate in cleaning of 
watercourse? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, how is the watercourse is 
cleaned? 
 
 
Do farmers participate in desilting of 
the distributary/minor? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how many days? Number of days: ____________ 
q If no, what will be the penalty 
for not providing free labour? 
 
 
Are farmers involved in other collective 
activities? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, what type of activities? ¨ Saving and credit scheme 
¨ Purchase of agricultural inputs 
¨ Hiring of agricultural machinery/equipments 
¨ Marketing    ¨ Grazing of livestock 
¨ Harvesting and/or processing    ¨ Community 
tubewell 
¨ Other(s), specify: _____________________ 
Conflict Resolution: 
Who is responsible for resolving water-
related conflicts reported to KP? 
 
How many disputes did the KP resolve 
in 2013? 
 
Number: ____________ 
Has any dispute been referred to the 
FO? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, why?  
Has the FO been able to resolve all 
water related disputes satisfactorily? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, why not? ¨ Lack of check and balance 
¨ Dis-interest of KP’s leadership 
¨ Not aware of it responsibility 
¨ Lack of dispute record/registration 
¨ Political interference 
¨ Other 
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If FO is unable to resolve a water-
related dispute, to whom the case shall 
be referred? 
¨ AWB    ¨PIDA    ¨IPD    ¨ Police    ¨Court              
¨ Other(s), specify: ___________________ 
Tubewells: 
How many tubewells have been 
installed in CCA of watercourse during 
last 10-20 years? 
 
How many of the installed tubewells are 
operational? 
 
What is the quality of groundwater? ¨ Good (fresh)    ¨ Moderate (brackish)   ¨ Poor 
(saline) 
Has the quality of groundwater changed 
during last 5 – 10 years? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, what has changed?  
 
Are owners of tubewells selling water 
to the farmers? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how much do they 
charge per hour? 
 
Rs ___________ per hour 
Are there any problems with 
waterlogging? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how many acres are 
affected? 
 
_________ acres 
q If YES, has the waterlogged 
area increased or decreased during last 
5 – 10 years? 
 
Are there salinity problems? ¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, how many acres are 
affected? 
 
_________ acres 
q If YES, has salinity increased or 
decreased during last 5 – 10 years? 
 
Is there any regulation/control of the 
use of groundwater? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If YES, what are the rules?  
q If YES, who have formulated 
them? 
 
 
q If YES, are these rules applied ¨ No         ¨ Yes 
q If NO, is regulation/control of 
groundwater use required? 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, why? 
q Level of interaction with the 
FOs 
¨ Weekly        ¨ Monthly  ¨ Half yearly      ¨ 
Annually 
q Are the common farmers are 
satisfied with the performance of KP 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why-----------------------------
--------------- 
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q Are the office-bearers of KP 
know their roles and responsibility 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if no why-----------------------------
--------------- 
q Any hurdle in the performance 
of tasks of KP’s leaderships 
¨ No         ¨ Yes, if yes what is hurdle 
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 Institutional Assessment of Area Water Board (AWB)  
 Membership of AWB 
Q1. How many are the members of AWB? (No)____________ 
Q2. What is the membership selection Criterion? 
i) Location of canal (H,M,T), ii) Farm size, iii) Political personality, iv) Other__________ 
Q3. Are the women members of AWB? ¨ Yes         ¨ No 
If no, why 
¨ Lack of social mobilization 
¨ No recognition of woman role in irrigation 
¨ Cultural barrier 
¨ Lack of education 
¨ Other 
Q4. Do you think woman role is necessary for the following? 
¨ Water distribution 
¨ Canal maintenance 
¨ Conflict resolution 
¨ Address the woman problems 
¨ Other 
Q 5.Do the members of AWB know their roles and responsibilities? ¨ Yes         ¨ No if no 
why¨ Lack of social mobilization 
¨ Lack of check and balance 
¨ Dis-interest  
¨ Lack of capacity building 
¨ Other 
 
 
Q6. Are you satisfied with the performance of Member? 
 
¨ Yes         ¨ No if no why 
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¨ Mis-use of powers 
 
¨ Give preference to personal work 
 
¨ Lack of accountability 
 
¨  Political interference 
 
¨ Lack of technical skill 
 
¨ Lack of awareness 
 
¨ Other 
 
 
2. Meetings of AWB 
Q7. Does the AWB organize regular meeting? ¨ Yes         ¨ No 
Q8. Frequency of meeting, ¨ Monthly  ¨ Quarterly 
Q9. When was the last meeting held? ¨ Yes         ¨ No 
Q10. No. of member attended the meeting? ________ 
Q11. What were the decisions of the meeting? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________  
Q12. What actions were taken to implement the decision? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________  
Q.13. Do the AWB held meeting with the FOs? ¨ Yes         ¨ No 
If yes, when the last meeting held? ____________and No of FOs participated_______Issues 
discussed?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
3. Training to AWBs  
Q14. Do the trainings held for AWBs? ¨ Yes         ¨ No 
If yes, how many training were organized? ___________and on what topic the trainings were 
given? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________  
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Q15. Are you satisfied with the training? ¨ Yes         ¨ No 
If no why  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________  
4. Complaints Received by FOs 
Q16. Do the complaint received by FOs?    ¨ Yes         ¨ No 
If yes, number of complaints received_____________and what were the issues  
¨ Less water supply 
¨ Lack of implementation on warabandi/rotational plan 
¨ Lack of capacity building 
¨ Lack of record availability 
¨ Other 
 
Q17. How the complaints were addressed? 
¨ Fulfill the water demand 
¨ Implementation on warabandi/rotational plan 
¨ Initiation of capacity building activities 
¨ Provide the required data 
¨  Other 
5. Rules and Regulations 
 
Q18. Does AWB have rules and regulations for its operation?  ¨ Yes         ¨ No 
 If yes, please specify 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
Q19.Do you think these are sufficient for the smooth functioning of the organization?  
 
¨ Yes         ¨ No 
 
If no, where do you find the deficiency?  
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_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
 
6. Transparency and Accountability  
 
Q20. Do you think transparency and accountability is existed in AWB? 
 
 
¨ Yes         ¨ No if no why 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
Q21. Do you think the transparency and accountability is required here? 
 
¨ Yes         ¨ No if yes why 
 
¨ Prevent the miss-use of power 
 
¨ Leaderships perform their roles and responsibilities 
 
¨ Achieve the equity in water distribution 
 
¨ Make the reform process more sustainable  
 
AWB’s Constraints 
1. Political Influence 
2. Lack of Funds 
3. Lack of legal support 
4. Lack of capacity building 
5. Lack of coordination with PID/PIDA & FOs 
6. Others 
 
8. Suggestions for Improvement 
 
1. Timely availability of funds 
2. Capacity building of AWB  
3. Legal backing of the Reform process 
4. Desire Cooperation from PID/PIDA/FOs 
5. Accountability and Transparency in the system 
6. Others 
 
Name of AWB’s member_______________________Place of Interview______________ 
 
 
Name of interviewer________________________Signature_________________________ 
